Sir Lancelot Sanderson. - This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Krishna Reddi, and a cross-appeal by Gandavaram Raghava Reddi and Kodur Venkataperumal Reddi, defendants 3 and 4, from a judgment and decree dated 19th April 1920, of the High Court of Madras, in Letters Patent Appeal No. 23 of 1918. The suit was brought as long ago as 1910, and it has had a chequered career. Defendant 1, Varada, was the father of defendant 2, Venkatarama, and the plain tiff is the son of defendant 2, and they are members of a joint undivided Hindu family. Venkatarama, defendant 2, had two wives; by his first wife he had a daughter, and by the second he had an only son, viz., the plaintiff. It was alleged on behalf of the plain tiff that he and his mother were obliged to leave the home of defendant 2, and to live with the plaintiff' mother' people for some three-and-a-half years before the suit was brought. Defendants 3, 4 and 5 were alleged to be close friends of defendant 2. By a document dated 22nd January 1910, defendant 1, Varada, purported to sell to defendant 3 properties comprised therein and specified in Sch. A to the plaint. The consideration was alleged to be Rs. 15,000 and the property was alleged to be the self-acquired property of defendant 1. On the same day, defendants 1 and 2 (defendant 2 purporting to act for himself and his minor son, the plaintiff), by another document purported to convey to defendant 4 the property comprised therein, and described in Sch. B to the plaint. The consideration was alleged to be Rs. 20,000, through a bond executed in favour of defendant 2 for discharging certain debts specified therein, and also other family debts. On 9th February 1910, defendant 2 purported, by means of an alleged deed of gift of that date, to give certain properties specified in Sch. C to the plaint in favour of a temple, of which defendant 5 was trustee. The plaintiff alleged that the proper ties specified in Sch. A, B and C were joint family properties of the family, of which the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 were members, that the above-men tioned alleged deeds of sale and the deed of gift were fraudulent and devoid of consideration, that there was no legal necessity, and that the alleged deeds were nullities. A, B and C were joint family properties of the family, of which the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2 were members, that the above-men tioned alleged deeds of sale and the deed of gift were fraudulent and devoid of consideration, that there was no legal necessity, and that the alleged deeds were nullities. On 31st January 1910, the alleged deeds of sale were registered, in spite of the plaintiff' mother' objection before the Registrar. The suit was brought on 15th April 1910 and the plaintiff claimed therein a declaration that the sale-deeds and the deed of gift were null and void and that he should be put in possession of the above-mentioned properties on behalf of the joint family. There was an alter native prayer for partition in case it was held that the deeds were in any way binding on the interests of defendants 1 and 2. The case of the contesting defendants, viz., defendants 3 and 4, was that the sales were bona fide and that consider ation passed for them, and that title was intended to and did actually pass to them. Defendant 1 was an old man, and it was alleged that defendant 2 was acting as manager of the family. The learned Subordinate Judge found that the sale-deeds were made to defraud ; the plaintiff, that they were not bona fide to discharge antecedent debts, and that they were not valid as against the plaintiff to the extent of his share, viz., one-quarter. He held that the properties in Sch. A were joint family properties. This finding is not now disputed. He held, further, that the gift of the properties in Sch. C was invalid. This finding also is not now disputed While holding that there was consider ation and that title was intended to pass under the two deeds of sale, he found there was no necessity for the sales and made a decree, dated 15th April 1913, that defendants 3 and 4 should put the plaintiff in possession of his share of the properties on his paying into Court Rs. 2,945-11-6 (i. e. one-quarter of Rs. 11,782-14-0), to be paid to defen dants 3 and 4 in the way they might arrange between themselves. It was further ordered that defendant 5 should put the plaintiff in possession of the properties comprised in Sch. C. The above-mentioned sum of Rs. 2,945-11-6 (i. e. one-quarter of Rs. 11,782-14-0), to be paid to defen dants 3 and 4 in the way they might arrange between themselves. It was further ordered that defendant 5 should put the plaintiff in possession of the properties comprised in Sch. C. The above-mentioned sum of Rs. 11,782-14-0 is explained by the fact that the learned Subordinate Judge found that debts to the extent of Rs. 11,782-14-0 had been discharged by defendant 4. The plaintiff and defendants 3 and 4 appealed against this decree to the learned District Judge. The plaintiff alleged that the alienations should have been set aside in toto as void, and defen dants 3 and 4 urged that the alienations were made for justifiable necessity and should have been upheld and the plain tiff' suit should have been dismissed. The learned District Judge held that Ex. 1 and 2, which are the alleged sale deeds of 22nd January 1910, not bona fide sales, but were resorted to screen the properties in case the plaintiff should bring a suit. In a later part of his judg ment he held that in pursuance of a scheme to defraud the plaintiff or his family the alienations were made, and defendants 3 and 4 actively participated in the fraud. He held, further, that the transactions were void even if consideration passed. He made a decree reversing the decree of the trial Court, in so far as it was against the plaintiff, and declaring that the plaintiff was entitled to get the sales of Sch. A and B lands set aside, and that plaintiff should recover possession of the said Sch. A and B lands on be half of the family on payment of Rs. 11,782-14-0, the amount of the debts which had been discharged by defendant. 4. The plaintiff' appeal was allowed and the appeal of defendants 3 and 4 was dismissed. Their Lordships understand that the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, as regards the properties comprised in Sch. C, was not interfered with. Defendants 3 and 4 appealed to the High Court of Madras and the plaintiff filed cross-objections. 4. The plaintiff' appeal was allowed and the appeal of defendants 3 and 4 was dismissed. Their Lordships understand that the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, as regards the properties comprised in Sch. C, was not interfered with. Defendants 3 and 4 appealed to the High Court of Madras and the plaintiff filed cross-objections. The learned Judges of the High Court, who heard the appeal, remanded the case to the lower appel late Court on the grounds that the learned District Judge had not recorded a formal decision on the question whether the alleged sale-deeds effected any real alienations, and that the learned District Judge had apparently decided the appeal on the ground that in any event a finding that the sales were merely fraudulent was a sufficient basis for the grant of the relief asked for. They required the learned District Judge to submit findings on the following issues : (1) Whether the alienation of A and B sche duled properties is not supported by considerntion? (2) Did either or both of the documents, Exs.1 and 2, effect a real transfer of the property which they purported to convey? Exhibit 1 is the deed of 22nd January 1910, in favour of Raghava (defendant 3), and Ex. 2 is the deed of 22nd January 1910, in favour of Venkataperumal (de fendant 4). The learned District Judge, on remand, found that the real object in resorting to sales was to screen the properties from the plaintiff, and that no consideration really passed; that the parties did not intend that the transactions should be genuine, and that the promissory notes only served to give an appearance of truth to the transactions. On the two above-mentioned issues he found that Exs. 1 and 2 were not supported by consideration and that those documents did not effect a real transfer of the pro perties which they purported to transfer. On the further hearing of the appeal, and upon the above-mentioned findings of the learned District Judge, the learned Judges of the High Court were agreed that the lower Court' findings must be accepted, and said that they would deal with the decree on the footing that as against the plaintiff at least the aliena tions of Sch. A and B properties were not for consideration and that Ex. 1 and 2 effected no real transfers. A and B properties were not for consideration and that Ex. 1 and 2 effected no real transfers. Unfortunately, the learned Judges could not agree as to the course which should be adopted. They however, came to the conclusion that the opinion of the senior Judge should prevail, and accord ingly they directed that the learned District Judge should be called upon to submit a further finding as proposed in the judgment of the senior Judge. The case, therefore, was again remanded to the learned District Judge for a finding on the issue whether as between defendants 1 and 2 and defendants 3 and 4 Exs. 1 and 2 effected a conveyance wholly or partially valid of the former' shares to the latter. The learned District Judge submitted his finding as follows : For these reasons, and for those set forth in in my previous finding, I find that, as between defendants 1 and 2 and defendants 3 and 4 Exs. 1 and 2 did not effect a conveyance of the former' share to the latter. The appeal then came once more before the learned Judges of the High Court. The senior Judge came to the conclusion that the appeal of defendants 3 and 4 should be dismissed and that the plaintiff' memorandum of objections should be allowed. The other learned Judge agreed that the final order should be as proposed by the senior Judge, but stated that he still adhered to the opinion which he expressed in his previous judgment and would have passed an order in the terms therein mentioned. The decree of the High Court, dated 15th February 1918, therefore, was to the effect that the decrees of the lower appellate Court and of the Court of first instance should be set aside, and a declaration was made that the sale-deeds of the 22nd January 1910, and the deed of gift dated 9th February 1910, were null and void and not binding on the plaintiff' family; and the Court further decreed that defendants 3 and 4 should put the plaintiff in possession of the plaint Sch. A, B and C proper ties, and that the Subordinate Judge should hold an enquiry regarding future mesne profits until date of delivery or three years from that date, whichever should be nearer, and pass a decree for them under O. 20, R. 12. A, B and C proper ties, and that the Subordinate Judge should hold an enquiry regarding future mesne profits until date of delivery or three years from that date, whichever should be nearer, and pass a decree for them under O. 20, R. 12. The decree contained a further direction for the pay ment by defendants 3 and 4 of the plain tiff' costs. This, however, was not the end of the proceedings in the High Court, for, as the learned Judges had differed, de fendants 3 and 4 appealed under the pro visions of the Letters Patent from the decisions of the learned senior Judge of the Division Bench. This appeal was heard by the learned Chief Justice and two other Judges of the High Court. The three learned Judges accepted the findings of the learned District Judge, which they stated were also accepted by the learned Judges of the Division Bench, viz., that the sales were purely sham transactions intended to defeat the plaintiff. They then stated that the only other question for consideration was whether the learned District Judge was right in making the relief which he had given to the plaintiff dependent upon the payment of the sum paid by defendants 3 and 4 for the discharge of the joint family debts. It should be noted that this order of the learned District Judge was not quoted correctly. The relief given by the learned District Judge to the plaintiff was dependent upon the payment of the debts which had been discharged by defendant 4; there was no reference to any sum paid for the discharge of debts by defendant 3 in the decree of the learned District Judge. The learned Judges came to the conclusion that there was no reason for inter fering with that part of the decree of the, learned District Judge. They, therefore decided to modify the decree made by the learned senior Judge of the Division Bench of the High Court by making the decree for possession dependent upon the payment by the plaintiff in the manner provided in the decree of the District Judge, and directing that the amount should bear interest at 6 per cent. from the date of the decree of the Subordinate Judge. The decree, as drawn up, directed that defendants 3 and 4 should put the plaintiff in possession of the plaint Sch. from the date of the decree of the Subordinate Judge. The decree, as drawn up, directed that defendants 3 and 4 should put the plaintiff in possession of the plaint Sch. A, B and C properties on payment by the plaintiff of Rs. 11,782-14-0, and that the said amount should carry interest at 6 per cent. per annum from 15th April 1913, until the date of payment. It is to be noted that the decree, as drawn up, went further than the judgment of the learned Judges who heard the Letters Patent appeal. The decree of the learned District Judge provided that the plaintiff should recover posses sion of the said Sch. A and B lands on payment of the sum of Rs. 11,782-14-0. The recovery of the Sch. C lands by the plaintiff was not dependent upon the payment of the said sum. But the decree made by the learned Judges who heard the Letters Patent appeal made the recovery of Sch. C lands dependent upon the above-mentioned pay ment, as well as the Sch. A and B lands. Since the decree of the learned Sub ordinate Judge, which directed that de fendant 5 should put the plaintiff in pos session of Sch. C lands, there had been apparently no question as to this part of the case. The decree in the Letters Patent appeal directed defendants 3 and 4 to put the plaintiff in possession of Sch. C lands, although, as far as their Lordships know, defendants 3 and 4 had nothing to do with Sch. C lands. It is, therefore, ap parent that the decree appealed from can not stand in its present form. There is, however, a serious question whether there is any reason why the de cree of the Division Bench of the High Court, dated 15th February 1918, should be interfered with. It was argued on behalf of defendants 3 and 4 before the Board that the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court were wrong in remanding the case for a find ing upon the two issues, which have al ready been referred to. It was argued on behalf of defendants 3 and 4 before the Board that the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court were wrong in remanding the case for a find ing upon the two issues, which have al ready been referred to. Their Lordships are not prepared to hold that the learned Judges were wrong in remanding the case for a clear and definite finding upon the issues whether the alienation of A and B scheduled properties was not supported by consideration, and whether either or both of the documents, Ex 1 and 2, effected a real transfer of the property which they purported to transfer. Their Lordships agree with the learned Judges that definite findings on these issues were material and necessary. If, then, the remand was not wrong, the findings of fact made by the learned District Judge upon these two issues were binding upon the High Court unless it could be said that there was no evi dence to support them. Their Lordships are clearly of opinion that such an objec tion to the findings cannot be upheld. The findings of the learned District Judge were adopted by the learned Judges of the Division Bench which heard the second appeal and by the learned Judges who heard the Letters Patent appeal, and their Lordships see no reason for differ ing from the conclusion arrived at by all the High Court Judges in this respect. There remains the question whether, in view of these findings, there was any ground for altering the decree of the Division Bench dated 15th February 1918. The learned Judges who heard the Letters Patent appeal apparently con cluded that it would not be equitable to allow the plaintiff to recover possession of the Sch. A and B property unless he paid the amount of the debts dis charged by defendant 4. In view, how ever, of the above-mentioned findings, which must be accepted, it cannot be held that defendant 4 did discharge family debts as alleged. The finding to that effect, which may be said to arise from the learned District Judge' decree of 26th February 1915, must be considered to have been eradi cated, when the learned District Judge, on remand and on further consideration of the evidence, came to the conclusion that there was no consideration for either of the alleged sale deeds, Ex. The finding to that effect, which may be said to arise from the learned District Judge' decree of 26th February 1915, must be considered to have been eradi cated, when the learned District Judge, on remand and on further consideration of the evidence, came to the conclusion that there was no consideration for either of the alleged sale deeds, Ex. 1 and 2, and that these deeds did not effect a real transfer of the properties. Subject to a further question which was raised by the learned counsel on behalf of defendants 3 and 4, their Lord ships are of opinion that there was no ground for interfering with the decree of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 15th February 1918. The other point to which reference has been made is as follows: It was argued on behalf of defendants 3 and 4 that, as between defendant 2 (viz., Venkatarama, the father of the plaintiff) and defendants 3 and 4, there was no reason for holding that the transfer was not complete, and that a decree should be made declaring that defendants 3 and 4 were entitled to the share of defendant 2 in the above-mentioned properties. Their Lordships are not satisfied that this point was raised before the learned Judges who heard the Letters Patent appeal, and, in view of the findings of the learned District Judge, that no real transfer was intended or effected between the above-mentioned parties, they are not prepared to enter upon the question further. For the reasons herein contained their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the plaintiff' appeal should be allowed and that defendants 3 and 4 should pay to him his costs of the appeal before this Board; that the decree of the High Court in the Letters Patent appeal No. 23 of 1918, dated 19th April 1920, be set aside with costs, and that the decree of the High Court in Second Appeal No. 711 of 1915, dated 15th Febru ary 1918, should be restored, and that the cross-appeal of defendants 3 and 4 should be dismissed with costs. Appeal allowed. .