Judgement Appeal (No. 24 of 1923) from a decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner (July 18, 1921) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Bahraich (March 22, 1921). The appellants and their father (respondent No. 6) formed a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara. The suit was brought by the appellants on June 23, 1920, to set aside a sale, made by their father on June 3, 1893, of an ancestral village; they alleged that the sale was made without necessity. The respondent-defendants Nos. 2 to 5 were descendants of the purchaser, who with them had been in possession since the date of the sale. The defendants, while denying the facts alleged, pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation. 82 Law. Rep. 52 Ind. App. 69 ( 1924- 1925) Ranodip Singh V. Parmeshwar Pershad 183 The plaintiff-appellants Nos. 1 and 2 were born before the date of the sale, but Nos. 3 and 4 were born later—namely, No. 3 in 1897 and No. 4 in 1900. By the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Sch. I., art. 126, the period of limitation for a suit by a Hindu to set aside his fathers alienation of ancestral property is twelve years, which run from the date when the alienee takes possession of the property. Both Courts in India held that the suit was barred by limitation. 1924. Oct. 27. Dube for the appellants. Having regard to ss. 6 and 7 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, the suit was brought within time so far as plaintiff No. 4 was concerned; no valid discharge could be given by the other plaintiffs Zamir Hasan v. Sundar (( 1899) I. L. R. 22 A. 199.), following Govindram v.Tatia (( 1895) I. L. R. 20 B. 383.) ; Ganga Dayal v. Manx Ram (( 1908) I. L. R. 31 A. 156.),differing from Vigneshwara v. Bapayya. (( 1893) I. L. R. 16 M. 436.) The cases cited were decided under the Limitation Act, 1877, in which s. 8 corresponds with s. 7 in the Act of 1908. The elder brothers could not ratify their fathers alienation so as to affect the rights of plaintiff No. 4 Kandasami Asari v. Somaskanda Ela Nidhi. (( 1910) I. L. R. 35 M. 177.) No suit was necessary to set aside the sale; the suit should be regarded as one for possession governed by art. 144. The elder brothers could not ratify their fathers alienation so as to affect the rights of plaintiff No. 4 Kandasami Asari v. Somaskanda Ela Nidhi. (( 1910) I. L. R. 35 M. 177.) No suit was necessary to set aside the sale; the suit should be regarded as one for possession governed by art. 144. The decision in Ram Tewary v. Luchmun Pershad (( 1867) 8 Suth. W. R. 15.) relied on below was under the Limitation Act of 1859 and was therefore not applicable. So far as it was held in that case that no new cause of action arose upon the birth of another member of the joint family, it was erroneously decided. [Reference on that point was made to Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachhpal (( 1913) L. R. 40 I. A. 213, 221.) ; Venkata Row v. Tuljaram Row (( 1921) L. R. 49 I. A. 91, 98.); and Maynes Hindu Law, para. 342.] The respondents did not appear. Nov. 17. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR LAWRENCE JENKINS. This is an appeal from a decree dated July 18, 1921, of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, affirming a decree dated March 22, 1921, of the Subordinate Judge of Bahraich. The suit out of which the appeal arises was instituted on June 23, 1920, by the four sons of the sixth defendant, Thakur Prithi Singh, claiming possession of the village described in the plaint. The plaintiffs and their father are a joint Hindu family governed by the law of the Mitakshara, and it is the plaintiffs case that the village is the ancestral property of the joint family. On June 3, 1893, the plaintiffs father purported to sell the village to Manjee Ram, who is represented in this suit by his descendants, defendants Nos. 1 to 5. The seventh defendant claims as a mortgagee from defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 5. The plaintiffs contend that the sale is not binding on them, as it was not made for legal necessity, and on this ground they claim a decree for possession. Of the many issues framed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge it is only necessary to consider whether the suit is barred by limitation, and for this purpose the dates at which the several plaintiffs were born become important. Of the many issues framed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge it is only necessary to consider whether the suit is barred by limitation, and for this purpose the dates at which the several plaintiffs were born become important. Ranodip Singh, plaintiff No. 1, was born on August 23, 1886 ; Kali Bakhsh Singh, plaintiff No. 2, on 82 Law. Rep. 52 Ind. App. 69 ( 1924- 1925) Ranodip Singh V. Parmeshwar Pershad 184 August 4, 1891 ; Sitla Bakhsh Singh, plaintiff No. 3, on October 1, 1897 ; and Patmeshuri Bakhsh Singh, plaintiff No. 4, on November 30, 1900. It will thus be seen that the first and second plaintiffs were in existence at the date of the sale, but the other two plaintiffs were born after its completion. The time from which the period of limitation began to run has throughout been treated as June 3, 1893, on the assumption that the alienees then took possession of the property within the meaning of art.126 in the first schedule to the Indian Limitation Act. 1908. The prescribed period of twelve years from this date expired in 1905, but the plaintiffs contend that limitation is saved by s. 7 of the Limitation Act, read with ss. 6 and 8. These sections so far as material are in these terms— "6(1).Where a person entitled to institute a suit .... is at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned a minor ....he may institute the suit ....within the same period after the disability has ceased as would otherwise have been allowed from the time prescribed therefor in the third column of the first schedule. “7. Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit ....is under any such disability and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person time will run against them all; but where no discharge can be given time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or. until the disability has ceased. “8. until the disability has ceased. “8. Nothing in s. 6 or in s. 7 ....shall be deemed to extend for more than three years from the cessation of the disability ....of the person affected thereby the period within which any suit must be instituted." It is conceded that the suit would not be saved by these sections if brought by the first three plaintiffs alone; but it is contended that the fourth plaintiff is entitled to the extended period for which the sections provide, and that the suit is therefore not barred by limitation. Both the Courts in India have decided adversely to this contention. The cause of action arose on June 3, 1893, and it is from that date that the period of limitation is to be reckoned. The fourth plaintiffs subsequent birth on November 30, 1900, did not create a fresh cause of action or a new starting point from which limitation should be reckoned. To the contention that by the cited sections the period of limitation is extended for three years from the cessation of the fourth plaintiffs minority the answer is that by their express terms this extended period can only be claimed by a person entitled to institute the suit at the time from which the period of limitation is to be reckoned. The fourth plaintiff does not come within this description, for at that time he was not in existence. He, therefore, is not entitled to the three years extension, and his suit is consequently barred. Their Lordships will accordingly humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal ought to be dismissed.