Judgement Appeal (No. 57 of 1925) by special leave from a decree of the High Court (May 19, 1921) affirming a decree of the Additional District Judge of Aligarh (August 2, 1918). The appeal, as it was ultimately presented, depended exclusively upon the true construction of a deed of settlement executed on September 4, 1875, by Jaswant Rao, the owner of an estate of great value in the Province of Agra. The suit was instituted by the appellant, who claimed the estate as the only son of Balwant Singh, who died in 1899. A provision in the deed in favour of any son who should be born to Balwant being inoperative in Hindu law, the plaintiff by his plaint claimed that the estate conferred by the deed upon the Rani and her successor terminated upon his attaining his majority, and that he was entitled a3 heir to Jaswant Rao. The deed of September 4, 1875, is fully set out in the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The Additional District Judge, to whose Court the suit was transferred, found on the evidence that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he was the legitimate son of Balwant. He was also of opinion that on the true construction of the deed the plaintiff, even if his paternity were established, was not entitled to the property in suit. Accordingly he made a decree dismissing the suit. An appeal to the High Court was dismissed by a judgment delivered on May 11, 1921. The learned judges (Mears C.J. and Banerji J.) agreed with the above finding of fact and affirmed the decree. The construction of the deed was not dealt with. On August 10, 1922, an Order in Council was made granting special leave to appeal. By an Order in Council made on July 26, 1926, the suit was remitted to the High Court to reconsider the whole case, having regard to certain further evidence which had been recorded in London in pursuance of an application by the appellant. The nature of that evidence and the terms of the order appear from the present judgment. The High Court having reconsidered the case, with the additional evidence, delivered a further judgment on May 11, 1927. The learned judges (Mears C.J. and Dalai J.) were of opinion that, having regard to the further evidence, the plaintiff had established that he was the legitimate son of Balwant. The High Court having reconsidered the case, with the additional evidence, delivered a further judgment on May 11, 1927. The learned judges (Mears C.J. and Dalai J.) were of opinion that, having regard to the further evidence, the plaintiff had established that he was the legitimate son of Balwant. On the construction of the deed they held that though the words in the preamble and clause 1 were sufficient to bestow upon the Rani full proprietary rights, the later clauses restricted her interest to the period ending in 1912, when the plaintiff attained his majority. They were further of opinion that even if the deed conferred an absolute estate subject to defeasance, that estate terminated upon Balwants son attaining majority, although the gift to him was invalid. 1927. Nov. 21, 22, 24, 25. Sir John Simon K.C., Maugham K.C., Kenworthy Brown and Motilal Nehru for the respondents. (Having regard to the judgment on remand the burden of the appeal was on the respondents.) The Privy Council decided in Balwant Singh v. Kishori (( 1898) L. R. 25 I. A. 54.) that the property now in suit was self-acquired. The earlier part of the deed conferred on the Rani an absolute gift; the later clauses made the gift subject to defeasance in certain events, but did not otherwise affect its nature. It is well established in English law that if a gift is subject to a condition subsequent, the invalidity of the condition does not affect the character of the gift; Co. Litt., p. 206a; Sugden on Powers, 8th ed., p. 526. That principle is embodied in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, ss. 28, 30. The Indian Succession Act, 1865, does not apply to this case, but it is noticeable that the same principle is there adopted 1 see ss. 118, 120 contrasted with s. 121. The words of gift being of sufficient amplitude the Rani took an absolute estate, even though she had not an absolute power of alienation Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao (( 1922) L. R. 49 I. A. 129, 135.); Prosunno Coomar Ghose v. Tarruchnath (( 1873) 10 Ben. L. R. 267.) ; Maynes Hindu Law, para. 664. The words of gift being of sufficient amplitude the Rani took an absolute estate, even though she had not an absolute power of alienation Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao (( 1922) L. R. 49 I. A. 129, 135.); Prosunno Coomar Ghose v. Tarruchnath (( 1873) 10 Ben. L. R. 267.) ; Maynes Hindu Law, para. 664. The object of the deed was to settle the estate to the exclusion of the settlors son, but at the date of the deed it was very likely that the settlors son would succeed if the deed had the meaning and effect which the plaintiff attributes to it. Doe v. Eyre (( 1848) 5 C. B. 713.), which was relied on by the High Court, is distinguishable. As was explained by Jessel M.R. in Hurst v. Hurst (( 1882) 21 Ch. D. 278, 293.), the will there under consideration showed an intention that there should be a forfeiture of the prior estate upon the happening of the event. That was also the case in Robinson v. Wood. (( 1858) 27 L. J. (Ch.) 726.) The deed now under consideration cannot be so construed ; the intention was to terminate the Ranis estate only in the event of a grandson succeeding under the deed. Upjohn K.C, Sir George Lowndes K.C. and Dube for the appellant. On the true construction of the deed the Rani took the estate in a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary capacity to protect it pending the majority of a grandson. Until that event she was to represent the settlor, and upon its happening her estate was to end. The decisions in Doe v. Eyre (3) and OMahoney v. Burdett (( 1874) L. R. 7 H. L. 358.) are precisely in point. The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, was enacted after the execution of the deed, and cannot affect its construction. The word “conditions” in the deed is not used in the technical sense of a “condition subsequent." The words “as I owned it" in the case of a gift to a wife do not connote the full estate Harilal v. Bai Rewa. (( 1895) I. L. R. 21 B. 376.) The power to appoint is inconsistent with an absolute estate, especially as the appointees are referred to as the settlors heir not the Ranis. (( 1895) I. L. R. 21 B. 376.) The power to appoint is inconsistent with an absolute estate, especially as the appointees are referred to as the settlors heir not the Ranis. In property given by a Hindu to his wife she may have either a womans estate in which case it descends to his heirs, or an absolute estate, in which case it descends to hers. The respondents contend here for a mixed estate—namely, absolute but without a power of alienation, There is no reported case of a womans estate of that character, and it would give rise to difficulties Koonjbehari Dhur v. Premchand Dutt. (( 1880) I. L. R. 5 C. 684.) It is an essential of stridhan that the holder should have a right of disposal during her life Venkata Rama Rao v. Venkata Sariya Rao. (( 1880) I. L. R. 2 M, 333, 335 (P. C.)) The deed should be construed according to the ideas of Hindus p and therefore in a manner to provide a succession of male heritors Mahomed Shumsool v. Shewukram. (( 1874) L. R. 2 I, A. 7, 14.) Sir John Simon K.C. in reply. Both Koonjbehari Dhurs case (1) and Harilals case (I. L. R. 21 B. 376.) are inconsistent with Surajmani v. Nath Ojha (( 1907) L. R. 35 I. A. 17.) and more recent decisions of the Board,, and the former was commented on in Janki v. Bhairon (( 1896) I. L. R. 19 A. 133, 134.), where it was stated that in Hindu law a husband could give property to his wife as her stridhan without giving her a power of alienation. 1928. Jan. 31. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN WALLIS. This appeal was by the plaintiff Narsingh Rao, son of Balwant Singh and grandson of Raja Jaswant Rai, both deceased, against the first defendant, Rani Kishori, since deceased, the widow of Jaswant Rai, the second defendant, her daughter, Beti Maha Lakshmi Bai, and the third defendant, Musammat Rameshwar Debi, widow of Lal Raghubans Rao, the second defendants son. The appellants suit was to recover the immovable properties which were the subject of a conditional deed of gift executed on September 4, 1875, by Jaswant Rai in favour of the first defendant, his junior wife. The appellants suit was to recover the immovable properties which were the subject of a conditional deed of gift executed on September 4, 1875, by Jaswant Rai in favour of the first defendant, his junior wife. The plaintiff claimed that under the deed of gift he was entitled to succeed to these properties on attaining majority, and that, even if the provisions of the deed in his favour were inoperative as opposed to the rules of Hindu law, still Rani Kishori took only an estate limited in point of duration which determined when he attained majority, so that he thereupon became entitled to take as heir of the settlor Jaswant Rai. The District Judge found that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he was the legitimate son of Jaswant Rais only son, Lal Balwant Singh, and that, even if he were legitimate, he was only entitled to take the estate by virtue of a condition subsequent terminating the estate limited to the Rani and her successors in the event of his attaining majority, and that this condition of defeasance, being illegal and void under Hindu law as created in favour of an unborn person, according to the decision of this Board in Tagore v. Tagore (L. R., I. A. Sup. 47.), was inoperative and void, and left the Ranis estate unaffected. When the case came before the High Court on an appeal by the plaintiff against the decree of the District Judge dismissing the suit, the learned judges dismissed the appeal on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove his legitimacy, and did not go into any other question. In coming to this conclusion, they attached great weight to the fact that the plaintiffs mother had refused to submit herself to a medical examination with reference to the question whether she had ever borne a child. The plaintiff having obtained special leave to appeal from this decree, presented a petition to His Majesty in Council praying that medical evidence on the question should be heard and recorded. The plaintiff having obtained special leave to appeal from this decree, presented a petition to His Majesty in Council praying that medical evidence on the question should be heard and recorded. His prayer was granted, and two lady gynaecologists, having examined the plaintiffs mother and certified that she had given birth to a child, and both parties having agreed to be bound by this certificate, subject to proof as to the identity of the lady examined, the case was remitted by an Order of His Majesty in Council to the High Court, with a direction that in the event of their being satisfied as to the identity of the person so examined, the High Court should reconsider the whole case on the footing that the certificate was correct and pass judgment thereon, and that the appeal should stand over, with liberty to either party to restore or amend it as they might be advised after the High Court had passed its judgment. After a rehearing on remand the High Court delivered judgment, holding, in the light of the new evidence, that the plaintiff was the legitimate son of the late Balwant Singh, and that, though the provisions in the deed in his favour were void under Hindu law, as he was not in existence at the date of the deed, still on a true construction of the deed of gift the first defendants interest was determined on the plaintiffs attaining majority, and that his father Balwant Singh being then dead, he became entitled to come in as next heir of the settlor. The plaintiffs appeal to His Majesty in Council against the judgment and decree of the High Court has again come on before their Lordships, and in view of the fact that the remand judgment was in favour of the plaintiff appellant, the case has been argued before their Lordships as if the respondents on the record were appealing from that judgment. At the outset Sir John Simon, who appeared for the respondents, disclaimed any intention of questioning the finding of the High Court in favour of the plaintiffs legitimacy, which must therefore be taken to be established. On the other hand, the finding of both the lower Courts that the provisions of the deed in favour of the plaintiff, who was not then born, were illegal and void, has not been questioned on his behalf. On the other hand, the finding of both the lower Courts that the provisions of the deed in favour of the plaintiff, who was not then born, were illegal and void, has not been questioned on his behalf. The sole question, therefore, for their Lordships in this appeal is whether, as contended for the defendants, on the true construction of the deed the Rani took the estate, subject to a condition of defeasance in the event of the plaintiffs attaining majority, and this condition subsequent being void, the Rani was entitled to retain the estate freed from the condition, or whether, as contended for the plaintiff and held by the High Court, the Rani only took a limited estate as custodian of the property until the plaintiff attained majority, when her estate was determined, and the provision in favour of the unborn son being illegal, the estate passed as on intestacy to the heir of the settlor—that is to say, to the plaintiff. It will be convenient in the first instance to set out the following table showing the relationships of the parties in the suit to the settlor, Jaswant Rai— 1. Ratan Kuer d. Oct. 2, 1880. | Raja Jaswant Rai (donor) d. Aug. 24, 1879. = 2. Rani Koshori (1st defendant), d. May 23, 1921. | Lal Balwant Singh b. = 1. Naraini Kuer D a ugh t e r 1841 convicted, Sept. (no issue). Mahalakshmibai, 2, 1871. released from prison, Aug, 1883, d. Jan 21, 1899. = (June (16. 1884) . 2. Kaithi Wali Lady (no issue and b. 1868)2nd defendant and 1st respondent) | p r e d eceas ed Son Lal = Rameshwar Debi husband). Raghubans Rao d. (3rd defendant and 2nd 3. Dunajau, married without issue, 1890. 1911. | Narsingh Rao (Plaintiff), b. March 2, 1894. In 1875, at the date of the deed, Raja Jaswant Rai, the settlor, had a son by his senior wife, Lal Balwant Singh, aged thirty-four, who was then in prison undergoing a sentence of thirteen years imprisonment for culpable homicide, and a daughter, Maha Lakshmi Bai, aged seven, the second defendant, by his junior wife, Rani Kishori, the first defendant. It appears clearly from the recitals in the deed, which is set out below, that the settlors intention was to disinherit his unworthy son, Balwant Singh, as regards his self-acquired property. It appears clearly from the recitals in the deed, which is set out below, that the settlors intention was to disinherit his unworthy son, Balwant Singh, as regards his self-acquired property. It appears equally clearly from the body of the deed that his intention was that, if Balwant had a son, that son on attaining majority should have the estate. This was a very natural wish on the part of a Hindu, and it is what would have happened if effect could be given to the deed according to its terms. Unfortunately, under a rule of law which has now been altered by the Legislature but not retro spectively, the provisions of the deed in favour of Balwants unborn son are void and inoperative, and the plaintiff has therefore to show that, on the true construction of the deed, there was an intestacy when he attained majority by reason of the failure of the gift over in his favour and that he became entitled to come in as heir of the settlor. It is unnecessary to set out the earlier recitals showing that the property, which was the subject of the gift, was the self-acquired property of the donor, but it may be mentioned that, after his release from prison, Balwant Singh sued to recover the properties included in the deed on the grounds that they were joint family property and that, even if they were not, the donor had no power to dispose of self-acquired immovable properties. This came before this Board on appeal to His Majesty in Council in Balwant Singh v. Kishori (L. R. 25 I. A. 54.), when both these contentions were rejected and the decree of the Appellate Court dismissing the suit was affirmed. This came before this Board on appeal to His Majesty in Council in Balwant Singh v. Kishori (L. R. 25 I. A. 54.), when both these contentions were rejected and the decree of the Appellate Court dismissing the suit was affirmed. The rest of the deed was as follows — " I am now 63 years old, and weakness and loss of strength are soon coming on, and there is no hope of an issue being born to me, and out of the two sons and a daughter born, Lal Balwant Singh is the eldest, who has, sice attaining majority, proved himself unworthy and of bad character ; that in spite of the instructions that were conveyed to him to correct his morals, he tried to make himself worse, and openly declared himself to be my enemy, inasmuch as, in consultation with the wishes of the officers for the time being, an agreement was obtained from him to the effect that he would get Rs.100 per month and improve and correct his morals, but it did no good and he began to commit heinous offences without even fearing the officers for the time being ; that at last he had been committed to prison for 13 years on a charge of murder, and he is still in jail; that, looking to these facts, I was compelled to exclude him from right of representing me and from inheritance, under a petition dated August 5, 1872, and the younger sons life did not last, having died when only 18 months old. I have now only one daughter, aged 7. I had two Ranis, one the mother of Lal Balwant Singh, who died of the grief brought about by the misconduct and misdeeds of her son, and the other, Rani Kishori, who is still alive. Therefore, for maintaining the name and protecting the property, it is necessary that there should be some representative, and my old age and uncertainty of continuous breathing stand in the way of delay, and besides Rani Kishori, my younger wife, there is no one else entitled to represent me. Therefore, for maintaining the name and protecting the property, it is necessary that there should be some representative, and my old age and uncertainty of continuous breathing stand in the way of delay, and besides Rani Kishori, my younger wife, there is no one else entitled to represent me. I have, therefore, made a gift in favour of Rani Kishori, of all my movable and immovable properties, together with all the rights and interests, both inherent and adventitious, all and in every shape, and appoint her my successor and repre sentative, subject to the following conditions — " I. That the zamindari and malguzari in five villages, Lakhna, etc., as lakhiraj in perpetuity, belonging to me, would as well be owned by the Rani Sahib just as I owned it, and all the rights both inherent and adventitious and saier and cesses, etc., appertaining to the zamindari would be in her possession just as I owned it, and complete possession has from this date been delivered to her and petitions would be presented in revenue courts, I would get her name entered in lieu of that of mine. " II. That the jagir property in seven villages, Biaspur, etc., I make a gift of in favour of the Rani Sahib, but I shall appropriate their income during my lifetime, and would, from time to time, spend that income at my pleasure ; but whatever would out of this income be left as surplus after my death and ten per cent, that may for the future be fixed as 6 malikana, the Rani Sahib would be entitled to get it, and none would be able to offer obstruction, and the Ranis name would as well be entered in respect of these seven 1 jagir villages. " III. That I have with great exertion built a temple of Kalka Debiat Lakhna, the Rani Sahib would be the superintendent (mutawalli) and in possession of the temple without being interfered with by any one, but the ‘ charava (offerings) income of the said temple would be used in the work of the temple, such as the improvement of buildings, etc., according to her wish, just as I have up to date done, and out of the income of the temple, it would never be legal to bring any portion whatever of the income to her personal use. " IV. " IV. I have built a temple known as Chatri in Lakhna in honour of my deceased father, Khuman Singh, and the haveli now occupied by the Rani Sahib appertains to it. That Chatri and haveli are from before under the management and superintendence of Rani Kishori it would as heretofore remain in her possession and management of as mutawalli. Be it known that Thakurain Adhur Kunwar having fixed and assigned the malikana of Dhanna, etc., at Rs. 1249-11-0 for the expenses of Chatri, etc., had got mutation effected in favour of the Rani Sahib ; but that amount appearing insufficient to meet the expenses relating to bhog (charity), pay of Pujaris, peons and other servants of the ‘ Chatri and for education of Brahman youths, and the amount of malikana allowance having been decreased in the recent settlement, since then out of the l jagir income of Lakhna, etc.—five villages, Rs.10 per day, I have further allowed for the expenses of Chatri, that the Rani Sahib should as usual continue to pay the malikana of Dhanna, etc., and Rs.10 from the income of five jagir villages, and that money should be spent in the aforesaid work of that 1 Chatri and in preparation of goods and furniture that may add lustre to the Chatri. "V. Generally the rights of my servants, friends and defendants that are now fixed, they are binding upon the Rani Sahib subject to the conditions and incidents with which they were fixed. As the daughter has not yet been married, the Rani Sahib is bound to prove her generous and charitable spirit in this ceremony and do not give less than Rs.50,000. Thakurain Adhar Kunwar Sahiba is the head member of my family, and the Rani Sahiba is, by reason of her being young, bound to pay respects due to her old age and attend upon and render service to her. She would continue to pay Rs.50 per month to the married wife of Lal Balwant Singh. " VI. Thakurain Adhar Kunwar Sahiba is the head member of my family, and the Rani Sahiba is, by reason of her being young, bound to pay respects due to her old age and attend upon and render service to her. She would continue to pay Rs.50 per month to the married wife of Lal Balwant Singh. " VI. That from this date up to 16 years, i.e., when Lal Balwant Singhs age, which is now 34 years, reaches to that of 50, any male issue be born by married wife, he would be entitled to that property on attaining majority, and the Rani Sahib would be bound to retain proprietary possession until he attains majority and deliver the property to him on his attaining majority. If up to this period no male issue be born to Lal Balwant Singh, without waiting for the birth of an issue to him, the Rani Sahib would have the power to appoint owner and representative and heir of the property either Maha Lachhmi Bai, daughter, who is now 7 years old, or her male issue if one be born to her, subject to this condition that the said daughter and her son take up their permanent residence at Lakhna. If both of these opportunities are not available, the Rani Sahiba is entitled to adopt and appoint him representative and owner of the riasat and property aforesaid, a male issue of Chaudhri Bhup Singh, resident of Mehdipur, who may be considered by the Rani Sahib competent and fit, and in the three cases the Rani Sahib would be entitled to impose any condition or conditions which she thinks necessary in regard to manner of succession and possession of property. " VII. If a son be born to Lal Balwant Singh by the married wife after the expiry of the fiftieth year of his age he would even then be entitled to the property after attaining his majority. " VII. If a son be born to Lal Balwant Singh by the married wife after the expiry of the fiftieth year of his age he would even then be entitled to the property after attaining his majority. Therefore the said property should remain either in the possession of the Rani Sahib or in that of the daughter, daughters son or adopted son, whomsoever Rani Sahib might have appointed as representative up to the time that boy of Lal Balwant Singh does not attain the age of 18, and then he would be the owner and hold possession of the property, and from whose possession the son of Lal Balwant Singh obtains the property, he would pay that person Rs.100 per month. " VIII. If by chance, before the son of Lal Balwant Singh attains majority, and an issue being born, or before the expiry of 50 years of his age, or in case of no issue being born, the Rani Sahib dies, the said property should devolve on Maha Lachmi Bai or on her son, if alive, and he would remain in possession until a son is born to Lal Balwant Singh by the married wife and attains majority, i.e., he would obtain possession when 18 years old, and the person formerly in possession should get Rs.100 per month. " IX. Lal Balwant Singh personally has been excluded from inheritance since August, 1872 ; he has no power and authority to interfere with the proprietary possession and future powers of the Rani Sahib ; but if Lal Balwant Singh after his release adopts an approved and grave course and remains obedient and in the service of Rani Sahib as a son, adopting such a mode of life which Rani Sahib may approve, he would besides Rs.50 per month allowed to his married wife under para. V. of this deed of gift, get Rs.100 per month from the Rani Sahib for his personal expenses, and this pay is not based on any title, nor would Lal Balwant Singh be able to claim it; nay, its continuance would depend at the pleasure of Rani Sahib. V. of this deed of gift, get Rs.100 per month from the Rani Sahib for his personal expenses, and this pay is not based on any title, nor would Lal Balwant Singh be able to claim it; nay, its continuance would depend at the pleasure of Rani Sahib. " X. This deed of gift would, subject to all the terms, be held enforceable from this date ; but, subject to the condition that, in case the Rani Sahib dies before me, the entire subject of gift property would revert to me, and the deed of gift, together with all the terms, would be cancelled. " XI. The Rani Sahib has started a money-lending and sarrafi firm in the name of Sri Gobindji and Rani Kishori at Lakhna with her stridhan/ and the deeds relating to debts appertaining to the firm and mortgage deeds and property, which she has contained in her name, I have nothing whatever to do with the business, etc., appertaining to it; they are her special property, and the deed of gift or any of its terms do not at present or for the future affect the same." After a very careful examination of the able arguments urged before them, their Lordships are of opinion that there are insuperable difficulties in the way of holding that the estate taken by the Rani was limited, as contended for the plaintiff. According to the recitals, the settlors object was to disinherit his son Balwant, and this purpose was effected by giving the estate to the Rani so that it was no longer descendible to the heirs of the settlor. After reciting that the settlor had been compelled to exclude Balwant Singh from the right of representing him and from inheritance, and that for the purose of maintaining the name and protecting the property it was necessary that there should be some representative (literally some one to stand in his place), and that there was none but Rani Kishori the deed goes on "I have therefore made a gift in favour of Rani Kishori of all my movable and immovable properties .... and appoint her my successor and representative subject to the following conditions." Under condition 1 the villages were to be " owned by the Rani Sahib just as I owned," and complete possession was to be given her. and appoint her my successor and representative subject to the following conditions." Under condition 1 the villages were to be " owned by the Rani Sahib just as I owned," and complete possession was to be given her. Similarly as to the 10 per cent, on the revenue of seven villages, condition 2 provides that, after the settlors death, " the Rani Sahib would be entitled to get it and none would be able to offer obstruction." In their Lordships opinion there is nothing so far in the deed to cut down the gift or prevent the Rani from taking such an estate in the properties, which are the subject of the gift, as a wife takes in immovable property given her by her husband. According to the Hindu law, such property is taken by her as stridhan and is descendible to her heirs and not to his, and would devolve first on her daughter and her daughters daughter and failing them on her daughters son, thus effectually excluding Balwant; but over such property, it is stated by Mr. Mayne, in his Hindu Law, para. 664, she would have no right of alienation unless the gift was coupled with an express power of alienation, or, as has been held by this Board, unless there are words of sufficient amplitude to confer it upon her. Some reliance has been placed on the fact that there is no mention of the donees heirs such as is generally found where it is intended to create an estate of inheritance, but condition 6, which has been so much discussed, shows clearly that it was the settlors intention to establish a line of succession that would exclude Balwant. Condition 6 provides that if a son is born to Balwant Singh within the next sixteen years—in other words, before he attains the age of fifty—such son is to take the property on his attaining majority, and the Rani is bound to retain " the proprietary possession " until he does attain majority. Condition 6 provides that if a son is born to Balwant Singh within the next sixteen years—in other words, before he attains the age of fifty—such son is to take the property on his attaining majority, and the Rani is bound to retain " the proprietary possession " until he does attain majority. If, however, no son is born to Balwant before he attains the age of fifty, she is not to be bound to retain the proprietary possession herself, but is expressly empowered to give or bequeath it to her daughter or her daughters son, " to appoint owner and representative and heir " her daughter— the second defendant—or her daughters son if she have one, and failing them to make an adoption, and in regard to all three cases she is empowered " to impose any condition or conditions which she thinks necessary in regard to manner of succession and possession of property." These provisions, which are only material in so far as they show the intention of the settlor, in their Lordships opinion, clearly show that it was the intention of the settlor that she should not only have the estate, which under Hindu law a woman has in property given her by her husband, but should also have power to alienate it to her daughter or her daughters son, thus enabling her, it may be observed, to prefer the daughters son to the daughters daughter, who would be a preferential heir to her stridhan. The effect was, whilst leaving the property to descend as stridhan and so exclude Balwant Singh to enable the Rani to transfer it as she was expected to do, to the daughters son if there was one, because according to Hindu religious ideas a daughters son stands in the place of a son and like a son is putrika, or a liberator from put. It was only failing them that she was to have power to adopt, and in all cases she was to have power to impose conditions of succession. These provisions, in their Lordships opinion, make it clear that it was intended to give her a womans estate enlarged by the powers of alienation to her daughter and daughters son, already specified, and that, in default of the exercise of these powers, it was to descend to her heirs. These provisions, in their Lordships opinion, make it clear that it was intended to give her a womans estate enlarged by the powers of alienation to her daughter and daughters son, already specified, and that, in default of the exercise of these powers, it was to descend to her heirs. Condition 7 then deals with the birth of a son to Balwant Singh after he had attained the age of fifty, when the widow might have transferred the estate to her daughter and her daughters son or to an adopted son under condition 6, and provides that she or her transferee should retain the property until Balwants son attained his majority and hand it over then. Further, it provides that, on succeeding to the property, Balwants son should be bound to pay Rs.100 a month to the person from whom he obtained it, an obligation by which the plaintiff would not be bound if it were held that he was entitled to succeed, not under the deed, but as heir of the settlor. Then comes condition 8, which, as translated, is not very clearly worded, but provides for what is to happen in case of the Rani dying before Balwant Singh had attained the age of fifty in case a son had been born to him but had not attained majority, or in case no son had been born to him. In either event the Ranis powers of disposition under condition 6 would not have come into operation, and, accordingly, the settlor himself provides that in these events the property is to " devolve on Maha Lakshmi Bai or son if alive," who should remain in possession until a son was born to Balwant Singh and attain majority, in which case he would take, and the person on whom the property had devolved would be entitled to receive, Rs.100 a month. These provisions for events which have not happened, in their Lordships opinion, were intended by the settlor to effectuate his declared object of disinheriting his son Balwant and preventing him from claiming to come in as heir on the death of the Rani. The same intention is clearly expressed in condition 9, which, whilst making some provision for Balwant Singh, recites that he personally had been excluded from the succession and had no power or authority to interfere with the property, possession and future powers of the Rani. The same intention is clearly expressed in condition 9, which, whilst making some provision for Balwant Singh, recites that he personally had been excluded from the succession and had no power or authority to interfere with the property, possession and future powers of the Rani. Condition 10 contains an additional condition of defeasance in the event of the Rani predeceasing the settlor, when the property would revert to the settlor. This clause, which was no doubt intended to enable the settlor to make a fresh settlement, does not appear to throw any light on the present question. In their Lordships opinion the testators intention clearly was that the property should pass to the Rani and her successors under the deed to the exclusion of the settlors heirs, unless a son was born to Balwant and attained majority. In that event Balwants son was to come in and take the estate under the deed, and not as the settlors heir on the suggested intestacy arising from the failure of the gift over to him, following the determination of the estate limited to the Rani and her successors until Balwants son should attain majority. Two intentions appear clearly in the deed, one to exclude Balwant altogether from inheritance, the other to bring in his son on his attaining majority. Both intentions are effectuated under the deed by holding that the Rani and her successors took an estate subject to defeasance on the happening of a certain event, the attainment of majority by a son of Balwant. On the other hand, the construction contended for on behalf of the plaintiff would defeat the settlors intention by letting in Balwant as the settlors heir if he was alive, as he very well might have been, when the plaintiff attained majority. For these reasons their Lordships are of opinion that the provisions in the unborn sons favour amount to a condition subsequent, and it is a well settled principle of law5 which has now been embodied in ss. For these reasons their Lordships are of opinion that the provisions in the unborn sons favour amount to a condition subsequent, and it is a well settled principle of law5 which has now been embodied in ss. 28 and 30 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, that in such a case " if the ulterior disposition is not valid the prior disposition is not affected by it." Their Lordships are therefore unable to agree with the learned judges of the High Court " that the Rani was left as a custodian of the property until its final devolution to a full owner." The Rani and her successors were put in, not merely as custodians until the attainment of majority of Balwants son, an event which might never happen, but also to effect the disherison of Balwant himself by leaving the property away from the settlors natural heirs. In their Lordships opinion, the terms of the deed clearly show that they were given an estate which was not limited but absolute, in point of duration, and subject only to defeasance in case of Balwant having a son who attained majority or the Rani dying before the settlor. The learned judges also held that there was a cesser of the Ranis estate " on the attainment of eighteen years by the appellant, and not on the appellant being capable of taking possession of the property, citing Doe v. Eyre (5 C. B. 61.), a judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber. That was the case of a gift to A. B. for life with a gift over which failed, and what was held was that it was clearly not the intention of the settlor that the heirs of the first donee should take in preference to the heirs of the settlor. In the present case the intention was wholly to exclude the heirs of the settlor as such as a means of keeping out his unworthy son, and, in their Lordships opinion, it is not open to the Court to adopt a construction which lets them in. For these reasons their Lordships are of opinion that the decree of the High Court confirming the decree of the lower Court, and dismissing the suit, was correct, and that this appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. For these reasons their Lordships are of opinion that the decree of the High Court confirming the decree of the lower Court, and dismissing the suit, was correct, and that this appeal fails and must be dismissed with costs. The costs of the remand to the High Court must also be paid by the appellant. They will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.