JUDGMENT Ananthakrishna Ayyar, J. 1. While the plaintiff was a minor the suit land belonging to him was sold to the defendant by D. Ramakrishna Rao who held a power-of-attorney as agent of Sundaramma, the mother and guardian of the plaintiff. The sale was for Rs. 300 under Ex. 1 dated 3rd February 1912. The plaintiffs suit was filed within three years after his becoming major, and the prayer in the plaint was to set aside the sale-deed and to recover possession with mesne profits. 2. The defendants plea was that the sale was valid and binding on the plaintiff. Both the lower Courts upheld the defendants plea and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff has accordingly preferred this second appeal. 3. It is better to note the recitals in the sale-deed in the first instance. Such recitals form a contemporaneous record of the representations made to the alienee, on the faith of which the alienee purchased the property. In the sale deed the only recital is that the property was sold for " our expenses." Next I proceed to note the exact averments in the written statement filed by the defendant in the present suit. Para. 2 of the written statement is as follows: The said Ramakrishna Rao effected the sale on behalf of the next friend under the mukhtarnama obtained from her. Therefore the said sale should be confirmed. At the time of the sale suit land was barren. The plaintiffs next friend could not pay Government theerva. Fearing that the suit land would be lost if it was sold by auction for Government revenue and with the intention of affording facilities for the maintenance of plaintiff she sold the suit land. The sale is not fraudulent. 4. On these pleadings issue 2 was framed by the trial Court to the following effect: " whether the sale deed is valid and binding on plaintiff." 5. The following are the facts, either found by the lower Court or admitted. The plaintiff is an inamdar owning large properties, Defendant 1 as D. W. 1 admitted that the whole of the Kyasankere village is the shrothriem of the plaintiffs family. The plaintiff pays about Rs. 800 as assessment to Government. D. W. 9 says that The plaintiffs estate was possessed of vast extent of lands worth about Rs. 70,000 to Rs. 80,000. The plaintiffs uncle and father had deposited about Rs. The plaintiff pays about Rs. 800 as assessment to Government. D. W. 9 says that The plaintiffs estate was possessed of vast extent of lands worth about Rs. 70,000 to Rs. 80,000. The plaintiffs uncle and father had deposited about Rs. 8,000 in the Local Fund Office. It was the plaintiff who drew the amount about three or four years ago. The plaintiffs family was a rich family and there were also outstandings due to the family. 6. In the face of these admissions, it is difficult to see how the sale could be upheld on the strength of the recital in the sale-deed, viz., that the suit property was sold for the purpose of meeting the maintenance expenses of the plaintiff and his mother. 7. With reference to the allegations made in the written statement, we have again the following facts either proved or admitted. The suit property is under a, tank; the said tank is in proper condition. Some other lands of the plaintiffs estate are under a different tank which breached some years ago. But the tank under which the suit lands are situated is in a proper condition. Two-thirds of plaint lands had been always under cultivation except for two years prior to the sale. The remaining one-third of the suit land was always waste. The assessment due on the suit land was Rs. 23-7-0. P.W. 2 says that he was paying Rs. 50 as rent while he was a tenant. The District Munsif remarked that even if that be true " the income from the land would not be up to much." The plaintiffs mother was practically a pardanashin woman. She " had a vast extent of lands more than she could manage:" See D. W. 9. The defendant did not ask Sundaramma directly about the circumstances connected with the sale. The defendant was a tenant of the estate and has his own lands, five fields off the suit lands. The defendant was a tenant of the plaintiffs family and knew the plaintiffs family since plaintiffs grand-fathers time. 8. The plaintiff is a big inamdar and possessed of large extent of lands and also cash. The sale was for Rs. 300. The defendant asked an aunt of the minor and ascertained that others had offered only a lower price. The lower appellate Court in para. 8. The plaintiff is a big inamdar and possessed of large extent of lands and also cash. The sale was for Rs. 300. The defendant asked an aunt of the minor and ascertained that others had offered only a lower price. The lower appellate Court in para. 5 held that legal necessity for the sale was not proved; but it hold that there is sufficient evidence to show that the transaction was of real benefit to the minors estate, because the lands ware in a poor condition and neglected and plaintiffs mother could not find tenants to take the lands. 9. On these grounds the lower appellate Court confirmed the decree of the 1st Court dismissing the suit. 10. The question then is whether the sale is binding on the plaintiff in the facts and circumstances stated above. 11. As remarked by the Privy Council in Hanuman Prasads case [1854-57] M.I.A. 393: The power of the manager of an infant heir to charge an estate not his own is under the Hindu Law a limited and qualified power. It can be exercised rightly in case of Deed or for the " benefit " of the estate. 12. The expression "benefit of the estate" has been explained by the Privy Council in the case reported in Palaniappa Chetty v. Devasikamony Pandara Sannathi A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 33l. In the case before the Privy Council the trustee of a temple granted permanent lease at a fixed rent and on payment of a premium of a piece of land belonging to the temple which was lying waste and the ruins on the land had become a nuisance. Proceedings before the Magistrate to abate the nuisance were either pending or about to be taken. In those circumstances a permanent cowle was granted. The High Court had held that the grant was not binding on the temple: Devasikamony Pandara Sannadhi v. Palaniappa Chettiar [1911] 34 Mad. 535 The" Privy Council confirmed the judgment of the High Court. Proceedings before the Magistrate to abate the nuisance were either pending or about to be taken. In those circumstances a permanent cowle was granted. The High Court had held that the grant was not binding on the temple: Devasikamony Pandara Sannadhi v. Palaniappa Chettiar [1911] 34 Mad. 535 The" Privy Council confirmed the judgment of the High Court. After noticing earlier cases which held that it was a breach of duty on the part of a shebait, unless-constrained by an unavoidable necessity, to grant a lease in perpetuity of debut--tar lands at a fixed rent, however adequate that rent may be at the time of granting, their Lordships proceeded to observe that though those cases dealt with agricultural lands, there was not reason why the principles they establish should not apply to a building site in the street of a village. They observed further that No authority had been cited to show that a shebait is entitled to sell debuttar lands--solely for the purpose of investing the price of it so as to bring in an income larger than that derived from the debuttar lands itself. 13. Referring to Hanooman Prasads case" (1), this is what their Lordships say at p. 716: In that particular case in reference to which this language was used, the " necessity " for the loan would appear to be plain and imperative, the benefit to the estate, the preservation of its existence, obvious. More-over, the transaction impeached was not an absolute alienation of property, but merely a pledge of it which might at any time be redeemed. The case in no way resembles the present case. 14. With reference to the expression " benefit to the estate " their Lordship say at p. 718 as follows: It is impossible, their Lordships think, to give a precise definition of it applicable to all oases, and they do not attempt to do so. The preservation, however, of the estate from extinction, the defence against hostile litigation affecting it, the protection of it or portions from injury or deterioration by inundation; these and such like things, would obviously be benefits. 15. I should like to extract one more passage from the Privy Council judgment. The preservation, however, of the estate from extinction, the defence against hostile litigation affecting it, the protection of it or portions from injury or deterioration by inundation; these and such like things, would obviously be benefits. 15. I should like to extract one more passage from the Privy Council judgment. At p. 720: The grant of a cowle may have been an easy and convenient way of getting the nuisance upon the site abated; but in their Lordships view, the evidence does not establish that the shebait was constrained by any necessity (as that term is in such a connexion understood) to make this grant, or that any benefit accrued to the charity estate from the making of it. If the matter stood; thus, their Lordships would be clearly of opinion that the cowle was invalid. 16. In the present case also it seems to me that the same remarks apply equally. In this case also the sale of the land may-have been an easy and convenient way of getting rid of the trouble of managing the land, but that does not show that the manager was constrained by any necessity to sell this land. It is not pretended that there were any debts due by the minors estate which justified the sale. On the contrary it is admitted that the minor was a big inamdar possessed of lands worth thousands of rupees paying an assessment of about Rs. 800 per year. Nor was the present a case of bona fide exchange of lands for convenient management. The tank irrigating the land was in an efficient condition. No doubt it is said that two-thirds of the land sold remained uncultivated for two years prior to the sale; but that evidently was due to the reason given by D. W. 9 viz., that "she had more lands than she could manage." The circumstance that a minors guardian finds that the minor had more lands than the guardian could manage is more a ground for the guardian retiring from management and leaving the management to abler hands than for the guardian effecting the sale of the properties. If the purchasers contention be upheld, then it would follow that the more incapable a guardian is to manage the minors property, more powers she would possess by way of effecting a sale of minors properties. This could not possibly be the law. If the purchasers contention be upheld, then it would follow that the more incapable a guardian is to manage the minors property, more powers she would possess by way of effecting a sale of minors properties. This could not possibly be the law. I do not find any legal grounds for upholding the sale in the present case. 17. Cases were cited before me where it was held that the manager of a joint Hindu Family or a Hindu widow could sell family property situated at a distant and inconvenient locality for purchasing new lands near the joint family residence. Such cases stand upon an entirely different footing. The purchaser of the joint family lands would in such circumstances, in case the joint family or the reversioners impugne the sale to him, have a charge on the newly purchased properties which were purchased from the purchase money paid by him. In the case before me it is not pretended that any new lands were purchased with the price paid by the defendant. 18. The decision reported in Nagindas Maneklal v. Mahomed Yusuf A.I.R. 1922 Bom. 122 was relied on by the learned advocate for the respondent. There the adult coparceners of a Hindu joint family owning several houses contracted to sell one of such houses which was in such a dilapidated condition that the municipality required it to be pulled down. The joint family was in fairly good circumstances and it was not necessary to sell the house. The Court held that the agreement of sale was binding on the minor coparceners because the adult coparceners had properly and wisely decided to get rid of the property which was in such a state as to be a burden to the family. With reference to that decision I have to make two observations: (1) the land sold in the present case could not properly be compared to the dilapidated house referred to in the Bombay case Here the -land was fetching a rent of Rs. 50 a year while the assessment due on it was only Rs. 23-7-0. No (such or similar) circumstances as were proved with reference to the house in the Bombay case have been proved with reference to the land in the present case. 50 a year while the assessment due on it was only Rs. 23-7-0. No (such or similar) circumstances as were proved with reference to the house in the Bombay case have been proved with reference to the land in the present case. The learned Judges remarked (at p. 315 of 46 Bom.) even taking it that such power to alienate can be exercised only when a clear case of necessity is made out, I think that the term "necessity" must not be strictly construed. The benefit to the family may under certain circumstances mean a necessity for the transaction. (2) The decision of the Privy Council -in the case reported in Palaniappa Chettiar v. Devasikamoney Pandara Sannadhi, has not been referred to. Further in a later case, reported in Ragho v. Zago Ekoba A.I.R. 1929 Bom. 251, the decision in Nagindas Maneklal v. Mahomed Yusuf, is explained as based on the special finding in that case. 19. Finally it was urged that the minors guardian had effected sales of some other " properties also of the minor and that the plaintiff has not chosen to impugne the same, and it was said that it was owing to enmity that the present suit was instituted. 20. The answer to this is obvious. Alienations made by a guardian, if not legally justified are only void-able and not void. The minor on coming of age may elect to stand by the same or may elect to avoid the same. The circumstance that the plaintiff has elected not to impugne some sales by guardian is no ground by itself to debar him from impugning the same to the defendants, if on the facts proved this particular sale by the guardian is not binding on the plaintiff. The motive of the plaintiff in bringing the suit is irrelevant if his legal right to the property is proved, though in appreciating the evidence, the motive may throw some light in particular cases. 21. For the above reasons I am of opinion that the sale to the defendant by Ramakrishna Rao, who held a power-of-attorney from the plaintiffs mother and guardian is not binding on the plaintiff. 21. For the above reasons I am of opinion that the sale to the defendant by Ramakrishna Rao, who held a power-of-attorney from the plaintiffs mother and guardian is not binding on the plaintiff. I accordingly allow the second appeal; but before passing a final decree it is necessary to have finding on issues 4 and 5 framed by the District Munsif, and also on issue 3 (slightly altered) whether the defendant is entitled to any and (if) so, to what amount of values of improvements made by him. The finding will be submitted by the lower appellate Court on the evidence on record, within six weeks; ten days for filing objections.