Judgement Law. Rep. 54 Ind. App. 272 ( 1926- 1927) Maung Sin V. Ma Tok 109 Appeal (No. 68 of 1926) from a decree of the High Court, sitting at Mandalay (July 20, 1925), reversing a decree of the District Court of Sagaing. The appeal arose out of an application by the respondent in 1924 to execute a decree made in 1916. The facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The District Judge held that the application was barred by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. On appeal to the High Court the decision was reversed. The learned judges (Heald and Pratt JJ.) held that having regard to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Sch. L, art. 182, cl. 7, the application as to the annual payments clearly was not barred. With regard to the claim for possession they held that during the years before 1923 the appellant had incurred expenses which the respondent was entitled to accept as payments under the decree. They held that having regard to Tukaram v. Babaji (( 1895) I. L. R. 21 Bom. 122.) and other decisions those payments could be certified under Order XXI., r. 2, at any time, and that the applicant was entitled to have them certified. On that view there was no default until 1923, and the claim to execute arose then only. 1927. March 17, 18. Dunne K.C., and L. R. Dunne for the appellant. The article of the Limitation Act governing the application for possession was art.181, not art.182, and the period was three years from the date when the right to possession first accrued. No payments for the years before 1923 were proved, consequently the right accrued in 1917, and that part of the application was barred even if under art. 182, cl. 7, the application as to the two annual payments was not barred. The High Court was wrong in holding that there could be a certification under Order xxi., r. 2, at any time ; it is submitted that having regard to the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Sch. L, art. 181, it can be only within three years of the payment. Under the last clause of the rule the applicant could not rely on the earlier payments even if made. L, art. 181, it can be only within three years of the payment. Under the last clause of the rule the applicant could not rely on the earlier payments even if made. [Their Lordships intimated that they desired that the true construction of the decree should first be argued.] The decree cannot be read as a series of decrees operating in each successive year. The first default in payment gave rise to the right to possession given by the decree. To construe the decree otherwise would be to read into it words which are not there. S. Moses for the respondent was not called upon. March 31. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD CARSON. The respondent, who is the wife of the appellant, on September 30, 1916, obtained a decree in the District Court of Sagaing, in terms of an award which had been previously made, by which certain properties, contained in a list attached to the award and the decree, were to be left in possession of the appellant (defendant), who was to pay to the respondent (plaintiff) annually a sum of Rs.2000 in the month Kason, or in default of payment of the same (Rs.2000 annually) the said property contained in the said list would be made over to the plaintiff-respondent. It appears that after the making of the decree the parties lived together until the year 1923, when they separated. On October 8, 1924, the respondent filed an application in the District Court of Sagaing for execution of the decree against the appellant in default of payment of two instalments of Rs.2000 each for the Law. Rep. 54 Ind. App. 272 ( 1926- 1927) Maung Sin V. Ma Tok 110 years 1923 and 1924 respectively, and claimed that as the judgment debtor had failed to pay according to the decree, the Court might direct the delivery of the lands in the said list by the judgment debtor to the decree-holder, the respondent. The respondent also filed an application rendering an account of the sums alleged to have been received by her, in pursuance of the decree, up to May, 1922, and requesting that this might be noted in Court. The respondent also filed an application rendering an account of the sums alleged to have been received by her, in pursuance of the decree, up to May, 1922, and requesting that this might be noted in Court. The appellant, however, denied that he had ever made any annual payments, and pleaded that the execution of the decree was time barred, and also alleged that even if the payments had been made, they could not be recognized by the Court, because they had not been certified within the time limit of the Court under Order XXI., r. 2. The learned District Judge before whom the case was first tried held that as the payments alleged, even if made, had not been certified, they could not be recognized by the Court, and that therefore, as no payment had been made from the date of the decree to the date of the claim for execution, the claim was barred by the Indian Limitation Act. The High Court, however, decided that, having regard to the provision of cl. 7 of art. 182 of the First Schedule of the Act, no question of limitation could possibly arise as to the instalments, and that as failure to pay these two instalments was admitted, the respondent was entitled to execution in respect of them. It was also held that the respondent was entitled to execute the decree for the two annual payments, Rs.2000 each, and also, as she claimed, possession of the property to which the decree referred. The question whether the alleged payments during the intervening years between 1916 and 1923 were, in fact, paid, or were to have been taken as paid according to the evidence given, was discussed and considered at some length in the High Court, as was also the question whether the claim of the respondent to have such payments certified was barred by time limit. In the view, however, which this Board takes of the construction of the original decree, their Lordships think that it is unnecessary to pronounce any opinion upon the question of the application of the Limitation Act to the certification of the payments, or as to the effect of the absence of such certification. In the view, however, which this Board takes of the construction of the original decree, their Lordships think that it is unnecessary to pronounce any opinion upon the question of the application of the Limitation Act to the certification of the payments, or as to the effect of the absence of such certification. Their Lordships are of opinion that upon the true construction of the decree each instalment as it became due was a claim originating under the decree from the date when such claim arose, and that the provisions of cl. 7 of art. 182 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act therefore applied. It was contended, however, on behalf of the appellant at the hearing before their Lordships that even if a decree could be made for the annual payments due in 1923 and 1924, nevertheless the respondent was not entitled in default of each payment to have the property mentioned in the decree made over to the respondent, the argument being that, as no claim was made to the possession of the property on default of payment during the early years after the decree, time commenced to run from the date of the earliest default, and the claim to the land was therefore time barred. Their Lordships cannot agree with this contention. They are of opinion that upon the construction of the decree itself, on the occasion of a default in each payment the right of the respondent to have the said property made over to her arose, and therefore the claim to the lands was not time barred. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.