JUDGMENT : Kanhaiya Lal, J.:— The dispute in this appeal relates to the property of Muhammad Husain Khan who had two wives. By one wife he had a son Bakar Husain who was married to Musammat Zarif-un-nissa and by his other wife he had four sons, only two of whom, namely, Fida Ali and Sheda Ali, are material for the purposes of this appeal. On the death of Muhammad Husain Khan there was a dispute between his heirs as to his property which was referred to arbitration and an award was made by which it was declared that the property shall go to Bakar Husain and his wife Musammat Zarif-un-nissa for their life-time without any power of transfer or alienation and that on their death none of their heirs or assigns will be entitled to that property but it shall go to Fida Ali and Sheda Ali and their representatives and assigns in full proprietary right. 2. Bakar Husain died in 1915. Musammat Zarif-un-nissa died in 1922. In 1916 Mazarul Hasan, one of the sons of Fida Ali, sold his interest in the property to the plaintiff, and Musammat Hajra Khatun, the widow of Sheda Ali, similarly sold her interest in the same to him. 3. The question for consideration in this case was whether the interest conveyed by the said award to Fida Ali and Sheda Ali was a vested interest capable of being transferred by them or by their heirs or whether it was merely a contingent interest or a right in expectancy, the sale of which was forbidden by section 6(a) of the Transfer of Property Act. The award provided that Bakar Husain and Musammat Zarif-un-nissa shall enjoy the property in question for their lives without any powers to transfer or alienate the same and that on their death the property shall go to Fida Ali and Sheda Ali and their representatives and assigns. This clearly created a vested remainder in these persons, which they or their heirs were entitled to transfer in any way they liked. The decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants have no application, because the release or transfer sought to be impeached in those cases was a release or transfer of a right in expectancy or of a contingent interest which had not matured. The other pleas taken in the memorandum of appeal are not pressed. The decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the defendants-appellants have no application, because the release or transfer sought to be impeached in those cases was a release or transfer of a right in expectancy or of a contingent interest which had not matured. The other pleas taken in the memorandum of appeal are not pressed. The appeal is dismissed with costs.