Judgement Petition for special leave to appeal from an order of the High Court at Lahore (April 4, 1924) confirming a conviction of the petitioner for murder and sentence of death passed upon him by the Sessions Judge. The following facts appeared from the petition The petitioner was tried at the Court of Sessions with six others upon a charge of having committed dacoity in company with one Misri and others, in which dacoity two persons were shot and in consequence died, and of having thereby committed an offence under s. 396 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner and five of the other accused were convicted and sentenced to death. Law. Rep. 52 Ind. App. 121 ( 1924- 1925) Umra V. King-Emperor 220 At the trial evidence was admitted, after objection, of a statement made by Misri to the police in the course of their investigations. The statement contained full details of the crime, and implicated the persons charged as well as Misri himself. After the statement had been made Misri, while attempting to escape from custody, was shot by the police and died. The statement was admitted in evidence at the trial under s. 32, sub-s. 3, of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as a statement made by a deceased person which would have "exposed the person making it to a criminal prosecution or to a suit for damages." Upon appeal to the High Court (Sir Shadi Lal C.J. and Fforde J.) it was contended that only those parts of the statement which affected Misri himself were admissible under the above sub-section. That contention was rejected, it being held that the whole of the statement, so far as it referred to or explained the part which Misri himself admitted having taken in the crime, was admissible against such of the accused as he named. Both learned judges, however, were of opinion that the evidence other than that contained in the statement established the guilt of the convicted persons beyond any reasonable doubt. 1924. Oct. 24. Sir George Lowndes K.C. and Wallach for the petitioner. Misris confession was not admissible in evidence against the petitioner. Had Misri been alive at the trial the confession would have been excluded by the Indian Evidence Act, s. 25, and by the Criminal Procedure Code, s.162. 1924. Oct. 24. Sir George Lowndes K.C. and Wallach for the petitioner. Misris confession was not admissible in evidence against the petitioner. Had Misri been alive at the trial the confession would have been excluded by the Indian Evidence Act, s. 25, and by the Criminal Procedure Code, s.162. Under s.32, sub-s.3, of the Evidence Act the statement was admissible only so far as it would have exposed Misri himself to proceedings. The provision in sub-s.3 is based upon the confirmation derived from self-interest, and it should not be applied where self-interest does not exist. The objections to extending the sub-section to include the circumstances of this case are manifest. The wrongful admission of the evidence resulted in a substantial denial of justice, and the petitioner should be granted special leave to appeal Vaithinatha Pillai v. The King-Emperor. (( 1913) L. R. 40 I. A. 193.) Kenworthy Brown for the respondent. The learned judges in the High Court were of opinion that the evidence other than that contained in Misris statement clearly established the petitioners guilt. It is not shown that there was any miscarriage of justice. Even if the statement was wrongly admitted that in itself does not entitle the petitioner to special leave. [Reference was made to Dal Singh v. The King-Emperor (( 1917) L. R, 44 I. A. 137.); Ibrahim v. The King. (( 1914) A. C. 599, 617.)] Sir George Lowndes K.C. replied. At the conclusion of the arguments their Lordships dismissed the petition, intimating that their reasons would be delivered at a later date. Nov. 17. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD DUNEDIN. This is a petition for special leave to appeal against a sentence of death pronounced on the petitioner by the Sessions Judge of Shahpur and confirmed by the High Court at Lahore. The petitioner, with others, organized a robbery in the house of a moneylender. They broke into the house at night and took ornaments, money and other things from the wife who was in the house (the moneylender himself being absent). Other persons arriving on the scene, two of the gang stationed on the roof fired shots and killed two persons. The conviction pronounced against the petitioner and four others was for the murder of these persons. Law. Rep. 52 Ind. App. Other persons arriving on the scene, two of the gang stationed on the roof fired shots and killed two persons. The conviction pronounced against the petitioner and four others was for the murder of these persons. Law. Rep. 52 Ind. App. 121 ( 1924- 1925) Umra V. King-Emperor 221 One Misri, one of the party, made a statement to the police, in which he detailed the incidents of the robbery and incriminated the various accused, including the petitioner. The admission of this statement was objected to by the vakil for the petitioner, but it was admitted by the Sessions Judge, and this admission was confirmed by the High Court. The ground for the present application is that the admission of the statement was clearly wrong, and that the improper admission of this evidence amounted to a grave injustice and a violation of the principles of natural justice, and especial reference was made to the case of Vaithinatha Pillai v. The King-Emperor. (L. R. 40 I. A. 193.) Their Lordships find that in the judgment of the High Court one of the learned judges, while dealing with the point as to the admission of the evidence, expressed himself thus " I do not suggest that in the present case the statement of Misri is essential to the conviction, as I am satisfied that the rest of the evidence on the record establishes the guilt beyond any reasonable doubt." The other learned judge agreed with these remarks. In view of this it seems to their Lordships out of the question that leave to appeal should be granted, as to do so would be to turn this Board into a Court of criminal appeal, a position which it has been again and again explained the Board will not assume. But, in view of the judgments given and the argument raised thereon, their Lordships feel constrained to add something more. The question of the admissibility of the evidence turned entirely on the interpretation of certain sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act. According to the view taken of these sections the evidence was or was not admissible. The question of the admissibility of the evidence turned entirely on the interpretation of certain sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act. According to the view taken of these sections the evidence was or was not admissible. Now, although if there has been any departure from the ordinary rules of procedure such as to amount to a denial of ordinary justice, of which an illustration is given in Vaithinatha Pillai v. The King-Emperor (L. R. 40 I. A. 193.); their Lordships will interfere; yet where the matter depends upon the particular view taken of sections of an Indian Act their Lordships could not say that to assert that upon those sections the judges had come to a wrong conclusion is tantamount to saying that there has been substantial and grave injustice done. Even, therefore, if there had not been the expression of opinion above quoted that the other evidence was sufficient, their Lordships would not have held that the so-called miscarriage of justice in respect of a wrong interpretation of the sections—as to the proper interpretation, their Lordships have not formed and express no opinion—is such as to bring the case within the rules laid down in In re Billet (( 1887) 12 App. Cas. 459.), and insisted upon in subsequent cases. Their Lordships are, therefore, unable to advise the Sovereign to grant special leave to appeal.