JUDGMENT Walsh, J. - There is no question, indeed the Privy Council have recognized in a passage to be found in the case reported in In the matter of Sashi Bhushan Sarbadhikary ILR (1906) All. 95 (108)., that this High Court has jurisdiction to deal with a libellous attack upon the Court of this nature in a summary manner, by fine, or imprisonment or both. Abdul Hasan took the objection that the original complainant who brought the matter to the attention of the High Court, namely, the Defendant in the litigation who was also attacked indirectly by this pamphlet, had no right to complain or to appear. There is nothing in this objection. As a matter of fact, by the direction of the High Court the Government Advocate appeared on behalf of the Local Government to support the complaint, but there is no rule of law restricting the manner in which complaints of such defamatory attacks may be brought to the notice of the Court. 2. The jurisdiction of this High Court to punish in a summary manner false and scandalous attacks upon the administration of justice, and upon the occupants of the Bench, is exercised on public grounds and is essential for maintaining the confidence of the public in the independence of the judiciary. No court will allow itself to exercise this jurisdiction merely for the purpose of preventing or restricting legitimate criticisms upon its decisions on questions of principle or upon its methods of conducting public business. There is a wide difference between, on the one hand, such criticisms, even criticisms which although bona fide might by their extravagance, or their ambiguity, encroach upon the border line of what is recognized as legitimate, and, on the other hand, gross and unfounded libels upon the court. In these matters it is usually the case that a mere printer is regarded as incurring a smaller measure of responsibility where he is not shown to have understood and joined in a deliberate attack. But in a country in which the mass of the population is illiterate, it is clear that a printer who does not take care to acquaint himself with the nature of the matter which he prints for the purpose of circulation is a source of grave public danger, because to the uneducated and illiterate, matter which appears in print necessarily carries greater weight. They do not as a rule possess the balance of Judgment, which education confers, to be able to distinguish between what may be merely idle and foolish and what is deliberately intended to misrepresent the truth, and as the matter so printed and circulated is necessarily published to them by word of mouth, it is extremely difficult if not impossible for the contradictions which follow to reach into all the corners of the bazar where the original publication has obtained a hearing. 3. We recognize that there is a difference between the degree of culpability in the cases of these two Respondents and we recognize that in the case of Abdul Hasan he himself reached, after much of the mischief had been done, a stage when he realized that he was doing wrong and that it was time to stop. But it is necessary in the public interest, and in order to prevent scandalous and unwarrantable attacks upon the administration of justice in the High Court, to make an example of both the Respondents. A mere fine cannot meet the necessities of the case, and might in the case of these two Respondents mean no personal punishment at all. It is necessary, therefore, to make an example of both of them by inflicting upon them a term of imprisonment in addition to ordering them to make contribution to the costs incurred by the appearance of the Local Government. 4. It has been pointed out that this libel includes a contempt upon the court of the Subordinate Judge. On the question of the jurisdiction of the High Court to punish contempts committed against courts subordinate to itself, I have studied all the cases, particularly the judgment in the case reported in Legal Remembrancer v. Motilal Ghose ILR (1913) Calc, 173., where the question was decided in the negative. This High Court is a Court of Record and has general power of superintendence and control over the courts subordinate to it, and I agree with the view taken in the Bombay case of In re Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1920) 22 Bom. L.R. 368., and in a case decided by three Judges in Madras in In the matter of K. Vankat Rao (1911) 21 M.L.J. 832 ., that the High Courts in India have-such power. L.R. 368., and in a case decided by three Judges in Madras in In the matter of K. Vankat Rao (1911) 21 M.L.J. 832 ., that the High Courts in India have-such power. We have not taken into account this part of the libel complained of in awarding the punishment which we have decided to inflict. Sulaiman, J. 5. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the pamphlet in question contains a most scurrilous attack on the whole administration of justice in these provinces and in particular on the Subordinate Judge, which is calculated to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect and disrepute. The decision of a case is described on the title page as mysterious and the introduction to the pamphlet professes to contain startling revelations and insinuates that justice and equity in these provinces have a rate and market value, and that judicial officers, who are described as weighmen holding the balance of justice in their hands, can at will by twist of the finger give short weight and make any side of the scales light or heavy as they like. It is stated that the market of justice is only for monied people and only God can look after those who have no money. It is suggested that if a Plaintiff who seeks justice happens to be poor and the aggressive Defendant rich, the poor Plaintiff has to knock at the door of justice in vain. It is also suggested that a poor man's pleader would not even fully discharge his duty, but being influenced by the wealth of the opposite party would even forsake his client. The body of the document contains defamatory statements against the Subordinate Judge who tried the case, and insinuates that silver and gold displayed their splendour and that the tampering of a ruqqa might even have been done in consultation with him or at a time when the document was kept under lock and key by the court. The Subordinate Judge, it is suggested, had such deep love for the rich Defendants that he was disposed to take steps in order to please them and did not care even about the facts. The Subordinate Judge, it is suggested, had such deep love for the rich Defendants that he was disposed to take steps in order to please them and did not care even about the facts. It states that a plan for the dismissal of the Plaintiff's claim had already been devised and that as money had power to invert the mind, even strong proofs and living objects failed to be worthy of attention. It winds up by saying that the proceedings in his court disclose a mysterious conspiracy. It is boldly stated that the High Court "paid no attention to the Plaintiff's case and did not see the judgment of the lower court with a critical eye but wholly followed the example of the original court and acted as its pupil and that common sense was not used in writing the Judgment." It is further suggested that the High Court became silent on the point because the writer of a particular letter was a Khan Bahadur. It also suggests that the Plaintiff's vakil in the High Court could not have been a simpleton but might have "received a wound from the golden knife of the well-to-do opposite party." 6. I leave aside the attack on the Plaintiff's advocate in this Court, for that in my opinion does not, properly speaking, amount to a contempt of court. No authority has been cited in support of the contention that it does, and I think it undesirable to extend the scope of the definition of. a contempt of court without authority. The insult offered to an advocate not during the trial of a case, but after its termination, cannot be a condemnation of the system of administration of justice but would amount to a calumny upon an individual. The position of advocates cannot be that of officers of the Court like Registrars who are appointed by the Court itself. Defamatory statements made against advocates after the termination of a case stand on quite a Different footing from insults offered to such advocates while actually conducting cases. I am, therefore, not prepared to hold that the libel on the Plaintiff's advocate in this case amounted to a contempt of the High Court. 7. Defamatory statements made against advocates after the termination of a case stand on quite a Different footing from insults offered to such advocates while actually conducting cases. I am, therefore, not prepared to hold that the libel on the Plaintiff's advocate in this case amounted to a contempt of the High Court. 7. As to the attack on the High Court, it is undoubtedly a contempt, though of a contemptible kind, and in spite of the author's assertion before us that he did not mean to cast any aspersions on the High Court Bench, there cannot be the slightest doubt that an insult to the dignity of this Court, couched in satirical language, was deliberately intended, and the High Court, along with the whole administration of justice under its supervision, is held out to ridicule, for which the author does not now attempt to show that there could be the slightest justification, and which, of course, he is unable to support. That such a contempt of Court can be dealt with summarily is a matter about which there can be no dispute. The pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Surendra Nath Banerjee v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court at Fort William in Bengal ILR (1883) Cal 109., that a High Court has such power, is conclusive. Contempt committed out of court is just as much punishable as one committed in the presence of a court ; In the matter of Sashi Bhushan Sarbadhikary ILR (1906) All 95. 8. That there was a gross attack on the integrity of the Subordinate Judge is patent even on a cursory perusal of the pamphlet, and that such an attack was intentional is admitted by the writer Abdul Hasan Jauhar. 9. Any conduct that tends to bring the authority of a court into disrespect or which amounts to an insult offered to the Judge or the dignity of the court, even though it may be after the termination of a pending case, is undoubtedly a contempt of court. Contempt is not confined only to cases which directly interfere with the administration of justice in a pending case. In the case of the St. James's Evening Post (1742) 2 Atk. Contempt is not confined only to cases which directly interfere with the administration of justice in a pending case. In the case of the St. James's Evening Post (1742) 2 Atk. 469 (471)., Lord HARDWICKE, L.C., distinctly remarked that "one kind of contempt is scandalizing the Court itself." In Reg v. Gray (1900) 2 Q.B. 36., Lord RUSSELL of Killowen, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the Court, held that scurrilous abuse of a Judge in his character of a Judge, that is, in reference to the conduct of the Judge in a judicial proceeding, even though the same has terminated, was a contempt of Court punishable in law. Such power exists not on the ground of any exaggerated notion of the dignity of individual Judges. The power is vested in the Judges not for their personal protection only, but for that of the public, whose interest it is that courts of justice should be above reproach and suspicion. If the power to punish contempt of court were based merely on the advisability of preventing actual interference with the administration of justice it might have been confined to pending cases only, but if, as is the case, the object be to ensure that the courts administer justice duly and impartially, they cannot be made helpless to prevent insults to their dignity. As observed by WILLS, J., in Rex v. Davies (1906) 1 K.B., 32 (40)., "the principle which is the root of and underlies" contempts of court cases "will be found to be, not the purpose of protecting either the Court as a whole or the individual Judges of the Court from a repetition of them, but of protecting the public, and especially those who, either voluntarily or by compulsion, are subject to its jurisdiction, from the mischief they will incur if the authority of the tribunal be undermined or impaired.... The offended dignity of a particular court, or of the persons who compose it, is not the subject of punishment.... The real offence is the wrong done to the public by weakening the authority and influence of the tribunal which exists for their good alone." When this is the real object it becomes immaterial whether the action, with reference to which the contempt was committed, has or has not terminated. 10. The real offence is the wrong done to the public by weakening the authority and influence of the tribunal which exists for their good alone." When this is the real object it becomes immaterial whether the action, with reference to which the contempt was committed, has or has not terminated. 10. The real question which requires consideration is whether the High Court has jurisdiction to commit for contempt of an inferior court. Inferior courts in these provinces, not being King's Courts, have no jurisdiction to commit for contempts not perpetrated in facie curiae. They cannot punish contempts committed out of court: Kochappa v. Sachi Devi ILR (1902) Mad. 494. If therefore the High Court also were to have no power to punish such contempts, they would go altogether unpunished, unless in particular cases they came within the provisions of the statutory penal law. The High Court has a general superintendence over its civil courts and watches over their proceedings, not only to prevent their exceeding their jurisdiction or otherwise acting contrary to law, but also to prevent persons from interfering with the course of justice in such courts. It would seem at first sight that a High Court of justice, being the highest court in the land, and yet without power to vindicate the dignity of its subordinate courts and to protect officers of such courts, would be an anomaly which could hardly be permitted to exist in a civilized country. Without such protection subordinate courts would soon lose their hold upon public respect and the maintenance of law and order would be rendered extremely difficult. The question, however, has become one of some difficulty because of a conflict of opinion that has prevailed in India. 11. I prefer to leave the question of contempt of inferior criminal courts still open, for that question does not arise in this case. Owing to their respective constitutions there is undoubtedly some difference between the criminal courts and the civil courts. The criminal courts are not directly under the High Court to the same extent as the civil courts are and the High Court does not possess the same power of control over the officers of the criminal courts. On the other hand the civil courts are directly and exclusively under the superintendence and control of the High Court. The criminal courts are not directly under the High Court to the same extent as the civil courts are and the High Court does not possess the same power of control over the officers of the criminal courts. On the other hand the civil courts are directly and exclusively under the superintendence and control of the High Court. Furthermore, the superior criminal court which existed in these provinces prior to the establishment of this High Court was the Sadar Nizamat Adalat which was not a Court of Record; nor was it even a King's Court. but the Company's Court; whereas the Sadar Diwani Adalat was a Court of Record and was authorized by Statute (21 Geo. III, c. 70, Section 21). It is on this ground that I can easily distinguish the case of the Legal Remembrancer v. Matilal Ghose ILR (1913) Cal 178. In that case the only question which properly arose for decision was as to whether the High Court at Calcutta could punish a contempt of an inferior, criminal court. JENKINS, C.J., at page 206 thought that as the jurisdiction of the Sadar Diwani Adalat was civil, the powers inherited from that Court were of no assistance to him in the case under consideration. The observations of the other learned Judges affecting contempts of inferior civil courts were mere obiter dicta, as the point did not properly arise for consideration. Similarly the remarks of SHAH, J., in his dissentient judgment in the case of Emperor v. Balkrishna Govind Kulkarni ILR (1921) 46 Bom. 592., must be deemed to relate to contempts of inferior criminal courts. On the other hand, the judgment of Sir NORMAN MACLEOD, C.J., in this last mentioned case, upheld the view that the High Court had powers of punishing contempt of even inferior criminal courts. 12. Confining myself to the question of punishing contempt of an inferior civil court, I find that there are two cases which hold that such jurisdiction exists. In In the matter of In Re: K. Venkat Rao, First Grade Pleader, (1911) 21 MLJ 832 , it was held that such power exists. This case was not followed by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court on the ground that it was merely based on the authority of Surendra Nath Banerjee v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court at Fort William ILR (1883) Cal. This case was not followed by the learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court on the ground that it was merely based on the authority of Surendra Nath Banerjee v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court at Fort William ILR (1883) Cal. 109., which did not support that comprehensive proposition. In In Re: Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Mahadeo Haribhai Desai, (1920) 22 BOMLR 368 MARTIN, J., held that it made no differ-ence that the alleged abuse was of a District Judge and not of a High Court, and that power exists in India, as in England, to protect the courts of inferior jurisdiction. Curiously enough, the case of Legal Remembrancer v. Matilal Ghose ILR (1913) Cal. 173., does not seem to have been referred to at all. 13. It therefore becomes necessary to examine the grounds on which such power can be based. The Calcutta High Court has expressed the view that power to punish for contempt of inferior courts can either be expressly conferred by statute or be inherited from the courts which were previously in existence and which have been abolished. It has come to the conclusion that no such power has been expressly conferred on the Indian High Courts, and further that such power was not possessed by the courts which have been abolished. It has, therefore, concluded that no such power can exist. I concede at once that there is no statutory provision under which the power to punish for contempt of inferior civil courts has been expressly conferred on the High Court. The new Contempt of Courts Act, although passed, did not come into force till the 1st of May, 1926, long after the publication of the pamphlet. It must also be conceded that such power is not expressly mentioned in the Indian High Courts Act or the Letters Patent under which this High Court was constituted, or the new Government of India Act. When neither the Sadar Diwani Adalat nor the Sadar Nizamat Adalat nor the inferior courts in these provinces were subordinate to or under the control of the Supreme 'Court at Calcutta, I would have great difficulty in holding that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to punish a contempt of an inferior court of these provinces, for even under the Common Law such jurisdiction is based on the duty to protect subordinate courts. To have some sort of jurisdiction in an area is one thing and to have control over the courts existing in that area is quite another. This High Court, till the establishment of the Chief Court in Oudh, had criminal jurisdiction over British subjects in Oudh but had no control over the Oudh courts. Could it have been held that this High Court had power to punish for contempt of an inferior Oudh court? I would also have some difficulty in holding that our Letters Patent together with the Indian High Courts Act has the effect of conferring on this High Court all the Common Law powers vested in the Calcutta High Court including those inherited from the Supreme Court. The preamble merely recites what Her Majesty could by Letters Patent lawfully do under the Indian High Courts Act of 1861. Section 16 of the Act confers all the powers authorized by the Act, and, subject to the Letters Patent, makes all the provisions of the Act, as far as circumstances may permit, applicable. And Section 9 confers on a High Court powers vested in any of the courts "in the same Presidency" which have been abolished. But the Supreme Court at Calcutta was not abolished by the establishment of the Allahabad High Court, but had been abolished five years earlier. 14. One may not, however, be prepared to admit offhand that the Sadar Diwani Adalat, which was a Court of Record, and a King's Court authorized by statute, did not possess any such inherent power. Although it may be true that every Court of Record need not possess such power, for example, the court of Quarter Sessions, Mayor's Court and County Court in England do not possess such powers, it cannot be equally true that a Court of Record which is the highest court in the land, does not also possess such power. But I am prepared to assume for the purposes of this case that the Sadar Diwani Adalat did not possess such inherent jurisdiction. I do not, however, think" that the inheritance of such powers is the only true basis. This High Court from its very constitution has certain inherent powers which it can exercise over the districts within its jurisdiction. But I am prepared to assume for the purposes of this case that the Sadar Diwani Adalat did not possess such inherent jurisdiction. I do not, however, think" that the inheritance of such powers is the only true basis. This High Court from its very constitution has certain inherent powers which it can exercise over the districts within its jurisdiction. If the Kumaun division were brought under its regular jurisdiction hereafter, can it be urged with any degree of force that inasmuch as the Court of the Commissioner at Kumaun, which may have to be abolished, does not possess those inherent powers, therefore the High Court also would not possess those inherent powers in Kumaun, though it may possess similar powers in the other districts? It is not the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of a Supreme Court, but rather the very nature of its constitution that is of importance. The question which one has to consider is whether power to protect its inferior courts is not co-eval with its very foundation and institution, and a necessary incident to every High Court of Justice. The circumstance that it is the Supreme Court in these provinces would suggest that it must be armed with the power and have imposed on it the duty of preventing brevi manu attempts to interfere with the administration of justice in the subordinate courts, for such interference affects the whole administration. 15. Even without any direct authority I would have been inclined to say that such inherent power must necessarily exist, the grounds for this view being (1) that it is not the indignity to individual officers which requires to be prevented, but public confidence in the courts has to be maintained; (2) that inferior courts themselves possess no such powers and would be entirely helpless if even the superior court cannot protect them; and (3) that the ordinary remedy under the penal laws of the land are meant for offences against officers in their individual capacity; and would, if resorted to, be cumbrous and cause considerable delay. If courts have to be protected effectively they must be protected in a way in which swift Justice can be dealt out, and that can be only in a summary proceeding of the nature of contempt of court. 16. If courts have to be protected effectively they must be protected in a way in which swift Justice can be dealt out, and that can be only in a summary proceeding of the nature of contempt of court. 16. There is, however, abundant authority for the view that inherent jurisdiction in a Supreme Court like the High Court must exist. In Rex v. Parke (1903) 2 K. B. 482., WILLS, J., in delivering the judgment of the Court remarked at page 442: This Court (the High Court) exercises a vigilant watch over the proceedings of inferior courts and successfully prevents them from usurping powers which they do not possess, or otherwise acting contrary to law. It would seem almost a natural corollary that it should possess correlative powers of guarding them against unlawful attacks and interferences with their independence on the part of others. It is said with respect to them that there is a remedy by criminal indictment. The latter remedy is unsatisfactory on account of the necessary delay. 17. That eminent Judge, quoting the opinion of WRIGHT, J., with approval, said: We should hesitate long before casting any more doubt than may already exist upon the capacity of this Court to deal by proceedings for contempt with cases in which attempts are made to pollute the stream of justice, and to interfere with its proper and unfettered administration by courts which possess no adequate means of protecting themselves in this respect. 18. In Rex v. Davies (1906) 1 K.B. 32 (42)., WILLS, J., again remarked: Courts or the administration of justice exist for the benefit of the people, and for the benefit of the people their independence must be protected from unauthorized interference, and the,law provides effective means by which this end . can be secured. If it is to be secured at all in the case of the inferior courts, it dan only be secured by the action of this Court, for they have not the power to protect themselves ; and if it be true that the King's Bench is in any sense the custos morum of the kingdom, it must be its function to apply with the necessary adaptations to the altered circumstances of the present day, the same great principle which it has always upheld. 19. 19. And again at page 43 he remarked: When the attainment of that end required that the misdeeds of others should be corrected as well as the misfeasance of the inferior courts themselves, it seems to us that it is no departure from principle, but only its legitimate application to,a new state of things, if others whose conduct tends to prevent the due performance of their duties by those courts have to be corrected as well as the courts themselves. In fact the danger to the inferior courts which have no such powers is perhaps greater than it is to superior courts of having their efficiency impaired by scurrilous publication. 20. I find that these two leading cases were followed in Bex v. Clarke (1910) 108 L.T. 636., where the High Court punished a contempt of the Coroner's Court. 21. I have been able to find another case where they have been still more recently followed, vide The King v. Editor of the Daily Mail (1921) 2 K. B. 733. In this last mentioned case, Lord COLERIDGE, J., at page 745 remarked: No other Court than the High Court has inherent power to protect itself against contempt by proceedings for attachment or otherwise except where that power is given it by statute. A court martial has no inherent power apart from statute to protect itself by such proceedings, but, if this Court can interfere with the proceedings of a court martial to check irregularities by that court, it seems to me that it must also be clothed with the inherent jurisdiction to protect a court martial from contempt calculated or tending to obstruct the administration of justice in that court, unless the Army Act...ousts the jurisdiction of this Court.... I am of opinion on the authority of Rex v. Davies that if the Army Act did not exist, this Court would have inherent jurisdiction in the matter of contempt in the case of a court martial. 22. Avory, J. at page 752 remarked: The result of that Judgment (Rex v. Davies) is to show that wherever this Court has power to correct an inferior court, it also has power to protect that court by punishing those who interfere with the due administration of justice in that court. 23. 22. Avory, J. at page 752 remarked: The result of that Judgment (Rex v. Davies) is to show that wherever this Court has power to correct an inferior court, it also has power to protect that court by punishing those who interfere with the due administration of justice in that court. 23. And at page 753 the learned Judge remarked that in the Army Act he could find No provision either express or implied which takes away the right of a party to proceedings before a court martial, who is aggrieved by a contempt of that court, to move this Court to exercise the inherent jurisdiction which it possesses over all inferior courts. 24. Similarly Salter, J. at page 754 remarked: It is of the last importance to assert and maintain the inherent jurisdiction of this Court to protect the administration of justice in all the inferior courts, unless the Parliament shows a plain intention to restrict that jurisdiction. 25. These leading cases unmistakably show that the power of the High Court in England to deal with the contempt of inferior courts is based not so much on its historical foundation as on the High Court's inherent jurisdiction. I do not think that I can properly allow my mind to be influenced by the American authorities on such questions as was done by a learned Judge in the Calcutta case. 26. This High Court is in an equal degree the guardian and protector of public justice throughout these provinces and has superintendence over the inferior civil courts and must therefore have a duty cast upon it to protect such courts, otherwise their independence and usefulness would be considerably impaired. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that such a power exists. I.might add that the new Contempt of Courts Act has been enacted in order to remove doubts which had arisen as to the powers of a High Court. That enactment does not imply that the legislature has recognized that no such power did in fact exist. Boys, J. 27. The facts of this case are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Mr. Justice WALSH. There cannot be the shadow of a doubt but that the pamphlet complained of contained many expressions which amount to contempt, both of this Court directly and of a subordinate court, that of the learned Subordinate. Judge. 28. Boys, J. 27. The facts of this case are sufficiently set out in the judgment of Mr. Justice WALSH. There cannot be the shadow of a doubt but that the pamphlet complained of contained many expressions which amount to contempt, both of this Court directly and of a subordinate court, that of the learned Subordinate. Judge. 28. A few words I will add as to the attitude adopted by the opposite party. He appeared before us in person and unrepresented by counsel. He tendered a petition in which he purported to describe how he came to write the pamphlet, how he came to realize the foolishness of his act, and what an excellent character he had previously borne, and states "that the Petitioner never entertained any contemptible idea against the judgment of the lower court." He concluded this document by saying that "the Petitioner without showing any cause commits himself entirely to your Lordships' mercy and begs for pardon." It is to be noticed that the document does not contain any sort of apology or any expression of sincere regret for his act. It is merely a recognition . of the "foolishness" of his act (suggesting merely possibly that he recognized the consequences that were likely to ensue), and asks for pardon. 29. When called upon at the commencement of the proceedings he demanded that orders be passed upon this petition before he said anything further, stating that if the order was unfavourable he would then engage and instruct counsel in his defence. In effect he demanded that a favourable order should be passed or in the alternative the case should be postponed. He had had ample time to instruct counsel and such a demand could not possibly be entertained. The later attitude taken up is also to be noted. He declared that he did not adhere to his accusations against the High Court but maintained the truth of his charges against the Subordinate Judge. The question inevitably suggests itself whether this attitude was adopted under a belief that this Court could deal with a contempt directed against itself but could not deal with a contempt directed against a subordinate court; and whether that belief was not the result of legal advice already taken and given on the basis of the decision in Legal Remembrancer v. Matilal Ghose ILR (1918) Cal. 178. 178. The only other question on which I propose to say anything is the jurisdiction of this Court. I have given my most careful consideration to the cases decided by the Courts in India. I will give as briefly as possible my. reasons for the conclusion at which I have arrived, that this Court has statutory jurisdiction to punish not only a contempt directed particularly against this Court but also a contempt directed against a court subordinate to it, and that in the latter case it is immaterial whether the contempt can or cannot be said to affect the High Court also by reason of the possibility of the proceeding to which the contempt relates coming by process of law before the High Court. 30. That this Court has jurisdiction by summary process to punish a contempt directed against this Court is beyond any need for discussion; see In the matter of Sashi Bhushan Sarbadhikary ILR (1906) All. 96. I will, therefore, only consider our power to deal with the contempt in so far as it related to the inferior court. * * * 31. It follows that this Court at Allahabad has the same Common Law summary jurisdiction to punish contempt as I have held to be possessed by the Calcutta Court. I therefore hold: (1) That the King's Bench had by virtue of the Common Law summary jurisdiction to punish as for contempt all offences against the administration of justice whether or not the offence was committed in face of the Court or outside the Court and whether the Court was sitting or not sitting; and whether concerning the King's Bench directly or in relation to proceedings concerning an inferior court and whether in the latter case those proceedings might or might not in some way come at some stage before the King's Bench. (2) That the Supreme Court had conferred on it, by the Statute and the Charter creating it, the abovenamed powers of the King's Bench. (3) That the Calcutta High Court by virtue of the Statute and the Charter creating it obtained similar powers, not limited to the area within the territorial jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but in relation to all the courts subject to the control of the High Court. (3) That the Calcutta High Court by virtue of the Statute and the Charter creating it obtained similar powers, not limited to the area within the territorial jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but in relation to all the courts subject to the control of the High Court. (4) That this Court at Allahabad had conferred on it, by the Statute and the Letters Patent creating it, similar powers to those conferred on the High Court of Calcutta. (5) That this Court is, as is the King's Bench Division as successor to the King's Bench, and, I may add as I see no reason to the contrary, every other High Court in this country, "in a special manner the guardian and protector of public justice", and that it has power to deal with all contempts directed against the administration of justice whether those contempts are committed in face of the Court or outside it and independently of whether the particular Court is sitting or not sitting; and whether those contempts relate to proceedings directly concerning itself or whether they relate to proceedings concerning an inferior court, and in the latter case whether those proceedings might or might not at some stage come before this Court. 32. In conclusion I would add that, if there be in fact any doubt as to the correctness of this view, I should further hold that this Court has such power as part of its inherent jurisdiction, accepting the proposition enunciated by Blackstone, quoted in au earlier portion of this judgment, that such a power in a Supreme Court of Justice results from the first principles of judicial establishments and must be an inseparable attendant upon every superior tribunal. Laws, without a competent authority to secure their administration from disobedience and contempt, would be vain and nugatory". The passages I have quoted are in direct relation not only to the Superior Court's power to deal with contempt against itself but in relation to the Superior Court's control of the administration of justice by the courts subordinate to it. 33. This would have been sufficient to dispose by itself of the question of our powers in the particular case, but there is also raised the question of the Statutory powers of this Court and in that aspect the power in this particular case is only a part of the much larger question of the Court's general jurisdiction. 33. This would have been sufficient to dispose by itself of the question of our powers in the particular case, but there is also raised the question of the Statutory powers of this Court and in that aspect the power in this particular case is only a part of the much larger question of the Court's general jurisdiction. 34. I agree to the order proposed. 35. BY THE COURT.--The order of the Court is that Abdul Hasan be kept in simple imprisonment for a term of six months and that he pay the sum of Rs. 150 towards the costs of the appearance of the Local Government or serve a further six weeks' imprisonment in default of payment, and that Muhammad Ismail be kept in simple imprisonment for a term of one week and that he do pay a sum of Rs. 50 towards the costs of the Local Government with a further term of one month's imprisonment in default of payment.