Judgement Appeal (No. 31 of 1924) from a decree of the High Court (October 26, 1922) reversing, so far as material to the present appeal, a decree of the District Judge of South Arcot. The appeal related to the succession to an impartible jaghir situate in Kallayan hills in South Arcot, on the death in 1914 of the holder without issue. In 1822 the younger son had succeeded by arrangement and the jaghir had since descended from father to son. Upon the death of the holder in 1914 the respondent, who was the senior member of the senior branch, took possession. Thereupon the appellant, the mother of the last holder, instituted the present suit, claiming the jaghir as heir to his separate property. The respondent claimed to succeed by survivorship. By his written statement he pleaded that " no arrangement, or act, capable of effecting a separation has ever been made, or done, between or by the members or branches of the family.” The suit raised other questions which were not material to the present appeal The material facts, with a pedigree, appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The District Judge held that the arrangement in 1822 did not operate as a separation of the branches; that view was affirmed on appeal. He found, however, that, at some undetermined date long before the suit, the joint family had been divided. He so inferred from evidence as to an absence of joint residence and community of worship, and other circumstances. He held that in consequence the jaghir was separate property, and passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff. On appeal to the High Court the decree was reversed so far as it related to the succession to the jaghir, and the defendant was held entitled to succeed. Krishnan J. said " It is a well settled proposition of law that the succession to an impartible estate is governed by the rule of survivorship if it is joint family property, and by the rule of inheritance to separate property if it is separate property. That was so laid down in the Sivaganga case (( 1863) 9 Moo. I. A. 543.), and has since been affirmed in several cases, the last one being the case of Baijnath Prasad Singh v. Tej Bali Singh. That was so laid down in the Sivaganga case (( 1863) 9 Moo. I. A. 543.), and has since been affirmed in several cases, the last one being the case of Baijnath Prasad Singh v. Tej Bali Singh. (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 195.) In the present case there is no difficulty in choosing a single individual out of a class for the jaghirship, for it is conceded that if the rule of survivorship applies, the first defendant is entitled as the senior member of the senior line whereas if the rule as to succession to the separate estate applies, the first plaintiff, the mother, is entitled.”. In his opinion the decision of the Privy Council in Tara Kumari v. Chaturbhuj Narayan Singh (( 1915) L. R. 42 I. A. 192.), and of the High Court in Gurusami Pandiyam v. Pandia Chinna Thambiar (( 1920)1. L. R. 44 Mad. 1.), were distinguishable, as in both those cases the evidence of the estate being the separate property of the last holder was much stronger. He agreed with the view arrived at by Ramesam J. that the evidence fell short of proving that the joint family rights of the defendant in the jaghir were extinguished at any time. Ramesam J. was of opinion that the authorities, which he discussed, showed that a family separation did not have the effect of making an impartible estate the separate property of the holder, unless there was an intention on the part of the junior members, either express or implied, to give up their chance of succeeding. The learned judge considered in great detail the evidence as to a separation after 1822. He observed that the holder of an impartible estate rarely considers it consistent with his dignity to permit other members of the family, except perhaps his brothers, to reside under the same roof with himself. With regard to the evidence as to an absence of joint worship he said "I will only observe that in Southern India there is no such thing as a private temple or a thakur or idol or deity in a house. Except in a few orthodox homes of the higher castes, which are daily diminishing in numbers, no such thing as household worship exists. ... Except in a few orthodox homes of the higher castes, which are daily diminishing in numbers, no such thing as household worship exists. ... I have never known in my experience of Southern Indian life that relatives not resident in the house participate either in household worship or public worship (such as a car festival) as a token of undivided status." He concluded his judgment as follows " To sum up the history of the family from 1820 to 1916 (1.) There is no positive act of separation—no samakhya, as in Ranganayakama v. Ramaiya (( 1872) 5 Cal. L. R. 439.); no agreement, as in Gurusami Pandiyam v. Pandia Chinna (( 1920) I. L. R. 44 Mad. 1.); no grant of a large property in view of separation, as in Tara Kumari v. Chaturbhuj Narayan i Singh (( 1915) L. R. 421. A. 192.); and no renunciation, as in Periasami v. i Periasami. (( 1878) L. R. 51. A. 61.) (2.) There was no assertion that the branches were separate until the plaint. (3.) Contrary assertions in the litigation of 1875, and in a document of 1901. (( 1878) L. R. 51. A. 61.) The continuance of all the junior members in their ancestral houses, contiguous to or part of the jaghirdars residence. (5.) The exemption of all junior members from taxation, which was equivalent to grants for maintenance. (6.) The receipt of supplies for marriages and other occasions. In my opinion there has never been a separation of the senior line and the jaghirdars line." 1927. Oct. 31 ; Nov. 1, 3. Narasimham for the appellant. Although no definite act of separation is proved, the inference to be drawn from the evidence as a whole is that at some date, probably after 1876, the joint status of the family was severed. As was held in Tara Kumari v. Chaturbhuj Narayan Singh (3) the effect was to alter the line of succession. It is to be inferred that there was expressed an intention to separate, and that resulted in a disruption of the joint status, as was held in Girja Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj (( 1916) L. R. 431. A. 151.), and cases following it. The line of succession depends upon whether the family is still joint; there is no decision which lays down that an intention to give up the right of succession must be proved. A. 151.), and cases following it. The line of succession depends upon whether the family is still joint; there is no decision which lays down that an intention to give up the right of succession must be proved. Further, the evidence shows that from, at any rate, 1876 the jaghir was held adversely to the senior branch. De Gruyther K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the respondent. The jaghir was the property of the joint family ; consequently it descended by survivorship Baijnath Prasad v. Tej Bali Singh. (L. R. 481. A. 195.) The evidence did not establish any separation; in any case no separation affecting the impartible estate was proved. In no decision has the succession to an impartible estate been held to be altered by a separation, unless it was to be inferred that the right to succeed had been abandoned Chowdhry Chintamun Singh v. Nowluckho Konwari (( 1875) L. R. 2 I. A. 263.); Periasami v. Periasami (( 1878) L. R. 5. I. A. 61.); Lakshmi Devi Garu v. Surya Narayana Dhatrazu, (( 1897) L. R. 24 I. A. 118.) In Yarlagadda Mallikarjuna v. Yarlagadda Durya (( 1900) L. R. 27 I. A. 151.) a partition suit was held not to have the effect of dividingthe family in relation to an impartible estate which it owned. In the present case no reason can be suggested why there should have been an intention to abandon the right to succeed. In Tara Kumaris case (L. R. 421. A. 192.) a considerable portion of the estate, which was alienable, was allotted to a brother, and it was to be inferred from the circumstances that he abandoned any claim to succeed to what ultimately might remain unalienated. Although there were no grants for maintenance land was cultivated free of tax; that, it is to be inferred, was the custom of this family. Narasimham in reply. The cases relied on do not lay down that an intention to abandon the right to succeed must be established. That view would be inconsistent with the more recent decisions of the Board to the effect that an intention to divide effects an automatic disruption of the joint status. Yarlagadda’s case is inconsistent with Rama Rao v. Raja of Pittapur (( 1918) L. R. 45.I A. 148.), in which it was held that the junior members have no right to maintenance save by custom. Dec. 15. Yarlagadda’s case is inconsistent with Rama Rao v. Raja of Pittapur (( 1918) L. R. 45.I A. 148.), in which it was held that the junior members have no right to maintenance save by custom. Dec. 15. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN WALLIS. This litigation is concerned with the right of succession to the Jadaya Gounder Jaghir or Chinna Tiruppadi hill Paleiyam, as it was formerly known, in the South Arcot District of the Madras Presidency. These ancient paleiyams in Southern India have always been held to be impartible, and this estate has now been included in the schedule of impartible estates to the Madras Impartible Estates Act II. of 1904. It is therefore according to the definition in s. 2 of the Act u an estate descendible to a single heir and subject to the other incidents of impartible estates in Southern India," and the proprietor of the estate is "the person entitled to the possession thereof as single heir under the special custom of the family or locality in which the estate is situated, or if there be no such family or local custom under the general custom regulating the succession to impartible estates in Southern India." This statutory definition would appear to be in entire accordance with what has often been laid down by this Board, that these impartible estates are the creatures of custom, and with the decision in the Shivagunga case (9 Moo. I. A. 539.) that, where no special custom is proved, the customary law of succession is to be found in the Mitakshara, which is the general customary law in this part of India, " with such qualifications only as flow from the impartible nature of the subject," and that consequently, in applying this law the impartible estate, though in the sole enjoyment of the holder, is to be regarded for the purposes of succession as the joint property of the holder and his family and as passing by survivorship, unless it is shown to be the separate property of the holder or his branch, in which case it is descendible according to the rules of the Mitakshara as to separate property. In this case the first plaintiff, who is the mother of the last holder, claims the estate as the nearest heir to his separate property, whereas the defendant, who is a distant male agnate, claims to succeed to it as joint family property. The plaint included an alternative claim by the second plaintiff, who is the son of the first plaintiffs sister under a will made by the last holder. This claim has been rejected rightly in both the lower Courts, as s. 4 of the Impartible Estates Act restrains the proprietor from making any alienations to enure beyond his own lifetime except for necessary purposes, except in so far as sub-s. 3 preserves his right to provide for the succession to the estate in default of heirs. As regards the first plaintiffs claim, the District Court held that the estate was the separate property of the last holder and decreed her suit, but this decree was reversed by the High Court of Madras, who held that the first defendant was entitled to succeed, as the estate had not ceased to be the joint property of the family of the last holder and the first defendant. It will be convenient in the first place to refer briefly to the history of the estate, to set out the pedigree showing the descent from a common ancestor, and to show how the present case arose. It appears, as the result of inquiries made by the Inam Commission in the sixties of the last century, the results of which are embodied in the inam register, ex. 3, that the estate consists of forty villages in the hilly tracts of the Kallikurichi taluoa of South Arcot, and had been granted by a former Government for services rendered to one Ramappa Jadaya Gounder, a remote ancestor of the then holder Lakshmanappa Jadaya Gounder. It is also recorded in the register that in 1813, shortly after the introduction of British rule, the then palegara was recognized as exempt from payment of revenue. It is also recorded in the register that in 1813, shortly after the introduction of British rule, the then palegara was recognized as exempt from payment of revenue. In view of this fact and of the long and undisturbed enjoyment of the family, it was recommended that the forty villages, which are described in the register as sarva or tax free inam, should be enfranchised subject to the imposition of an annual quit rent of one-eighth of the income then derived from them by the palegara, which was treated as the assessment in view of the fact that the villages had never been surveyed or assessed. Under the very primitive conditions, which still exist, the income of Rs.1800 was shown to be derived from a plough tax, certain poll taxes, and jungle rent and tree tax. The recommendation was adopted by the Inam Commissioner on October 22, 1868, and an inam patta or permanent grant was accordingly issued to the palegara or jaghirdar. The following pedigree taken from the judgment of Ramesam J. in the High Court shows the descent of the family from the common ancestor, Lakshmanappa Jadaya Gounder, who died in 1822. Laks hmanappa I. (29th Jaghirdar) | | ||| Ramappa Annadanna Vengap Kannap I. 1820-pa pa. 1860 (30th | jaghirdar) | | | | | Kannap Lakshman Muthiyappa. Jadayap pa. appa | pa (R.7). | | | | | | Laksh Konappa Ramap Lakshm Vadamal Lakshmana manapp (Hill pa anappa ai ppa II. a Munsil (R.5) (R.6) 1860- 1866. (R. 3) | alive R.4) (31st Jaghirdar). || | Triumal Kannappa appa. (D.W.2) Annadana | II. (32nd | jaghirdar). | ( 1866| 1901) (R. | 1). M. | Konammal. ||| | Annada Muthusam Perumal Narayanap nna i (alive) (alive) pa (33rd (Defen jaghirdar). dant) ( 1901- 1914 ). The letters R.I R.2 show the persons entered under the heding " Surviving heirs of the present incumbent " in the order mentioned in the inam register already mentioned. Lakshmanappa I., who died in 1822, was succeeded by his second son Annadana I., described as the 30th jaghirdar, who died in 1860. dant) ( 1901- 1914 ). The letters R.I R.2 show the persons entered under the heding " Surviving heirs of the present incumbent " in the order mentioned in the inam register already mentioned. Lakshmanappa I., who died in 1822, was succeeded by his second son Annadana I., described as the 30th jaghirdar, who died in 1860. The circumstances under which his elder brother Ramappa was set aside were investigated in the suit brought in 1875 by Annadanas grandson Annadana II., the 32nd jaghirdar, to recover the estate from his cousin Lakshmanappa, who was the grandson of Ramappa and grandfather of the first defendant here, and had taken possession of the estate during his minority and claimed to be rightful heir. In that case the High Court in appeal No. 116 of 1876, on appeal from the judgment of the Subordinate Judge at Cuddalore in O.S. No. 7 of 1875, were inclined to think that in 1820, two years before his death, Lakshmanappa I. had relinquished the estate, to his second son Annadana because his eldest son Ramappa was of weak intellect and Ramappas son Kannappa, if then born, an infant of tender years; and they found as a fact that by an arrangement between the palegara and the adult members of his family the paleiyam was transferred to his second son Annadana, and that information of this was given to the revenue officials and was recorded by them. They found also that after Annadanas death in 1860 he was succeeded as of right by his son Lakshmanappa II. (alias Narayanappa), and that his claim was not challenged by the defendant in the suit, who was then thirty-three years of age. The High Court also found that at the death of Lakshmanappa (alias Narayanappa) in 1866, leaving a son Annadana, then aged three years, the defendant had succeeded in getting himself recognized and installed as jaghirdar, but that what happened did not give validity to the defendants title or affect the plaintiffs right to hold the estate which by inheritance had passed to him on his fathers death. There was thus a clear decision that as between the two branches the right of succession was in the junior branch. There was thus a clear decision that as between the two branches the right of succession was in the junior branch. It is also clear, and has been rightly decided by the lower Courts, that no question arose in that case as to whether the effect of the supersession of the senior line in 1820 had the effect of separating them from the junior branch, and that consequently that question is not res judicata in the present case by reason of the judgments in that case. The inam register, which was compiled before 1866, shows the jaghirdar as still residing on Chinna Tiruppadi hill, but some time prior to the institution of the suit just referred to the minors mother removed him to the plains ; and he afterwards took up his residence there in the village of Akkarayapalaryam. The remaining members of the family continued to reside* in the family home at Chinna Tiruppadi, which consisted of a number of thatched buildings, one of which, known as the kachahri or office, was allowed to fall into ruins after the jaghirdars had ceased to reside there. The jaghirdar Annadana II. died in 1901, and was succeeded by his son Narayanappa, who died in 1914, when this branch of the family became extinct in the male line. Thereupon Annadana, the present defendant, who belongs to the senior branch of the family, took possession of the estate, claiming to have succeeded by survivorship, and was subsequently sued by Narayanappas mother, Konammal, the present plaintiff, who alleged that the estate was the separate property of her deceased son and that she was entitled to succeed to it. Thereupon Annadana, the present defendant, who belongs to the senior branch of the family, took possession of the estate, claiming to have succeeded by survivorship, and was subsequently sued by Narayanappas mother, Konammal, the present plaintiff, who alleged that the estate was the separate property of her deceased son and that she was entitled to succeed to it. The onus of proving that the estate had become the separate property of the junior branch was on the plaintiff, who based the claim in the plaint on the following grounds (1.) That Annadana (the 30th jaghirdar) and his descendants had all along owned and held the estate as their separate and absolute property; (2.) that they had also acquired a title by adverse possession ; (3.) that the first defendants claim was barred by res judicata by reason of the judgments and decrees of the Small Cause Court at Cuddalore in 1875, and of the High Court of Madras in 1876 ; (4.) that the late jaghirdar and his ancestors were separated from Ramappa and his descendant, and in any case after the proceedings of 1876 and by their subsequent conduct there had been a complete separation between the two branches; and (5.) that the late jaghirdar and his ancestors had been holding the estate as their separate and absolute estate to the knowledge and with the acquiescence of the senior branch. All these allegations were denied by the first defendant and formed the subject of the third, fourth and eighth issues which cover all the questions raised before their Lordships, and were 3. Was the jaghir held by Annadana Jadaya Gounder and his descendants as their separate estate and absolute property asserting an exclusive title to themselves ? 4. Has there been a separation of status between the different branches of the family, as alleged by the plaintiffs, or are the families still joint ? 8. Is the first defendants claim to succession affected by the rule of res judicata by the decision in O.S. 7 of 1875, in the file of the Subordinate Court, Cuddalore? This issue has already been disposed of. 8. Is the first defendants claim to succession affected by the rule of res judicata by the decision in O.S. 7 of 1875, in the file of the Subordinate Court, Cuddalore? This issue has already been disposed of. As to what constitutes separation, it is clear that where an impartible zamindari has been acquired by the last holder or his branch as a self acquisition, the other undivided members of his family take no interest in it and it descends as the separate property of the acquirer. That was what happened in the Shivagunga case. (9 Moo. I. A. 539.) On the other hand, it is also well settled that as regards an impartible estate which was or had to be considered joint family property, a member of the joint family might become separate with regard to it so as to lose his right to succeed to it by survivorship. That is what happened in Periasami v. Periasami (L. R. 5 I. A. 61.), where a member of the joint family, believing himself to be next in succession to the larger zamindari of Shivagunga, joined in a settlement under which he was held to have renounced all claims to the lesser zamindari. Or, again, an impartible zamindari might by consent be settled on a particular branch of the family as their separate property, as in Ranganayakamma v. Romaiya. (5 Cal. L. R. 439.) The question in the present case is whether the evidence shows that the estate had become the separate property of the junior branch ; and it may at once be observed that in dealing with it the District Judge was at a disadvantage, as compared with the High Court, because he had not the guidance of the judgment of their Lordships delivered by Lord Dunedin in Baijnath Prashad Singh v. Tej Bali Singh. (L. R. 48 I. A. 195.) Prior to that decision the authority of the earlier cases which proceeded on the footing that the estate though impartible must still be regarded as joint family property for the purposes of succession had been shaken by the decisions of the Board in Sartaj Kuaris case (( 1888) L. R. 15 I. A. 51.), and the first and second Pittapur cases (( 1899) L. R. 26 I. A. 83; L. R. 45. I. A. 148.), in which it was held that the holder for the time being had an unrestricted right of alienation inter vivos or by will, and that the junior members of the family had no right to maintenance out of the estate not based on custom. Further, in the Courts below the appellant relied on two decisions of this Board given not long before the judgment delivered by Lord Dunedin—namely, Tar a Kumari v. Chaturbhuj Narayan Singh (L. R. 421. A. 192.) and the Bettiah Raj case. (( 1920) 24 Cal. W. N. 857.) In the former case it was held that an impartible estate had become the separate property of one branch of the family by reason of a number of facts showing that the two branches had become separate. This case cannot now, in their Lordships opinion, be treated as laying down any proposition of law for the purposes of the present case, as it does not deal with the question whether an impartible estate is to be treated for purposes of succession as joint family property or with the legal consequences that follow if it is. The Bettiah Raj case went much further, and contains observations denying that the junior members of the family have any coparcenary interest in the impartible estate even for purposes of succession, but these observations have been explained in Lord Dunedins judgment. (L. R. 48 LA. 195, 212, 213.) In the light of these authorities the District Judge, on a consideration of the very voluminous but often irrelevant evidence adduced by both sides, as to the jaghirdars relations with the other members of the family from the time the defendant’s ancestor was set aside in favour of his younger brother, arrived at the conclusion stated in para. 94 of his judgment, that there was not the slightest reason to believe that the family of the defendant and that of the polygala were joint or had been joint for a long time. 94 of his judgment, that there was not the slightest reason to believe that the family of the defendant and that of the polygala were joint or had been joint for a long time. When the case came before the High Court the whole question had been reconsidered in the judgment delivered by Lord Dunedin already referred to, and it had been laid down that the earlier decisions as to the right of succession were not affected, and were not intended to be affected by the line of decisions already mentioned, and that for purposes of succession an impartible estate must still be considered joint family property unless it were shown to be separate. It being established in the present case that this impartible estate was at one time the joint property of a family consisting of the descendants of the common ancestor of the defendant and the last holder, it is in their Lordships opinion incumbent on the plaintiff to adduce satisfactory grounds for holding that the joint ownership of the defendants branch in this estate was determined, so that it became the separate property of the last holders branch. Now reviewing the cases which are collected and examined i the careful and exhaustive judgment of Ramesam J. in the High Court, or referred to in the argument before their Lordships, it will be found that in the early decisions of the Board, which have now been reaffirmed in the leading case, the test applied was whether the facts showed a clear intention to renounce or to surrender all interest in the impartible estate. Thus in Chowdhry Chintamun Singh v. Nowlukho Konwari (L. R. 21. A. 263.), where there had been to some extent a separation in the family, it was held that the question was, whether the plaintiffs father and his branch [had waived the right of succession and had impressed upon the taluqa the character of separate property. Thus in Chowdhry Chintamun Singh v. Nowlukho Konwari (L. R. 21. A. 263.), where there had been to some extent a separation in the family, it was held that the question was, whether the plaintiffs father and his branch [had waived the right of succession and had impressed upon the taluqa the character of separate property. Again, in Periasami v. Periasami (L. R. 5 I. A. 61.), it was held on the facts that Muthu Vaduganatha Tevar, conceiving that he was entitled to succeed to the important zamindari of Shivagunga, had renounced for himself and his offspring all interest in the small and dependent paleiyam of Padamatur, thus, in the words of their Lordships in the second Naragunti case (( 1881) I. L. R. 4 M. 250, 264.), " manifesting his intention to separate himself and his descendants completely from the paleiyam." On the other hand, in Yanumula Venkayamah v. Yanumula Boochia Vankondora (( 1870) 13 Moo, I. A. 333.), it was held that when Bapamdora, a junior member of the family, drove out the fifth mansabdar, who had quarrelled with his overlord and involved the family in difficulties, and himself became the sixth mansabdar, he must 3 be held to have taken possession for the undivided family, and that it had not thereby become the separate property of Bapamdora himself and his descendants, so as to exclude the other members of the family from the right of succession. Similarly in the Naragunti case (( 1881) I. L. R. 4 M. 250, 264.) already mentioned, where the elder brother, Krishnappa, had stood aside and allowed his junior brother, Kuppi, to assert and to enforce the claims of his branch to succeed to the paleiyam, the full bench of the Madras High Court held that this transaction did not render the impartible estate the separate property of Kuppi and his line, but was " consistent with the enjoyment by the other members of the family of their coparcenary interests represented by their enjoyment of maintenance and possibility of succession," and later on, when construing a deed executed by the elder brother, the learned judges observed that it " cannot be held that he intended to renounce all claim on the part of himself and his heirs to the succession if it opened by reason of the extinction of the line of Kuppi." Those authorities, in their Lordships opinion, go far to support the inference deduced by Ramesam J. from an examination of the cases that in order to establish that an impartible estate has ceased to be joint family property for the purposes of succession, it is necessary to prove an intention expressed or implied on behalf 01 the junior members of the family to give up their chance of succession to the impartible estate. Their Lordships will now proceed to deal with the grounds of separation relied on in this case. It is, in their Lordships opinion, clear upon the foregoing authorities that the fact that the defendants ancestor was set aside in favour of the younger brother Annadana and his line in 1822 in the circumstances already stated, is not of itself sufficient to show that Ramappas line thereby lost their rights as members of the joint family to succeed to the estate on failure of Annadanas line. It only remains to be considered whether anything else has happened to produce such a result. It was contended for the appellant that, though there had never been any formal partition, the evidence showed that there had been a separation between the senior and the junior branches of the family, and also that the defendants branch had become divided inter se, and that, in either event, the defendants branch had lost their right of succession to the estate. Now once it is established—as it must now be taken to be —that for the purposes of succession an impartible estate may be joint family property, it is difficult to see upon what principle the fact that the members of the joint family or of any branch of the family have exercised their right of partition over their partible property should be held to divest them of their interest in the impartible estate over which they have no right of partition. It certainly cannot be put upon the ground of surrender or renunciation, for there is nothing in the fact of these partitions of their partible property to suggest any intention of renouncing their rights of succession to the impartible estate, nor do they receive any consideration for such renunciation. In Malabar, where all joint property is impartible, it is a matter of everyday occurrence for a female member of the tarwad and her descendants to acquire and hold property as a tahvizi or sub-tarwad without their rights of property in the main tarwad being in any way affected. Further, to lay down that members of a joint family could not partition their partible property without losing their rights of succession in the impartible estate would impose on these families a restriction on the free right to partition which has been so fully recognized by the decisions of this Board in recent years. Those decisions, which have been cited for the appellant, affirm the right of any adult member of the joint family to become divided in interest as to his share in the joint property by a clear expression of his intention to divide, but there would not appear to be anything in these decisions, of which the latest is Palani Ammal v. Muthuvenicatacharla Moniagar (( 1924) L. R. 52 I. A. 83.), to support the plaintiffs contention. On the other hand it is in conflict with the express decision of this Board in the Challapalli case. On the other hand it is in conflict with the express decision of this Board in the Challapalli case. (L. R. 27 I. A. 151.) In that case the plaintiff, who had sued for partition of a zamindari and other properties, and had failed as to the zamindari, which was held to be impartible, but had succeeded as to the other properties, was held not to have lost thereby his right to sue for maintenance out of the impartible estate on the ground that it had become the separate property of the holder. " It is true," their Lordships say, " that in that suit a decree was made for partition of a portion of the family property, but it was a very inconsiderable portion, and had no relation whatever to the zamindari estate.9 It has been contended that the weight of this decision is affected by the fact that it recognizes a right of the junior member to maintenance which has since been negatived by the decisions of this Board. It is, however, clear that exactly the same question would have arisen if the claim had been to succeed as next heir instead of for maintenance, and that the decision would have been the same way. In the present case the High Court, differing from the District Judge, have held that no separation has been proved either between the two branches or between the members of the first defendants branch inter se. Their Lordships agree with that decision. A great deal of evidence had been adduced in the trial Court as to whether the two branches had continued joint in food, worship and estate. Ramesam J., a Hindu judge necessarily of great experience in such matters, has pointed out that in Southern India evidence as -to separate food and the absence of joint worship is of very little weight. Ramesam J., a Hindu judge necessarily of great experience in such matters, has pointed out that in Southern India evidence as -to separate food and the absence of joint worship is of very little weight. As regards worship, there is practically no joint family worship, and the evidence which was adduced as to whether or not the defendants branch had any part assigned to them in the annual festival of the local temple in which the jaghirdar took a prominent part had no bearing on the present question, Similarly, as regards food, Ramesam J, has pointed out that it is not the practice for the junior branches of the family to live with the owner of an impartible estate, and that no inference as to separation can be drawn from separate living. In the present case, what happened was that the members of the first defendants branch continued to live in the old family residence on Tiruppadi hill in houses closely adjoining the so called palace of the jaghirdar, while the jaghirdar ceased to reside in the hills and acquired a new residence more to his taste in the plains. The position of the junior members was in no way altered ; they went on living as they did before, and continued to enjoy the privilege of cultivating land free of the plough tax and poll tax levied on the other inhabitants, a privilege which in the primitive conditions obtaining in these hills was equivalent to maintenance. They also on such occasions as marriages as members of the jaghirdars family received contributions from the inhabitants of the same kind as those received by the jaghirdar himself. As regards the alleged separation of the members of the first defendants branch inter se, the evidence was equally unsatisfactory. One of them, a hill munsif, and his brother went to live where their duties and business took them. There was also some evidence that some members of this branch of the family purchased provisions in the plains, it was suggested, on their own account, and also effected some sales of produce Their Lordships agree with the learned judges of the High Court that this is evidence of a very trivial and inconclusive kind. There was also some evidence that some members of this branch of the family purchased provisions in the plains, it was suggested, on their own account, and also effected some sales of produce Their Lordships agree with the learned judges of the High Court that this is evidence of a very trivial and inconclusive kind. As pointed out for the respondent, the facts proved in this case are not nearly so strong as the facts which were held by the Board to be insufficient to establish separation in Chowdhry Chintamun Singh v. Nowlukho Konwari (L. R. 2 I. A. 263.) and Lakshmi Devi v. Surya Narayana Dhutrazu. (L. R. 24 I. A. 118.) In the latter case there had been separate living for no less than seventy years. For these reasons their Lordships are of opinion that the appeal fails and should be dismissed with costs, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.