JUDGMENT C. C. Ghose and Cammiade, JJ. - This 'Rule was issued by ray learned brothers Mr. Justice Cumming and Mr. Justice Mallik, calling upon the District Magistrate of the 24-. Parganas and also on the complainant, Babu Anukul Chandra Mitra, to show cause why the proceedings against the Petitioner, who is a Barrister-at-law and an advocate of this Court, now pending in the Court of the Subdivisional Magistrate in Diamond Harbour, should not be quashed on these grounds, namely, first, that the petition of complaint did not disclose any offence committed by the Petitioner: secondly, that, on the allegations made by the complainant in his petition of complaint, no prima facie case had been made out against the Petitioner: and thirdly that, in view of the admission of the complainant that the alleged defamatory question was put by the Petitioner in cross-examination on instructions from the muktear, no charge could in law be sustained. 2. In order to understand the precise significance of the three grounds upon which the present Rule was issued, it is necessary to state shortly the circumstances giving rise to the present application. The Petitioner before us was engaged to defend one Heramat Ali who was charged with having committed an offence punishable u/s 504 of the Indian Penal Code, i.e., with having intentionally insulted a certain person with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, before the Deputy Magistrate of Diamond Harbour. It appears from the record that the case against the said Heramat Ali ended in his conviction. At the trial of Heramat Ali, a person of the name of Satish Chandra Bose, who is a muktear practising in the Courts at Diamond Harbour, instructed the present Petitioner on behalf of Heramat Ali. One of the witnesses for the prosecution was the present opposite party, Babu Anukul Chandra Mitra. After he had been examined-in-chief he was cross-examined by the present Petitioner, who asked him whether it was not a fact that he was low-born and untrustworthy, and that his mother had led a life of shame in Calcutta. One of the witnesses for the prosecution was the present opposite party, Babu Anukul Chandra Mitra. After he had been examined-in-chief he was cross-examined by the present Petitioner, who asked him whether it was not a fact that he was low-born and untrustworthy, and that his mother had led a life of shame in Calcutta. It is admitted by the opposite party that the question referred to was asked on the express instructions of the muktear, and the Petitioner's contention is that the question was asked in entire good faith and with the bond fide object of shaking the credit of the witness, Anukul Chandra Mitra, and to discover his position in life, and that he honestly believed that the imputation involved in the said question was well founded. The offensive question was asked in cross-examination on the 5th February, 1927. On the 8th February, 1927, the witness Anukul preferred a complaint against the present Petitioner and two others, u/s 500 of the Indian Penal Code, with having defamed him. The learned Magistrate issued process against Mr. Banerjee. 3. Mr. Langford James, who appears on behalf of the Petitioner, has contended before us that on the grounds on which the present Rule has been issued, it should be made absolute, and that it is right and proper that the proceedings against the Petitioner should be quashed. While insisting that the proceedings should be quashed, Mr. James, on the instructions of his client, has expressed his client's deep regret that he should have asked a question even in good faith, which has given pain to the opposite party, and has apologised on behalf of Mr. Banerjee. 4. In view of what has taken place in Court it is unnecessary for us to refer in detail to the state of the law in this matter in England or in India. So far as the English law is concerned, it is settled that advocates have absolute and unqualified privilege in respect of questions asked in cross-examination. So far as advocates in this country are concerned, by which expression I include vakils as well as pleaders, they have not such unqualified and absolute privilege as is accorded to their brethren in England (See in this connection Sullivan v. Norton (1886) ILR 10 Mad. 28., Re Venkata Reddly (1912) I.L R. 36 Mad. 216., Re Nagarji Trikamji (1894) ILR 19 Bom. 28., Re Venkata Reddly (1912) I.L R. 36 Mad. 216., Re Nagarji Trikamji (1894) ILR 19 Bom. 340., Bhaishanker Nanabhai v. Wadia (1890) 2 Bom. L.R. 3., Narandas Ramji Vs. Narandas Ramji, (1907) 9 BOMLR 287 ., Upendra Nath Bagchi v. Emperor (1909) ILR 36 Calc. 375., Nikunja Behari Sen v. Harendra Chandra Sinha (1913) ILR 41 Calc. 514. and McDonnell v. King-Emperor (1925) ILR 3 Ran 524. It is not defamatory to make imputation on the character and position in life of a witness, provided that the imputation is made in good faith and for the protection of the client who has engaged the advocate (see the 9th Exception to Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code). The presumption, therefore, is that a question asked in cross-examination, making an imputation as regards a witness, affords no ground ordinarily for a criminal prosecution, and that it is the duty of a Court, when complaint is made against an advocate for having used defamatory words, that it should ordinarily be presumed that the remark or question objected to was made on instructions and in entire good faith. No doubt there may be circumstances which may show that the question or remark objected to was made wantonly, or from malice or from private motive, but the greatest care ought to be taken to enquire into the circumstances, and, as stated in the Rangoon case, an opportunity should be given to the party accused of such offence to offer explanations before summons is issued. In this view of the matter, and having regard to the state of the record before us, we accept the statement that the offensive question in this case was asked in entire good faith and on instructions from the muktear instructing the learned advocate. At the same time there cannot be any doubt that, while Mr. Banerji may have acted from a sense of duty towards his client, and in entire good faith, he certainly failed to exercise his own discretion before he put the question to Babu Anukul Chandra Mitra. It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that while counsel have their privileges, they have also their responsibilities, and they ought never to abuse their privileges. We are glad that Mr. It cannot be too strongly insisted upon that while counsel have their privileges, they have also their responsibilities, and they ought never to abuse their privileges. We are glad that Mr. Banerjee has expressed his deep regret that he should have caused any pain to the witness, Anukul Babu, and we are equally glad that Anukul Babu, who has been present in Court before us, has through his learned vakil accepted Mr. Banerjee's apology. In this view of the matter we think the proceedings against Mr. Banerjee should be quashed, and we, accordingly, make the Rule absolute.