JUDGMENT : KANHAIYA LAL and ASHWORTH, JJ.:— The judgement of the Court after setting forth the facts, thus continued: The defence, so far as it is material for the purpose of this appeal, was that the attachments were inoperative against the sale deed of the 19th of November, 1908, because they had been removed by a subsequent order passed by the court which made those attachments, striking off the execution proceeding on the 9th of February, 1909, and that the defendants appellants were in any case entitled to set up their mortgages of 1904 as shields against the claim of the plaintiffs for the possession of the mortgaged properties. Both these contentions were repelled by the court below and we do not consider that it is possible to take a different view on either of those matters. It appears that the attachments of the villages in question were made on the 14th of September, 1908. As certain standing crops had also been attached along with those properties, which were described as ancestral, the court proceeded at first with the sale of the standing crops, and on receiving a report that they had been sold and the sale proceeds had been realized, it struck off the execution proceeding in each case on the 9th of February, 1909, without taking any steps to proceed with the sale of the remaining properties which had been attached in the same proceeding. It does not appear from the order sheet whether those orders were passed in the presence of the decree-holder or his counsel. There was no order made requiring the deposit of the sale fees by the decree-holder in connection with the sale of the remaining properties. The execution proceeding was struck off in each case without regard to the impending attachment of the other properties and it is noticeable that in one of those orders the court significantly observes that the case was to be struck off from the pending file. Before the present Code was enacted there used to be some controversy as to the exact effect of an order striking off or dismissing an execution proceeding, and the question which that controversy raised affected the necessity or otherwise of a fresh attachment of the same property in a subsequent proceeding. Before the present Code was enacted there used to be some controversy as to the exact effect of an order striking off or dismissing an execution proceeding, and the question which that controversy raised affected the necessity or otherwise of a fresh attachment of the same property in a subsequent proceeding. That controversy was set at rest when order XXI, rule 57, of the present Code was enacted, which lays down that where any property has been attached in execution of a decree, but by reason of the default of the decree-holder the court is unable to proceed further with the application for execution, it shall either dismiss the application, or for any sufficient reason adjourn the proceeding to a future date, and upon the dismissal of such application the attachment-shall cease. The rule incorporated in the Code practically embodied the results of the decisions which had been arrived at by different courts as regards the effect of an order striking off an execution proceeding on an attachment made in that proceeding, and in substance what it lays down is that if the decree-holder has been in default in not taking the necessary steps to proceed further with the application for execution, and the court has to dismiss the proceeding, the legal result of such dismissal shall be that the attachment shall cease. That rule does not, however, apply to a case where a court strikes off an execution proceeding or consigns the record to the record room to suit its own convenience, or to reduce its pending file, without any default having been committed by the decree-holder, or without his having been asked to take any further steps necessary for proceeding with it. In the present case there was no default by the attaching decree-holder. He had done all he could to get the attachments made to enable him to proceed with the sale of the properties in question. The court proceeded with the sale of the standing crops because the sale of the other properties, which were ancestral, could not have been effected except through the Collector, to whom the amount due under each of the decrees would have to be certified and no such certificate could have been granted until the amount actually realized from the sale of the standing crops attached was ascertained. After the standing crops were sold, it was the duty of the court to ask the decree-holder to take further steps to proceed with the execution of the decree against the remaining properties which were then under attachment, before striking off the execution proceeding. It did not do so; nor did it declare, while passing the order striking off the proceeding, whether the attachment was to be maintained or raised. As there was no default it cannot be said that the order aforesaid was an order dismissing the application under order XXI, rule 57, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Even if that were not so, the subsequent proceeding taken by the decree-holder on the 23rd of February, 1909, to revive or continue the present execution proceeding from the stage at which it was left, is sufficient to make the attachment made in the previous execution proceeding operative against the sale which was effected by the judgement-debtor in favour of Sant Bakhsh Sahi during the pendency of that attachment. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Shaikh Kamar-ud-din Ahmad v. Jawahir Lal, (1905) L.R., 32 I.A., 102., an application which is in substance as well as in form an application to revive a pending execution of a decree which had been suspended, for no act or default of the decree-holder, is not an application to initiate a fresh execution, and the effect of such an application, if granted, is that the proceeding is continued from the stage at which it was left and any sale effected in pursuance of the attachment made in the previous proceeding is as effective against the judgement-debtor as if it had been held during the pendency of that proceeding itself. In Aziz Bakhsh v. Kaniz Fatima Bibi, (1912) I.L.R., 34 All., 490, where by a mistake of the court an application for execution against property which was under attachment was dismissed but no order was made removing the attachment, and the decree-holder subsequently obtained a review of that order and the execution court was directed to proceed, it was held on an application made by the decree-holder to sell the attached property that the attachment still subsisted and was valid as against a sale made by the judgement-debtor previous to the review. The learned counsel for the defendants appellants has referred to the decision in Dildar Husain v. Sheo Narain, (1918) I.L.R., 41 All., 157. But in that case the application was dismissed at the request of the decree-holder, who for some reason or another did not want to proceed with it, and that case has therefore no bearing on the present case. As pointed out in Gopal v. Kashi, (1919) I.L.R., 43 All., 39, an order restoring an attachment relates back to the date when the attachment was first made and its effect is to invalidate the sale made during the subsistence of that attachment. The effect of the order granting the application of the decree-holder of the 23rd of February, 1909, was that the execution proceeding was continued from the stage at which it had been suspended for no act or default of the decree-holder, and the sale of the 9th of February, 1909, through which the defendants appellants claimed to derive their title, cannot be deemed to be enforceable as against the claim arising from the attachment of the 14th of September, 1908, in pursuance of which the property in dispute was sold and purchased by the plaintiffs respondents. The defendants appellants claim the protection of their mortgagee rights under the mortgages of 1904 as against the plaintiffs respondents, but as those mortgages were not usufructuary mortgages and the plaintiffs have purchased the equity of redemption, it is not open to them to resist the claim of the, plaintiffs to possession. The defendants appellants got possession by virtue of the sale of the 19th of November, 1909, and if the sale is invalid, they must surrender possession. They may have a right to sue on their mortgages, but the decree for possession cannot be made conditional on the payment of the moneys due on those mortgages. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.