Judgement Appeal (No. 31 of 1929) from a decree of the High Court (January 3, 1924) affirming a judgment of the Additional District Judge of Sheikhupura (March 26, 1923) which reversed a decree of the Subordinate Judge. The respondents sued to redeem a mortgage of 1880; the defendants were the original mortgagee, and the present appellants who] represented three persons (two of whom were dead) who had purchased the mortgagees interest. The appellants pleaded that they had bought the equity of redemption in or about 1892, and that they had since held the land not as mortgagees but as owners. The Transfer of Property Act not applying in the Punjab the sale and transfer could validly be effected orally. Five issues were settled, including the following (1) Does the relation of mortgagor and mortgagees subsist between the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 3 to 7? (4.) Was the land in suit sold to defendants Nos. 3 to 7 by Sultan and Mohammad Bakhsh (the mortgagors)? At the trial both parties adduced oral and documentary evidence. The appellants relied on, inter alia, a record-of-rights of the village prepared in 1892 under the Punjab Land Revenue Act (XVII. of 1887), s. 31, the names of those represented by them were entered as owners ; by s. 44 the entries were to be presumed to be correct. The facts of the case appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit, holding that the sale was proved having regard to the presumption under s. 44 of the Act. On appeal the Additional District Judge made a decree for redemption. He held that as the mortgage was admitted, the onus was upon the defendants to prove that it was not subsisting, and that the onus was not discharged, A receipt for the purchase price put forward by the defendants was in his view a concocted document, and consequently he could place no reliance on the rest of the verbal evidence which they adduced; further, he found errors in the entries in the register. An appeal to the High Court was dismissed by Broadway and Forde JJ., who held that under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, ss. 100, 101, the finding that there had been no sale was binding in second appeal. 1929. Nov. 12, 14. An appeal to the High Court was dismissed by Broadway and Forde JJ., who held that under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, ss. 100, 101, the finding that there had been no sale was binding in second appeal. 1929. Nov. 12, 14. De Gruyther K.C. and Wallach for the appellants The question to be determined in the suit was not a question of fact but of inference of law. Consequently the finding of the District Judge was not binding upon the High Court under ss. 100, 101, of the Code of Civil Procedure Ram Gopal v. Shamskhaton (( 1892) L. R. 19 I. A. 228.) ; Chaudhri Satgur Prashad v. Kishore Lal (( 1919) L. R. 46 I. A. 201.); Dhanna Mai v. Moti Sagar.(( 1927) L. R. 54 I. A. 178.) In the case last cited the question was whether the inference from the facts was that a permanent tenancy existed, which is analogous to the question in this case, which is whether the mortgage was subsisting? Further, the finding was not binding, because, having regard to the presumption which arose under s. 44 of Act XVII. of 1887, the District Judge was wrong in law in placing the onus upon the defendants. Effect was given by the Board to that presumption in Court of Wards v. Ilahi Bakhsh. (( 1912) L. R. 40 I. A. 18.) The evidence did not displace the presumption so arising. Dube for the respondents The mortgage being admitted, the question was purely one of fact—namely, had the defendants proved the alleged sale to them. The finding of the District Judge therefore was binding upon the High Court and upon the Board Durga Choudhrain v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri (( 1890) L.R. 17 I. A. 122.) ; Nafar Chandra Pal v. Shukur.(( 1918) L. R. 45 I. A. 183.) That the District Judge had to consider the entries in the record-of-rights did not prevent his finding being one of fact as they were not the foundations of title or rights but merely part of the evidence of the fact to be decided Luchmun Lal Chowdhry v. Kanhya Lal Mowar (( 1894) L. R. 22 I. A. 51.); Midnapur Zamindary Co. v. Uma Charan Mandal.(( 1923) 29 Cal. v. Uma Charan Mandal.(( 1923) 29 Cal. W. N. 131(P.C).) The entries in the record-of-rights did not affect proprietary rights, and were of slight evidence in any case Nirman Singh v. Rudra Partab Narain Singh (( 1926) L. R. 53 I. A. 220.); Nageshar Bakhsh Singh v. Ganesha.(( 1919) L. R. 47 I. A. 57.) Further, under the definition in s. 3, sub-s.2, of Act XVII. of 1887 a " landowner " in that Act includes a mortgagee in possession. In any case the sale was not proved. The trial judge, as well as the District Judge, found that the witnesses in support of the alleged receipt were unreliable. Wallach replied. Dec. 16. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR BINOD MITTER. The facts out of which this present appeal arises are shortly as follows— By a registered deed dated March 15, 1880, and executed by Sultan and Mohammad Bakhsh, certain lands and wells were mortgaged to the aforesaid Chaudhri Miran Bakhsh in consideration of the sum of Rs.1200. The mortgagees went into possession, and it was a term of the mortgage that the mortgagors would not be competent to redeem the mortgaged premises until after twenty years from the date of the mortgage. About the year 1891, Miran Bakhsh transferred his interest to Wali Mohammad, Ali Mohammad, and Mohammad Bakhsh, sons of Dare Khan, and they went into possession after their purchase. It is alleged by the defendants that the mortgagors Mohammad Bakhsh and Sultan sold their equity of redemption about the year 1891 or 1892 to Wali Mohammad (appellant No. 1, defendant No. 3), and Ali Mohammad and Mohammad Bakhsh (both dead and represented by the other appellants) for Rs.2000, and Miran Bakhsh released the mortgaged premises to them. The plaintiffs, who are the mortgagor Mohammad Bakhsh and the descendants of Sultan, denied the alleged sale, and instituted the present suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Sheikhupura on November 17, 1920, against the sons of Miran Bakhsh and the present appellants for the redemption of the mortgaged premises. The only point discussed before the Board is whether the appellants have proved the sale. The learned Subordinate Judge who tried the case held that the alleged sale had been proved. The only point discussed before the Board is whether the appellants have proved the sale. The learned Subordinate Judge who tried the case held that the alleged sale had been proved. From his judgment and decree there was an appeal to the Additional District Judge of Sheikhupura (hereinafter referred to as the Appellate Court) who came to an opposite conclusion. There was a second appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Lahore, and they held that the question whether there had been a sale or not is a question of fact, and that it was not open to them to reconsider the evidence, as the Appellate Court had not contravened any of the provisions of s. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The first question, therefore, for their Lordships consideration is whether the decision of the Appellate Court— namely, that there had been no sale—is a pure question of fact, for, if that is so, then its decision was final. In the Punjab the sale might have been oral, as it was not governed by the Transfer of Property Act. The case for the appellants is that the sale was oral, and the mortgagors on such sale executed a receipt showing that Rs.800 had been paid to them and Rs.1200 to Miran Bakhsh. The appellant Wali Mohammad gave evidence and called witnesses to prove the execution of the receipt, but both the trial and the Appellate Court held that the receipt had not been proved. The appellants case further was that on the sale there was mutation in favour of Wali Mohammad and his brothers, but that the mutation records had been burnt during the Gujranwala riots in the Punjab in 1919. They, however, relied on a number of entries in the record-of-rights prepared under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, being Act XVII. of 1887, and they contended that these entries recognized the appellants or their predecessors as the owners of these properties, and that such entries duly made under s. 44 of the said Act are to be presumed to be correct as to the facts they record until the contrary is proved. The Appellate Court held that the mortgage being admitted, the onus was on the appellants to show that the mortgage had been extinguished by subse quent sale. The Appellate Court held that the mortgage being admitted, the onus was on the appellants to show that the mortgage had been extinguished by subse quent sale. Their Lordships agree with the High Court that the Appellate Court was right in its view on the question of onus. In the view of the latter Court some of the entries in the record-of-rights were proved to be wrong, and after con sidering the evidence, both oral and documentary, and giving effect to the statutory presumption, it held that the onus upon the appellants had not been discharged. The first question therefore for consideration is whether its decision that the sale has not been proved is a question of fact or involves any question of law. It has been argued by the counsel for the appellants that the inference drawn from the various entries in the record-of-rights is a question of law, and that the Appellate Court drew a wrong inference from them. The respondents contended that these various entries are merely links in the chain of evidence to prove the sale, and that the question whether there was a sale or not is a pure question of fact. Sect. 100 of the present Code of Civil Procedure has replaced s. 584 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882. These sections are substantially the same in their terms and have often been considered by the Board and the different High Courts in India. Sect. 100 of the present Code of Civil Procedure has replaced s. 584 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882. These sections are substantially the same in their terms and have often been considered by the Board and the different High Courts in India. No doubt questions of law and fact are often difficult to disentangle, but the following propositions are clearly established— (1.) There is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of facts, however gross the error may seem to be see Durga Choudrain v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri.(L. R. 17 I. A. 122,127.) (2.) The proper legal effect of a proved fact is essentially a question of law; but the question whether a fact has been proved when evidence for and against has been properly admitted is necessarily a pure question of fact see Nafar Chandra Pal v. Shukur.(L. R. 45 I. A. 183, 187.) (3.) Where the question to be decided is one of fact, it does not involve an issue of law merely because documents which were not instruments of title or otherwise the direct foundations of rights, but were really historical materials, have to be construed for the purpose of deciding the question see Midnapur Zamindary Co. v. Uma Charan Mandal.(29 Cal. W. N. 131.) In the last cited case the question the Board had to decide was the date of the origin of under-tenure. The first Appellate Court fixed the date from the contents of some documents. No oral evidence had been called in this case. (4.) A second appeal would not lie because some portion of the evidence might be contained in a document or documents, and the first Appellate Court had made a mistake as to its meaning see Nowbut Singh v. Chutter Dharee Singh.(( 1873) 19 Suth. W. R. 222.) The judgment in that case was delivered by Sir Richard Couch, under s. 372 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1859, but it has repeatedly been followed in decisions under the Civil Procedure Codes of 1882 and 1908. W. R. 222.) The judgment in that case was delivered by Sir Richard Couch, under s. 372 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1859, but it has repeatedly been followed in decisions under the Civil Procedure Codes of 1882 and 1908. Great reliance was placed by the appellants counsel on Dhanna Mal v. Moti Sagar (L. R. 54 I. A. 178.), but there the tenancy was admitted, and the question was whether it was permanent or not, and the solution of it depended upon what was the legal inference to be drawn from proved facts, or, in other words, the question was what was the legal effect of proved facts. The question whether a statutory presumption is rebutted by the rest of the evidence, being evidence such as in this case, is a question of fact see Kumeda Prosunna Bhuiya v. Secretary of State in Council.(( 1914) 19 Cal. W. N. 1017.) That case was recently approved by the Board in the case of Midnapur Zamindary Co., v. Secretary of State in Council.(( 1929) L.R. 56 I. A. 388.) Their Lordships are of opinion that whether there was a sale or not is a question of the fact. In this case both parties led evidence, oral and documentary. The Appellate Court, as has already been stated, held that many of the entries, notwithstanding the presumption under s. 44, were incorrect. The entries relied on by the appellants were not the foundations of their title, but were mere items of evidence adduced by them to prove the sale. The only question as regards the entries is their evidentiary value on the fact in issue—namely, the sale. Their Lordships therefore have no hesitation in holding that the finding of the Appellate Court that there was no sale is final, and that the judgment of the High Court is right. The appeal should therefore be dismissed with costs, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.