JUDGMENT Dalal and Boys, JJ. - The procedure actually followed by the Judge was clearly adopted in an attempt to save public time and money, and counsel for the Appellants has wholly failed to prove, has almost even failed to suggest, that that procedure was protested against in any way whatever or at any stage whatever. There are, however, only two methods provided by law for conducting a trial or trials in such cases as these. Either the trials must be separate if the law requires them to be separate or they may be and ordinarily will be joint, if the law permits them to be joint, unless for some particular reason the learned Judge considers that the trials should be held separately. It is very dangerous and not in accordance with law for a Judge, with the very best intentions, to follow some procedure which is really neither one nor the other of the two procedures provided by law. * * * 2. We hold that these particular proceedings amounted in effect to a joint trial. A decision in every case of this nature must of necessity depend upon its particular facts. 3. The next question for decision is whether a joint trial was permissible in this case and the answer to this question depends upon the application of the law to the particular facts. Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure says in the material clauses of that section: "The following persons may be charged and tried together, namely (a) persons accused of the same offence com- mitted in the course of the same transaction; (b) persons accused of different offences com- mitted in the course of the same transaction. 4. It is clear that the accused committed the same offence, namely, an offence in each case u/s 193 of the Indian Penal Code. This point has not even been argued by counsel for the Appellants and it Gould not be argued. The only question then that remains is whether these offences were committed in the course of the same transaction. Here again the circumstances in different cases may vary to an infinite degree. This point has not even been argued by counsel for the Appellants and it Gould not be argued. The only question then that remains is whether these offences were committed in the course of the same transaction. Here again the circumstances in different cases may vary to an infinite degree. In the present case we find three accused persons, witnesses on the same side in a case of communal riot, all giving evidence on the same point and to the same effect, to prove the same fact, viz: the manner in which a certain man met his death. We have no hesitation in holding that this evidence in the case of the three witnesses was given in the course of the same transaction. When the facts are stated as we have above stated them, there is to our minds hardly room for argument. There was the most obvious identity of purpose and that alone in the circumstances of this case is, to our minds, sufficient. 5. We prefer the phrase "identity of purpose" to the phrase "community of purpose." The latter phrase is ambiguous in that it may mean only "identity of purpose" or it may suggest that the purpose of each was not only the same but was known to the others, or in other words, "conspiracy." We do not consider "conspiracy" in any way a necessary element, though, if it is present, its presence will be a further element supporting a finding that the offences were committed in the same transaction. It is clear that the framers of the Code of Criminal Procedure could never have had in mind the necessity for any proof of conspiracy before the terms of Section 239 could be applied. There is nothing requiring any element of conspiracy indicated by Section 239. Further, that section has been in the Code for a very large number of years, if not from its actual inception, and certainly long before Sections 120A and 120B were added to the Indian Penal Code. We have to look to Section 239, and to Section 239 only. If the several acts of the accused were committed in the same transaction there is an end of the matter; there can legally and properly be a joint trial. 6. We have to look to Section 239, and to Section 239 only. If the several acts of the accused were committed in the same transaction there is an end of the matter; there can legally and properly be a joint trial. 6. We may add that much confusion appears to us to have arisen in regard to this type of case owing to a failure to distinguish between different acts of the accused and different transactions. The act of each accused may be wholly independent of the act of the other and in that sense there may be no community whatever; but there may still be community of purpose in the sense of identity of purpose and the acts committed in the same transaction. In this case there cannot be a shadow of a doubt that there was identity of purpose, and further, in the circumstances of this case, no reasonable man could believe that there was not in fact also community of purpose in the sense of a conspiracy or prior consultation. In either view we are satisfied that the offences of the three accused were committed in the same transaction and that therefore u/s 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a joint trial was legal. The Appellants contend, and we have also held, that in effect the trial was a joint trial. 7. The appeals, therefore, fail and are dismissed.