JUDGMENT : SEN, J.:— This is an application for the revision of the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge of Agra on May 10, 1929, refusing to set aside an order of discharge passed by an Honorary Magistrate with first class powers on April 4, 1929. 2. There is a wall, which separates the house of Bohra Madan Lal from a temple known as that of Radha Mohanji Maharaj. Bohra Tara Chand, the accused, has been described by the Magistrate as one of the trustees of the said temple. A complaint was launched by Madan Lal under Sections 448 and 379 of the Penal Code, 1860 against Tara Chand, charging him with house trespass and theft on the allegations that, on December 28, 1928, the accused, with an associate named Pandit Girdhari Lal, removed certain door-leaves and a window frame from the intervening wall, which was claimed by the complainant as his property and that the accused committed trespass by locking up a small room on the upper flat of his house. 3. The title to the wall is in controversy. It appears that the dispute was by no means new and that a compromise had been arrived at between the parties under which Madan Lal, the complainant, was allowed a right of egress and ingress through the door for the limited purpose of having a darshan of Thakurji at the time of worship and for other purposes during the time of darshan. 4. The accused admits that he removed the door and the window frame. Indeed these articles were found in the temple and they were made over to Tara Chand by the Investigating Officer under a supurdnamah. The accused pleaded that the door and the window were a constant source of friction between the complainant and the temple priest, as the cdmplainant used, not infrequently, to keep the doors shut during the hours of worship— thereby causing inconvenience and annoyance to the pujari and to other folks concerned. The trial court came to the conclusion that the fixtures were not removed with the intention to commit theft. This finding appears to have been fully justified by the evidence which was before the court and by the surrounding circumstances. 5. The trial court came to the conclusion that the fixtures were not removed with the intention to commit theft. This finding appears to have been fully justified by the evidence which was before the court and by the surrounding circumstances. 5. To constitute an offence under Section 379 of the Penal Code, 1860 the determining factor is the intention of the taker and where articles have been removed in the bona fide exercise of a light of ownership which is believed to exist, the act does not amount to theft. The mere assertion of a claim is not sufficient to exclude the application of Section 378 of the Penal Code, 1860. Where the claim is no more than a mere pretence, the jurisdiction of the criminal court is not ousted. 6. In the present case the action of the accused was supported by the compromise already referred to. The trial court, therefore, was well warranted in coming to the conclusion that the offence of theft had not been made out. 7. It is obvious that the charge under Section 448 of the Penal Code, 1860 is equally untenable, and the matter need not be canvassed in detail. 8. Not uncommonly, the criminal court is used as a lever to harass an inconvenient adversary. If there is a bona fide dispute as to the ownership in the property itself or as to right of way, the straight course is to approach the civil court for the determination of the controversial questions of title as may arise between the parties. The accused were properly discharged. I see no reason to interfere and reject this application.