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1925 DIGILAW 52 (SC)

AHMAD KHAN v. CHANNI BIBI

1925-07-28

AMEER ALI, DUFF, SIR JOHN EDGE, VISCOUNT FINLAY

body1925
Judgement Appeal (No. 74 of 1924) from a decree of the High Court (May 25, 1922) reversing in part a decree of the Subordinate Judge of the Attock District at Campbellpur. The parties were Mahomedans belonging to one of the agricultural tribes called the Khattar. The suit was brought by the respondent claiming as sister of Ali Waris Khan, who died in 1904, to succeed to the property which had descended to him from their father Mohamed Khan upon the death of the last survivor of the latters two widows. The plaintiff-respondent claimed under Mahomedan law, and while admitting that in the tribe there was a custom by which a sister or daughter was excluded from succession in favour of collaterals, alleged that that custom did not apply to self-acquired property. Both Courts in India found that part of the property claimed was self-acquired property. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit, but the High Court made a decree in the plaintiffs favour as to that portion of the property. The learned judges (Raoof and Qadir JJ.) were of opinion that the custom as alleged by the plaintiff was established by instances proved in evidence, although there was no certain evidence of mutation in accordance with the instances, and by statements made by witnesses in a previous suit relating to the tribe in question. 1925. July 2. De Gruyther K.C. and E. B. Raikes for the appellants. Abdul Majid for the respondent. July 28. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by MR. AMEER ALI This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the respondent Musammat Channi Bibi in the Court of the District Judge at Attock, for the establishment of her title in respect of certain lands which she claimed by right of succession to her deceased brother Ali Waris Khan. The parties both trace their descent from one Zulfikar Khan through his son Mahmud Khan. Mahmud had two wives, named respectively Sataro and Gohar Bano. By Sataro he had three sons, respectively named Ahmad Khan, Amir Khan and Mohamed Khan. By Gohar Bano he had also three sons named Khan Mulak, Baland Khan and Hidaya Khan. It is in evidence that Mohamed Khan died in 1902, leaving him surviving two widows Musammat Ilahi Khanam and Musammat Nur Jehan. The latter died in 1905. By Sataro he had three sons, respectively named Ahmad Khan, Amir Khan and Mohamed Khan. By Gohar Bano he had also three sons named Khan Mulak, Baland Khan and Hidaya Khan. It is in evidence that Mohamed Khan died in 1902, leaving him surviving two widows Musammat Ilahi Khanam and Musammat Nur Jehan. The latter died in 1905. By Ilahi Khanam, who lived until 1915, Mohamed Khan had a son, Ali Waris, and a daughter, the plaintiff in this case. Ali Waris died in 1904; and the litigation relates to his inheritance. The defendants are the descendants of the brothers and half-brothers of Mohamed Khan. The parties belong to one of the agricultural tribes of the Punjab, called the Khattar. The plaintiff, whilst admitting the existence in her tribe of a custom under which a daughter or a sister is excluded in favour of collaterals from inheritance in respect of "ancestral" property, denies its application to "self-acquired property." She states that there is no special or general custom prevailing in the Khattar tribe under which collaterals like the defendants deprive a daughter or a sister of the right of succession to property acquired by the father or brother. The defendants plead that by the custom prevailing in the tribe or in the family, females are excluded from succession irrespective of the character of the property whether it was ancestral or self-acquired. The parties went to trial on that issue. There are two properties in dispute, one called Surag Salar, the other Kharala. The senior Subordinate Judge of Attock, before whom the case came for trial, found as a fact that Surag Salar was "self-acquired property" within the meaning of the custom alleged by the plaintiff, and that Kharala, save and except 416 kanals of land, was "ancestral." But as regards the plaintiffs claim he held that she had failed for absence of specific instances to establish satisfactorily the custom under which she claimed her brothers inheritance. He accordingly dismissed her suit in respect of both the properties. The High Court of Lahore, on the plaintiffs appeal, have given her a decree in respect of Surag Salar and the 416 kanals of Kharala which appears to have been admittedly purchased by Mohamed Khan, and dismissed her suit regarding the ancestral village of Kharala. He accordingly dismissed her suit in respect of both the properties. The High Court of Lahore, on the plaintiffs appeal, have given her a decree in respect of Surag Salar and the 416 kanals of Kharala which appears to have been admittedly purchased by Mohamed Khan, and dismissed her suit regarding the ancestral village of Kharala. The appeal to this Board is by the defendants the collaterals who claimed the succession of Ali Waris in preference to Channi Bibi the sister. The two points that have been raised before their Lordships really form the kernel of the case. The first is does. Surag Salar, as has been found by the Courts in India, constitute in fact "self-acquired property" within the meaning of the custom alleged? The question whether Surag Salar was the "self-acquired" property of the plaintiffs father turns upon the construction of the revenue settlement which began in 1852 and was completed in the year 1863. The settlement was in fact made with Amir Khan and Baland Khan representing the two branches of Mahmud Khans family. The settlement papers make it perfectly clear that prior to the settlement of 1863, the family of Mahmud Khan had no right in Surag Salar. That about the close of the Sikh rule his sons had forcibly ousted another family that had been settled at Surag Salar for over forty years. As already stated they had no title in the property; they had installed themselves there by force, and on the establishment of British rule in the Punjab, when settlement proceedings were begun they applied for settlement with them on the strength of certain advances or payments they had made to the Sikh Government. The settlement proceedings lasted several years and concluded only in 1863. In the course of the proceedings a thorough inquiry was made as to title and possession. In the Punjab the settlement officer in the early days of British rule combined in his person both judicial and administrative functions. He had to investigate into the actual conditions of the occupation of lands in respect of which the settlement proceedings were instituted, and to give effect to ascertained facts in accordance with the result of his inquiry whether the occupation was by virtue of any right or title. He had to investigate into the actual conditions of the occupation of lands in respect of which the settlement proceedings were instituted, and to give effect to ascertained facts in accordance with the result of his inquiry whether the occupation was by virtue of any right or title. There can hardly be any dispute that whilst the settlement proceedings were proceeding Mahmud Khan had died, for the settlement was made with his sons. Before the settlement officer there were two parties arrayed against each other as claimants to the property of Surag Salar. Ghazan Khan represented the family which had been in possession of Surag Salar for over forty years. They were placed in the category of plaintiffs; whilst Amir Khan and Baland Khan representing the family of Mahmud Khan were the defendants. Both belonged to the tribe of Khattar. It is not necessary in this judgment to refer in detail to the proceedings which culminated in the settlement. [The judgment, after setting out passages from the robakar (exhibit F. 7) stating the result of the inquiry, and from the proceedings before the settlement officers (exhibit P. 8), continued as follows] The final decision of the settlement officer concerning the half share settled with Mahmuds family is contained in exhibit D. 39, as follows " The proprietors descended from Zulfikar Khan and Fateh Khan will collect the produce of the entire land, cultivated by them and by the tenants, distribute it among themselves according to the shares shown in the Khewat papers, and pay the Government revenue according to ancestral shares in addition to Rs.17 per cent, on account of cesses as under." In their Lordships judgment, the settlement officer, having regard to the conflicting claims of the plaintiffs on one side and of the defendants on the other, made an equitable division of the property between the two sets of claimants. The plaintiffs (Ghazans people) had the original title by long occupation; the defendants had ousted them to a considerable extent and had undertaken some liabilities in respect of the payment of revenue, etc. The settlement officer, therefore, came to the conclusion that it would be equitable to settle half of the lands with the descendants of Khazan Khan, who were the plaintiffs in the proceedings, and give the other half to the descendants of Zulfikar Khan. The settlement officer, therefore, came to the conclusion that it would be equitable to settle half of the lands with the descendants of Khazan Khan, who were the plaintiffs in the proceedings, and give the other half to the descendants of Zulfikar Khan. Surag Salar was thus in no sense ancestral property—it had not been acquired by their ancestor Zulfikar or Mahmud Khan and handed down to their successors. The settlement was effected in fact with Amir Khan and Baland Khan as representing the family of Zulfikar Khan and the title of proprietors was declared to be with them for the family. The direction contained in exhibit D. 39 shows the character of the settlement with the defendants family. Their Lordships are clearly of opinion that the judgment of the Subordinate Judge and of the learned judges of the High Court with regard to Surag Salar is right. As regards the custom in respect of which the two Courts in India have differed, their Lordships think the Subordinate Judge was in error in putting aside the large body of evidence on the plaintiffs side merely on the ground that specific instances had not been proved. They are of opinion that the learned judges of the High Court are right in holding that a custom of the kind alleged in this case may be proved by general evidence as to its existence by members of the tribe or family who would naturally be cognisant of its existence and its exercise without controversy. There is a large body of oral evidence establishing the custom, wholly unrebutted by the defendants, who have relied exclusively on the district riwaj-i-am. The judges of the High Court have commented on these documents, and their Lordships see no reason to differ from them. The judges of the High Court have referred to the evidence of Sirdar Mohammed Hyat Khan, a distinguished officer of the Government, which if admissible would be conclusive in the case; but it is urged by the appellants counsel that it cannot be put in evidence, as it is not in compliance with the requirements of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Their Lordships are not prepared to say that in the circumstances of the case it was erroneously admitted, but assuming it is inadmissible it forms only one item in the mass of evidence on which the plaintiff relied and which has been thoroughly examined by the High Court. On the whole evidence their Lordships are of opinion that this appeal should be dismissed, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. The appellants will pay to the respondent the costs.