Lord Warrington of Clyffe. - By the Crown Lands Act, 1915, of South Australia it was provided (S. 9, xiii) that the Commissioner of Crown Lands might authorize any person to take possession of lands, messuages, or tenements belong ing to the Crown whereon any person is in unauthorized possession or occupation and to forcibly eject every person there from. Early in May 1923, the appellant, as Commissioner, purporting to act under the aforesaid statutory power authorized certain constables to take possession of the lands now in question and to forcibly eject the respondent therefrom; they took possession of such lands accordingly and ejected the respondent therefrom. Shortly afterwards the respondent, as plaintiff, instituted the present action against the appellant as defendant, claim ing damages for the entry and ejectment, alleging that it was wrongful. The appellant pleaded the above-men tioned statute, alleging that the respon dent was in unlawful possession or oc cupation of the lands in question. The question, then, is whether the res pondent at the time of his ejectment therefrom was in unlawful possession or occupation of the lands. The action was tried on the question of liability only by Pool, J., who by his judgment dated 17th April 1924, decided in favour of the respondent. On appeal to the Pull Court this judg ment was reversed by Murray, C. J., Angus Parsons, J., and Napier, J., who by their judgment dated 12th August 1924 allowed the appellant' appeal and ordered the respondent to pay the costs of the action. The respondent appealed to the High Court of Australia, who, on 17th Decem ber 1925, by a majority (Higgins, J , dis senting), allowed the appeal with costs and restored the judgment of Pool, J The present appeal is brought by spe cial leave of His Majesty in Council, the appellant undertaking to pay the respon dent' costs of the appeal as between soli citor and client in any event. There has thus been a very considerable difference of opinion in the Courts of the State and Commonwealth and even those Judges who came to a conclusion favourable to one side or the other were by no means unanimous in their reasons for their decisions. There has thus been a very considerable difference of opinion in the Courts of the State and Commonwealth and even those Judges who came to a conclusion favourable to one side or the other were by no means unanimous in their reasons for their decisions. At the conclusion of the War the Government of South Australia was faced with the problem of dealing with numbers of discharged soldiers, and deter mined, amongst other things, to make provision for the settlement of such men on unoccupied Crown lands and for ad vances out of public funds to men so settled, and for this purpose obtained the passing of the Discharged Soldiers' Settle ment Act, 1917, and subsequent amend ing Acts. The administration of these Acts was entrusted to the Minister of Repatriation, a corporation sole created by the Act of 1917. The appellant at all material times held the two offices of Commissioner of Crown Lands and Minister of Repatria tion. It is obvious that for the success of such a scheme two main objects were in view - the proper cultivation and de velopment of the land and the advantage of the men settled thereon. Superinten dents and inspectors were appointed whose duty it was to inform themselves of the conduct and prospects of the sett lers and to report thereon to the Minister. The respondent, a discharged soldier, who had had some training on a Govern ment training farm, by a letter dated 9th February 1918, applied for a grant of the lands in question, and on 25th February 1918, he was informed by letter of the Minister that his application was granted and of the conditions on which the land would be held. Except that the letter stated that for the first twelve months his occupancy of the land would be strictly probationary, it is unnecessary to set out its terms, inasmuch as they were embo died in the formal agreement to be pres ently mentioned. The respondent appears to have been let into possession of the lands on 1st March 1918. On 25th April 1920, he made a formal application for the grant to him of an agreement over the land. The agreement is dated 1st March 1919, the day on which the probationary period expired, but it was not actually sealed by the Minister or signed by the respondent until 26th February 1921. On 25th April 1920, he made a formal application for the grant to him of an agreement over the land. The agreement is dated 1st March 1919, the day on which the probationary period expired, but it was not actually sealed by the Minister or signed by the respondent until 26th February 1921. It was treated before this Board as common ground that for purposes of construction and effect the date of the agreement is 1st March 1919. The agreement purports to be made between the Minister of Repatriation of and for the State of South Australia contracting for and on behalf of His Majesty the King (thereinafter called the vendor) of the one part and the respon dent (thereinafter with his executors, administrators and assigns called the purchaser) of the other part. It may be observed in passing that it is clear from the contract that in every passage mate rial to the case "the vendor" means the Minister and not His Majesty himself. The agreement was to be for a term of 65 years, and thereby the vendor agreed to sell and the purchaser to purchase the land as therein described for £ 2,106, subject to a reservation of minerals. It is desirable to set out the provisions for payment of purchase money and interest. They are as follows: 3 The purchaser shall pay the said purchase money and interest thereon by instalments as follows : (i) No instalments shall be payable for the first year of the term of this agreement. (ii) During the succeeding four years of the term of this agreement the purchaser shall pay interest on the said purchase-money at the following rates. For the second year at the rate of £2 10s. per cent., for the third year at the rate of £3 10s. per cent., for the fourth and fifth years at the rats of £5 per cent. per annum. Such interest shall be payable by equal half-yearly instalments of £26 6s. 6d. during the second year, of £36 17s. 1d. during the third year, and of £52 13s. during the fourth and fifth years of the said term, such instalments to be paid on the 31st and 28th days of the month of August and February respectively in each year. 6d. during the second year, of £36 17s. 1d. during the third year, and of £52 13s. during the fourth and fifth years of the said term, such instalments to be paid on the 31st and 28th days of the month of August and February respectively in each year. (iii) During the remainder of the term of this agreement the purchaser shall pay the said purchase-money and interest on the balance thereof for the time being unpaid at the rate of £5 per cent. per annum.; by half-yearly instal ments of £55 10s. 11d., such instalments to be paid on the days of the months lastly herein before mentioned in each and every year until the whole of the said purchase-money and interest shall have been paid. Then follow certain conditions as to residence, the proper cultivation and improvement of the land, and other matters not material to be set forth in detail. Cl. 22 is as follows : If at any time within the period of ten years from the date of this agreement the vendor is satisfied on such evidence as he deems sufficient that by reason of incompetency or personal disability the purchaser is incapable of managing the said land with advantage to himself or that the purchaser has neglected to work the land satisfactorily or has been guilty of serious mis conduct during his occupation thereof, the ven dor by notice in writing given to the purchaser may determine this agreement upon and subject to such terms and conditions as the vendor thinks fit [and] upon the expiration of three months from the giving of such notice, this agreement and the right of the purchaser to complete the purchase and to possession of the said land shall cease and determine and be void, anything in this agreement to the contrary not withstanding. [The insertson of "and" though not in record, seems necessary]. After a provision in Cl. 23 for return in the event of surrender or forfeiture of instalments of purchase money already paid and for certain allowances for improvements, Cl. [The insertson of "and" though not in record, seems necessary]. After a provision in Cl. 23 for return in the event of surrender or forfeiture of instalments of purchase money already paid and for certain allowances for improvements, Cl. 24, so far as it is mate rial, is as follows: And it is hereby declared that if any of the instalments hereby reserved shall be unpaid and in arrear for more than six months after the day whereon the same is hereby made payable the purchaser having had at least three months' previous notice in writing demanding its payment this agreement may be cancelled by the vendor . . . and the vendor may thereupon insert a notice in the Government Gazette declaring this agreement to be forfeited and such notice appearing in the Government Gazette shall in all Courts and elsewhere and under all circumstances be taken to be conclusive evidence that this agreement has been legally cancelled and forfeited. The respondent never paid any of the instalments of interest payable under Cl. 3 (ii) of the agreement, and on 21st December 1921, there remained due the following, viz. : The payment due on 31st August 1920, £26 6s. 6d.; that due on 28th February 1921, £26 6s. 6d., and that due on 31st August 1921, £36 17s. 1d. It will be observed that of these payments the first two only were then six months in arrear. On 21st December 1921, the Assistant Secretary for Lands wrote and sent to the respondent the following letter: I am directed by the Hon. Commissioner for Crown Lands to advise you that it is intended to cancel Soldiers' Acquired Agreement No. 30 and to re-offer the land unless all arrears are paid within two months from this date. In the event of forfeiture taking place as in dicated, you will be liable for payment of amounts due up to the date of actual cancella tion. Payment due 31/8/20 ... £26 6s. 6d. and interest thereon. ,, 28/2/21 ... £26 6s. 6d. ,, ,, 31/8/21 ... £36 17s. 1d. ,, Agreement No. 30 is the agreement in question. After some correspondence the Secre tary for Lands on 15th November 1922, wrote to the respondent a letter in which he informed him that the agreement had been cancelled and the land was then Crown land and would be dealt with at an early date. £36 17s. 1d. ,, Agreement No. 30 is the agreement in question. After some correspondence the Secre tary for Lands on 15th November 1922, wrote to the respondent a letter in which he informed him that the agreement had been cancelled and the land was then Crown land and would be dealt with at an early date. In the Government Gazette of 7th December, 1922, there was published the following notice dated 6th December 1922: Notice is hereby given that the lease and agreements mentioned and described at the foot hereof have been cancelled by the Commissioner of Crown Lands in terms of S. 63, Crown Lands Act, 1915 and are hereby declared forfeited. (Signed) Geo. R. Laffer, Commissioner of Crown Lands and Immigration There then follows a reference to the agreement in question and the words "non-payment of arrears." Finally, to complete this part of the story, on 22nd December 1922, the appellant, as Commissioner of Crown Lands, signed a notice addressed to the Registrar-General and expressed to be given, in pursuance of S. 94 of the Real Property Act, 1886, that the Crown lease therein mentioned, being the agreement in question, had been lawfully and wholly determined. This notice was sent to the Registrar-General on 9th January 1923, and on 17th January 1923 a memorial thereof, as provided by S. 94 above mentioned, was duly entered in the Register of Crown Leases as provided by S. 94 above men tioned, by being endorsed on the copy of the agreement filed in such register as provided by S. 93 of the same statute. S. 94 is in the following terms : The Registrar-General on receipt of notice from the Commissioner of Crown Lands that any Crown lease has been lawfully forfeited or determined in whole or in part, shall make an entry to that effect in the Register of the Crown Leases, and such forfeiture or determination shall thereupon have effect. On 11th January 1923, the appellant, having been informed by the respondent' solicitors that in their opinion the notice of cancellation was not in order, consulted the Crown Solicitor, and was advised that it would be unsafe to rely on the document of 21st December 1921, either as a notice in writing demanding pay ment within Cl. 24 of the agreement or as a notice in writing within the meaning of Cl. 22. 24 of the agreement or as a notice in writing within the meaning of Cl. 22. He thereupon sent the respondent the following notice : The Minister of Repatriation of and for the State of South Australia, for and on behalf of H. M. King George V hereby gives you notice that he is satisfied upon evidence which he deems sufficient that you have neglected to work satisfactorily the land which by agreement for sale and purchase No. 30, Register Book, Vol. 645, fo. 10, you have agreed to purchase, namely, block 372, in the Hundred of Wongyarra, and block 340 in the Hundred of Gregory, and the said Minister accordingly hereby determines the said agreement, and gives you notice that, upon the expiration of three months from the giving of this notice, the said agreement and your right to complete the purchase and to possession of the said land will cease and determine and be void. Dated the 24th day of January 1923. (Signed) Geo. R. Laffer, Minister of Repatriation. To Francis Arnold Gillen. This notice was duly posted, addressed in accordance with the provisions in that behalf of the agreement, and was regis tered at the post office. The respondent refused to take it in, and it was ultimately returned through the dead letter office. After the three months had expired the appellant, as already mentioned, caused possession to be taken of the land, and ejected the respondent therefrom. On these facts the appellant makes the following submissions : 1. That the letter of 21st December 1921 was a sufficient three months' notice in writing demanding payment of the arrears and that as default was made in such payment he was, as vendor, justi fied in cancelling the agreement which was accordingly lawfully forfeited or determined. 2. That whether it was so or not such forfeiture or determination had effect under S. 94 of the Act of 1886 upon the entry above mentioned being made in the Register of the Crown Leases pursuant to the notice of 22nd December 1922. 3. That whether the agreement had already determined or not it was so deter mined at the expiration of three months from the date of the notice of 24th January 1923. 4. 3. That whether the agreement had already determined or not it was so deter mined at the expiration of three months from the date of the notice of 24th January 1923. 4. That if he establishes any one of these submissions the respondent was on 1st May 1923 in unauthorized possession of the land in question and his ejectment therefrom was justified by S. 9 (xiii) of the Grown Lands Act, 1915. As the appellant' final proceedings were based upon the provisions of Cl. 22 of the agreement and the notice of 24th January 1928 their Lordships propose to deal with this point first. The contention of the respondent on this point is that before deciding to termi nate the agreement it was incumbent upon the appellant to institute some judicial or quasi-judicial enquiry, or at the least to communicate to the respon dent the information he had received and his intention to act thereon and give him an opportunity of stating his case in answer thereto. The question is entirely one of con struction, and in common with all such questions can only be properly answered after a consideration of all the surround ing circumstances, the position of the parties to the agreement, its subject-matter, and the apparent purpose and object thereof, and in particular of the provisions to be construed. In the present case the transaction to which the agreement related was effected under the provisions of Acts of Parliament specially passed for the purpose of provid ing for discharged soldiers and in parti cular by settling them on unoccupied lands for the twofold purpose of develop ing such lands and at the same time affording to the soldier settlers the opportunity of making good in life. The administration of the Acts was en trusted to a special Minister called the Minister of Repatriation who was, of course, responsible to Parliament for his conduct in the matter. The clause in question was inserted in the agreement in pursuance of an impe rative regulation made under the Acts in question and having the force of an Act of Parliament : see Record, p. 169, Regn. 13 (h). The clause in question was inserted in the agreement in pursuance of an impe rative regulation made under the Acts in question and having the force of an Act of Parliament : see Record, p. 169, Regn. 13 (h). It is obvious that the authorities contemplated that amongst the more or less experimental cases there would be a number of failures, and its seems not un reasonable to conclude that they intended to put into the hands of the responsible Minister means whereby such cases might be readily dealt with, and, if necessary, a fresh start made. Turning to the words of the clause; it is provided that the power in question may be exercised by the vendor, viz., the Minister acting on behalf of His Majesty the King. The only conditions are that must be exercised within the first ten years, and that the vendor is satisfied on which evidence as he deems sufficient that one or the other of the specified arounds exists. There is nothing in the words used to suggest as essential to the satisfaction of the vendor any particular form of enquiry, judicial or otherwise. It may fairly be assumed that those who equired the clause to be inserted in every agreement of the kind were well aware that the vendor would be assisted by officers whose duty it would be to ascertain and report to him the conduct and prospects of the soldier settler, and that we would thereby be furnished with evi dence which he might well deem sufficient to enable him to form a judgment. Merely to inform the person affected of what was in contemplation would be useless unless he was also given some particulars of the information on which the vendor proposed to act and to give such information, if it consisted as it probably would, of reports from the Minister' officers, would render their position impossible, and the knowledge that such might be the result would intend to defeat the object with which they were appointed, viz., the obtaining of honest and true reports. Their Lordships agree with Higgins, J., in thinking that nothing is further from the intendment of this clause than a judicial or quasi-judicial enquiry. Their Lordships agree with Higgins, J., in thinking that nothing is further from the intendment of this clause than a judicial or quasi-judicial enquiry. They also agree with the following passage in his judgment : The power is confined to the first ten years, as years of probation; the contract is one in which the chief object of the vendor is to benefit the purchaser because the purchaser is a man who has served the country in the Great War; the facts of which the Minister is to be satisfied involve issues of such a character as might lead to endless debate; and the Minister as adminis srator is under a duty to other returned soldiers to see that the first holder is not blocking them without advantage to himself and under a duty to the State to see that its generosity is not wasted. In their Lordships' opinion the cases referred to in argument have no bearing on the present case. The vendor is under this clause exercising a merely administrative function, and is entitled to form an opinion on such materials as he himself thinks sufficient. There is no suggestion that the Appellant in the present case acted otherwise than in absolute good faith. There appears at p. 23 of the Record at line 24 a passage of the appellant' evidence in which he gives a general description of the materials before him, and this shows that he acted with great care and deliberation. On the whole their Lordships are of opinion that on this point the appellant is entitled to succeed. The Board having come to this con clusion, it may be said that a decision on the other points is unnecessary. But they have been argued and various opi nions thereon have been expressed in the Courts below, and their Lordships there fore think it right to state their own views upon them. On the first point their Lordships have no hesitation in saying that the letter of the 21st December, 1921, was not a sufficient demand in writing within Cl. 24 of the agreement. On the first point their Lordships have no hesitation in saying that the letter of the 21st December, 1921, was not a sufficient demand in writing within Cl. 24 of the agreement. It was, moreover, open to other attacks; it only purported to give two months for payment instead of three, one of the three sums or default in pay ment of which cancellation was threa tened was not six months in arrear, and no distinction was made between it and the other sums, so that if the letter was, in fact, a demand, it would require pay ment of a sum to which the clause did not apply at all. Counsel or the Appellant hardly pressed his submission on this point. As to the effect of S. 94, this is a more difficult question, but their Lordships are of opinion that the appellant' contention is correct. The Registrar is directed to make the entry in the register by which effect is given to the forfeiture or deter mination on receipt of the notice from the Commissioner that the Crown lease in question has been lawfully forfeited. In this respect the Crown lease is placed in a different position from that occupied by an ordinary lease. In this case the lessor, seeking to have registered the fact of re-entry, has to prove the fact, and that it has taken place in manner pres cribed by the lease to the satisfaction of the Registrar. The Registrar is then to make an entry in the register, and the estate of the lessee in the land is then to determine: see Real Property Act, 1886, S. 126. If the view of the appellant is not correct, then the Crown is in a less favourable position than the ordinary per son. In the latter case when once he has satisfied the Registrar and the necessary entry has been made in the register, the validity of the re-entry cannot be questioned, for the statute provides that the estate of the lessee in the land shall there upon determine, whereas in the case of a crown lease, if the respondent is right, validity or otherwise of the forfeiture or determination might remain an open question until it should be decided whe ther it was lawful or not. It is more rea sonable to suppose that in this case the duty of deciding the point was cast upon the responsible Minister whose view was to be taken as final so far as the register is concerned. The two cases would then be on the same footing, except only that in the one case the decision affecting the register would be that of the Registrar in the other that of the Commissioner. The Judges in the Courts below who decided against the appellant on this point do so on the ground that the forfeiture or determination which is to have effect is a lawful forfeiture or determination. Their Lordships cannot agree with this view; the forfeiture or determination is that above referred to viz., one which the Commissioner in his notice says has been lawfully effected. It may be worth noticing that this is apparently the view taken by the Registrar, for in the endorsement on the agreement he says that it has been lawfully determined as appears by the notice from the Commissioner. It has been suggested by the appellant that any hardship to individuals deprived of land by erroneous entries in the regis ter is met by the provision in the Act contained for compensation either by the person responsible for an erroneous entry (S. 203) or out of the assurance fund (S. 208). Beyond saying that there ap pears to be something, in the suggestion their Lordships express no opinion on the matter, as the point was not really be fore them. In their Lordships' view, therefore, the appellant fails on his first point but succeeds on this second. As he also succeeds on the third point he estab lishes his case on the fourth. Their Lordships are therefore of opinion that this appeal should be allowed and the order of the High Court of Australia discharged, the order of the Pull Court of South Australia being thus restored. As to the costs of this appeal the appellant, pursuant to his undertaking, must pay the costs of the respondent as between solicitor and client. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. Appeal allowed.