Sir John Edge:- This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from a decree of the High Court at Allahabad, dated the 13th July, 1921, which reversed a decree of an Addi tional Subordinate Judge of Gorakhpur, dated the 24th April, 1918. The family to which the parties to the suit belonged is a Hindu family which is governed by the law of the Mitakshara. The following pedigree shows how the parties to the suit are connected with each other, but in reading the pedigree as printed, it must be read from the right of the reader to his left. Sheo Narain was the eldest son of Bal Krishna Rai and of his seven younger brothers, Durga Prasad was the youngest :- The suit in which this appeal has arisen was brought by Jag Prasad and Ram Jas Rai against Mt. Singari, the widow of Gaya Prasad, who died childless, for possession, or a declaration that the plaintiffs are entitled to the possession of property of which Gaya Prasad died possessed on the allegation that they and Gaya Prasad were, when he died, mem bers of a joint Mitakshara family. Bal Krishna had eight sons who are shown in the pedigree, and he with his eight sons, when they were all living, constituted a Mitakshara joint family. The family was possessed of several villages and other property. The family lived at Sonchiraiya which was the principal ancestral village. Their Lordships do not know when Bal Krishna, died, but he died several years before 1892. Indarjit, who was the third son, died in 1882, Sriram, Ram Dhan and Durga Prasad, who were the sixth, seventh and eighth sons, died before 1892. All the eight sons had married and had a ton or sons who were living in 1892. In 1892 the family agreed that Sheo Narain, who was the eldest son of Bal Krishna, should partition the joint family property into eight equal shares. The intention of such a partition obviously was that there should be a separation of the family into eight families, each representing one of the eight sons of Bal Krishna and his descendant or descendants and joint within itself. In their Lordships' opinion the effect of that agreement was that the previous joint family separated into eight families. There upon Sheo Narain in 1892 partitioned the joint property into eight shares. In their Lordships' opinion the effect of that agreement was that the previous joint family separated into eight families. There upon Sheo Narain in 1892 partitioned the joint property into eight shares. The parties to the agreement were not satisfied that the eight shares into which Sheo Narain had partitioned the property were equal in value, and on the 3rd January, 1895, the following persons, describing themselves as Nand Lal Rai, Chhatarpal Rai and Sheo Ratan Rai, sons of Bal Krishna Rai deceased; Nageshar Prasad Rai, Rambaran Rai and Mahadeo Prasad Rai, sons of Durga Rai, deceased, Brijraj Rai and Gajraj Rai, sons of Sri Ram Rai, deceased; Shami Nath Rai, son of Ram dhan Rai, deceased ; and Ram Jas Rai, son of Indarjit Rai, deceased appointed three arbitrators to make the partition in eight equal shares of the property in Sudar tahsil, district of Gorakhpur, and other tahsils. One of the three arbitrators died before an award was made and thereafter the co-sharers who were patties to the agreement of the 3rd January, 1895 exe cuted on the 18th February, 1896, an agreement by which they appointed the two surviving arbitrators and another man in the place of the deceased arbitrator, as arbitrators to partition the property in eight equal shares. The agreement of the 18th February, 1896, contained the follo wing authority and directions to the arbi trators :- "The said arbitrators becoming unanimous should conscientiously take down the evidence on oath of each party on every point, examine the quality of every land on the spot, and at their pleasure amend or not amend the map and the lots prepared by Sheo Narain Rai, arbitrator. The arbitrators should in the lot which they may form include bonds, mortgage-deeds, decrees, cows, bullocks, etc., the property of all sorts in the districts of Azamgarh and Gorakhpur and Nepal ilaqa (which has been omitted) equalising the value. The arbitrators should separate the share of all the 8 persons. Each party will be liable for payment of revenue of the share which will be allotted to him in a particular village. If any bond or any property is found to be the ex clusive property of any party, his statement may be taken down on oath and the same may not be partitioned. The arbitrators should mark out the land forming the share of each party. If any bond or any property is found to be the ex clusive property of any party, his statement may be taken down on oath and the same may not be partitioned. The arbitrators should mark out the land forming the share of each party. Each party is at liberty to carry on his business either separately or jointly. Whatever may be the deci sion of the arbitrators about all sorts of expenses shall be valid. The parties would accept the award of the arbitrators unanimously arrived at on the points mentioned above, and no party shall deviate from it, but if any party deviates, his objection shall not be entertainable by the Court. The arbitrators are competent in every way to do what they like. All of us, the executants, shall be bound by the award which all the three arbitrators will make unanimously. The arbitra tors should allot equally unculturable and dihat lands and fruit and timber trees of all sorts to each co-sharer. They are at liberty to alter or uphold the lots mentioned above. They should make chaks of productive and unproductive lands equalising their value. As regards the lots to be prepared by the present arbitrators, all of us, the executants, agree that if on account of any previous act, the whole or part of the lot of any party be disturbed in some way, all of us, the executants, shall be responsible therefor and shall make it up from our respective share. As re-regards the rights of all of us,the holders of 8 thoks whatever the arbitrators will determine and record, the same shall be accepted by us. We, the executants, representing the 8 thoks, shall accept whatever the award the arbitrators will make unanimously about the property of all sorts belonging to us. Nobody will raise any ob jection, and if he raise any, it shall not be enter tainable by this Court. Hence we have executed this agreement so that it may be of use in time of need. " Dated 18th February, 1896." Their Lordships would infer from that agreement that the parties to it or some of them had, although the family had separ ated, been carrying on some business joint ly as partners. Hence we have executed this agreement so that it may be of use in time of need. " Dated 18th February, 1896." Their Lordships would infer from that agreement that the parties to it or some of them had, although the family had separ ated, been carrying on some business joint ly as partners. Before the arbitrators made their award, Sheo Narain and his brother Nand Lal had agreed to re-unite together, and they made an application to the arbi trators that two shares should be dealt with in the award as one undivided share. Their Lordships quote paragraph 5 of the award which was made as showing what that application was. It is as follows :- " (5) Out of the holders of 8 lots, Sheo Narain Rai, the former arbitrator, prepared a lot in his name and another in that of Nand Lal Rai se parately and gave different colours in the map in accordance therewith. Now both these persons apply and make statement on oath that both of them are joint in the entire business connected with the village and Court and are joint in mess, that a single lot of the entires movable and im movable property may be drawn up for both of them at the time of partition or that both the lots may be joined in one and represented by one colour, and that subsequently both of them, or their heirs, will get the entire moveable and im moveable family property partitioned half and half either by mutual consent or through Court, when they will choose to do so. Hence, as desir ed by both the persons, their lots were joined in one, but they will be represented by former colours." In compliance with that application the arbitrators allotted to Sheo Narain and Nand Lal two out of the eight shares which they partitioned to Sheo Narain and Nand Lal as one joint share. The arbitra tors made their award on the 19th De cember, 1896. The High Court and the Subordinate Judge came to concurrent findings, that the award effected a separation of the joint family. In their Lordships' opinion the joint family had separated when they agreed in 1892 that Sheo Narain should partition the joint property in eight shares and that there was no agreement between the co-parceners to continue to be a joint family. In their Lordships' opinion the joint family had separated when they agreed in 1892 that Sheo Narain should partition the joint property in eight shares and that there was no agreement between the co-parceners to continue to be a joint family. The question thus arises whether Chhatarpal, his son Jag Prasad and Ramjas, ever agreed with Gajraj Rai and his son Gaya Prasad to re-unite as a joint family. It has been contended on behalf of the plaintiffs appellants that those persons did agree to re-unite, and that they had agreed to re-unite before the arbitrators made their award. If there was a re-uniting, it was for the plaintiffs to prove it. In Balabux Ladhuram v. Rukhmabai (1908) 30 Cal 725 : 30 IA 130 : 7 CWN 642 : 5 Bom LR 469 : 8 Sar 470 was distinctly held by the Board that, when co-paroeners in a Mitakshara family had separated, an agreement to re-unite must be proved like any other fact, and that, if not proved, they remain separate. Some doubts were entertained as to the effect of that decision and it was contend ed in Hari Bakhsh v. Babu Lal AIR 1924 PC 126 : 5 L 92 : 51 IA 163 : 22 ALJ 254 : 26 Bom LR 1108 : 28 CWN 953 : 5 LR PC 113 : 47 MLJ 938 : 20 MLW 406 : (1924) MWN 650 : 34 MLT 70 (PC) that it meant that when brothers who were co parceners separated, their separation neces sarily involved that the sons of one of those brothers had separated from each other. In Han Bakhsh v. Babu Lal AIR 1924 PC 126 : 5 L 92 : 51 IA 163 : 22 ALJ 254 : 26 Bom LR 1108 : 28 CWN 953 : 5 LR PC 113 : 47 MLJ 938 : 20 MLW 406 : (1924) MWN 650 : 34 MLT 70 (PC) the Board disposed of that contention and pointed out what Lord Davey meant by the judgment of the Board which he deli vered in Balabux Ladhuram v. Rukmabai (1908) 30 Cal 725 : 30 IA 130 : 7 CWN 642 : 5 Bom LR 469 : 8 Sar 470 as to a reuniting of a separated family. Referring to the plaintiff's contention that an application was made to the arbi trators by Chhatarpal, Ramjas, Brijraj and Gujraj Rai to have three shares allotted to them jointly on the ground that they had reunited, but that the arbitrators had not acceded to their request, their Lordships discussed the parol evidence about the matter and held that such evidence did not prove the contention. Then their Lord ships proceeded as follows. Their Lordships will now consider the other documentary evidence, but before doing so they may state that on the evid ence in the record they have come to the conclusion that the members of the family who had moved from Sonchiraiya to Shikargarh and had lived there in one house, carried on business as partners, but not as co-parceners of a joint family, as money-lenders and in the cultivation of sir and khudkasht lands, and they may observe that entries in khewats and other similar village papers showing that the shares of co-owners have been specific, afford by themselves no proof that the owners were members of a joint Mitakshara family or had separated. See Rewa Prasad Sukal v. Deo Dutt Ram Sukal (1900) 27 Cal 515 : 27 IA 39 : 4 CWN 582 : 2 Bom LR 658 : 7 Sar 653 which was an appeal from the Central Provinces ; and Nageshar Bakhsh Singh v. Gunesha AIR 1920 PC 46 : 42 All 368 : 47 IA 57 : 38 MLJ 521 : 18 ALJ 532 : 22 Bom LR 596 : 28 MLT 5 : 7 OLJ 43 : 23 OC 1 (PC) which was an appeal from Oudh. Their Lordships will also observe that in their opinion payments jointly of Govern ment Revenue, Taxes, Income-tax and such like payments do not by themselves indicate that the parties making such pay ments were joint or separate, the parties may have been carrying on business as partners and not as Hindu co-parceners. For the same reason the fact that money had been lent on mortgages, or had been applied in the purchase of property, does not by itself indicate that the money was or was not the separate money of Hindu co-parceners. For the same reason the fact that money had been lent on mortgages, or had been applied in the purchase of property, does not by itself indicate that the money was or was not the separate money of Hindu co-parceners. The books of account of a joint family would, if produced, show whe ther the moneys or payments had been ad vanced or paid from a joint Hindu family fund or from a partnership fund. The fact that two or more Hindus had a banking account does not by itself prove that the moneys received by the bank were moneys of a Hindu joint family or Hindus who were partners in farming or other business. Not one of the documents in this case which has been brought to the attention of their Lordships, proves either that the moneys mentioned were or were not the moneys of a joint Hindu family. [Referring to the non-production of the accounts of the alleged joint family their Lordships observed :- ] The books of account would have shown whether the accounts, which must have been kept, were the accounts of a joint family or of a partnership. The non-pro duction of any of those books of account has not been satisfactorily explained by or on behalf of the plaintiffs, and their Lord ships draw inference that if they were produced they would not support the case of the plaintiffs. Their Lordships will now refer to two documents on the record which, in their opinion, afford crucial evidence that the case of the plaintiffs is a false case, and that there never was a reuniting after 1892 of Chhatarpal and Ramjas with Brijraj and Gajraj. [After discussing the evidence their Lord ships held that the family never re-united after separation and in the end, their Lord ships dismissed the appeal with costs.]