JUDGMENT 1. These are appeals in suits filed on judgments obtained in the Colombo Court against a partnership whose members were the defendants or their predecessors-in-interest. The lower Court has found that the partnership did not submit to the jurisdiction of the Colombo Court, but as against some of the defendants there was jurisdiction because they individually submitted to that jurisdiction. It has been held in Ramanalhan Chettyar v. Kalimuthu Pillay 18 Ind. Cas. 189 : 37 M. 163 : 24 M.L.J. 619 and also in Janoothassan v. Mahamad Ohuthu 82 Ind. Cas. 425 : 47 M. 877 : 47 M.L.J. 356 : 20 L.W. 677 : (1925) A.I.R. (M.) 155, that the execution of the power-of-attorney authorising an agent to conduct litigation in a Foreign Court is a submission to jurisdiction. In the present case, it is clear from the deed of partnership and from the power of-attorney by one of the managing partners Exs. H and J that the holder of the power was authorised to file suits, to defend suits and to carry on all manner of proceedings in the Courts in Ceylon. It is suggested for the respondents that these documents were not in force at the time these suits were filed, because the partnership has been dissolved. The only evidence we have on this point is the statement of the plaintiff that he thinks that the partnership was dissolved at about the time of the riots and the statement of the 2nd defendant that the business of the firm ended in 1914, but the 2nd defendant adds, "I did not authorise my partners there to contest the suits in Ceylon", thus implying that there was a parnership existing. On this evidence it is quite impossible to come to the conclusion that the partnership had been dissolved at the date on which the suits were filed. The mere fact that the partners ran away to India on account of the riots in Ceylon does not, as the Subordinate Judge remarks, terminate the partnership and in the absence of any other evidence that the partnership was terminated, we must hold that this deed of partnership and the power-of-attorney were in full force on the date of the suits. There is also an additional circumstance which would possibly give the Ceylon Court jurisdiction and that is the fact that the defendants firm actually filed suit in the Ceylon Court and having come in as plaintiffs can hardly be allowed as defendants to deny the jurisdiction which they themselves invoked and in this connection I would refer to a judgment in Second Appeal No. 1492 of 1920 (not reported). The question whether the plaintiff obtained an assignment of the decrees benami for the defendants firm was raised and contested in the Ceylon Court and consequently that finding is now conclusive under Section 13 of the C.P.C. 2. The respondents raised a further point that in a case in which there was no appearance, the decision cannot be said to have been upon the merits but this question has been fully discussed in Janoothassan v. Mahamad Ohuthu 82 Ind. Cas. 425 : 47 M. 877 : 47 M.L.J. 356 : 20 L.W. 677 : (1925) A.I.R. (M.) 155, to which one of us was a party and we are prepared to follow that decision again. 3. In the result the appeals must be allowed and there will be a decree in each case for the plaintiff as sued for with costs throughout.