Judgement Appeal (No. 11 of 1926) from a decree of the High Court (August 4, 1924) reversing a decree of the District Judge of Murshidabad (December 9, 1921) which reversed a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Murshidabad. The suit was brought by the appellants on June 29, 1917, for declarations (a) that the company was an occupancy raiyat not a tenure-holder of Char Narainpur, and (b) that the entry in the record-of-rights prepared under the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, that the company was a tenure-holder of the lands was a nullity. The record-of-rights in question had been published in 1915, and the land in suit was about 800 bighas in area. In addition to the respondent, who alone contested the suit, there were joined as defendants the zamindar and all persons claiming to hold as tenants of the land in suit. The facts of the case and the issues framed appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. He was of opinion that the plaintiffs predecessors, the Menasakkans, had first acquired the land in 1841 under an ijara from Government as rent collectors, and that consequently, having regard to s. 5 of the Act, they were tenure-holders even if they cultivated the land themselves after the termination of the ijara. He held also that the suit was under s. 104H, and was consequently barred by sub-s. 2. An appeal to the District Judge was allowed. He found that the Menasakkans had acquired and used the land for the purpose of cultivation before the ijara of 1841, and that they were occupancy tenants. He made a decree so declaring, but considered that he was precluded by authority from declaring that the entry in the record was a nullity. Upon a second appeal to the High Court (Sanderson C.J. and Chotzner J.) the decree of the Subordinate Judge was restored. The learned Chief Justice, who delivered the judgment, was of opinion that the view that the Menasakkans had been in possession before 1841 was merely speculative, and that there was no evidence to displace the presumption that the entry in the record-of-rights was correct. 1929. June 20, 24, 25, 27. De Gruyther K.C, and E. B. Raikes for the appellants. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, ss. 1929. June 20, 24, 25, 27. De Gruyther K.C, and E. B. Raikes for the appellants. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, ss. 100, 101, the District Judges finding that the plaintiffs were occupancy raiyats was binding upon the High Court Durga Choudhrain v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri. (( 1890) L. R. 17 I. A. 122, 127.) There was evidence to support the finding, more particularly the rubokaris included in the settlement record of 1880 made under Reg. VII. of 1822. The suit was maintainable under the proviso to s. 111A of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and was not barred ; s. 104H did not apply to it Promoda Nath Roy v. Asiruddin Mandal (( 1911) 15 Cal. W. N. 896.) ; Kumeda Prosunna Bhuiya v. Secretary of State. (( 1914) 19 Cal. W. N. 1017.) Dunne K.C. and Kenworthy Brown for the respondent. Under s. 103B of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, the entry in the record-of-rights was to be presumed to be correct. The onus of displacing that presumption was not discharged ; the evidence really supported the presumption. The finding of the District Judge was not binding in second appeal, as he gave no weight to the presumption under s. 103B, and there was no evidence whatever that the Menasakkans had cultivated the land before they became ijaradars. It was a question of construction whether the settlement record made under Reg. VII. of 1822 showed that the plaintiffs were raiyats. The fact that in 1880 the plaintiffs were recorded as raiyats without any proof that there was then any dispute as to their status did not displace the presumption under s. 103B Secretary of State v. Gobind Prashad Barik. (( 1916) 2 Cal. W. N. 505.) Further, the suit was under s. 104H, sub-s. 3 (e), and was barred by s. 104H, sub-s. 2. The proviso to s. 111A merely preserves the right to bring civil suits given by s. 104H. If the present suit is under s. 111A and not under s. 104H, sub-s. 3 (e), the latter clause was not needed. The decisions relied on to the contrary were wrongly decided. July 29. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR BINOD MITTER. If the present suit is under s. 111A and not under s. 104H, sub-s. 3 (e), the latter clause was not needed. The decisions relied on to the contrary were wrongly decided. July 29. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR BINOD MITTER. This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal dated August 4, 1924, which reversed the decree of December 9, 1921, and restored the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Murshidabad dated March 28, 1919. The questions for determination in the suit out of which the present appeal arises were whether the appellants are raiyats or tenure-holders of a certain holding in Char Narainpur consisting of about 800 bighas, (2.) whether the suit comes within the purview of s. 104H or the proviso to s. 111A of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and (3.) whether the suit is within time having regard to the law of limitation under s. 104H of the same Act. The Subordinate Judge held that the appellants had not proved that the entry in the record-of-rights finally published on April 2, 1915, to the effect that the appellants are tenure-holders is incorrect; he further held that the plaintiffs suit was not maintainable under the provisions of s. 111A, and that it was barred under s. 104H, as it was not brought within six months from the date of the certificate of the final publication of the record-of-rights. From the decision of the Subordinate Judge there was an appeal to the District Judge of Murshidabad, who held that the appellants were occupancy raiyats and not tenure-holders, and he further held that the suit was maintainable under s. 111A and was not barred by limitation. From this decision there was a second appeal to the High Court and that Court held that there was no reliable evidence to justify the District Judges conclusion that the original purpose for which the tenancy was created was for cultivation. The High Court further held, that the onus of showing that the entry in the record-of-rights is not correct, was upon the appellants and that there was no evidence to justify the finding that they have discharged the onus. The High Court did not decide any other points involved in the case. The High Court further held, that the onus of showing that the entry in the record-of-rights is not correct, was upon the appellants and that there was no evidence to justify the finding that they have discharged the onus. The High Court did not decide any other points involved in the case. Their Lordships have to observe at the outset that no second appeal lies on the ground that the District Judge came to an erroneous finding of fact. The only question which the High Court could consider was whether the District Judge had before him any evidence proper for his consideration in support of his finding. Sect. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, being Act No. V. of 1908, corresponds with s. 584 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882. The construction of s. 584 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 has often been considered by the Board. In Durga Choudhrain v. Jawahir Singh Choudhri (L. R. 17 I. A. 122, 127.) the Board said "It is enough in the present case to say that an erroneous finding of Tact is a different thing from an error or defect in procedure and that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be. Where there is no error or defect in the procedure, the finding of the first Appellate Court upon a question of fact is final, if that Court had before it evidence proper for its consideration in support of the finding." In Anangamanjari Chowdhrani v. Tripura Soondari Chowdhrani (( 1887) L. R. 14 I. A. 101, 110.) the Board laid down the law to the same effect " It was in the opinion of their Lordships within their jurisdiction " (that is to say within the jurisdiction of the judges on a second appeal) " to dismiss the case, if they were satisfied that there was, as an English lawyer would express it, no evidence to go to the jury, because that would not raise a question of fact such as arises upon the issue itself, but a question of law for the consideration of the judge." The learned District Judge in his judgment held (1.) that the holding in question was acquired for the purpose of cultivation of indigo by hired labour ; (2.) that the ijara of 1840 could not be rightly regarded as the origin of the holding, and that the origin was unknown, and from these findings of fact, he came to the conclusion that the entry in the record-of-rights was wrong and that the appellants were occupancy raiyats. It seems to their Lordships that the real test, whether a holding is a tenure or rayati, depends upon the purpose for which the holding was acquired. The respondent relied on s. 103B, cl. 3, and s. 5, cl. 5, of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Their Lordships have no reason to doubt that the learned District Judge in coming to his findings of fact gave to the entry in the record-of-rights the proper weight to which it is entitled under s. 103B. He has expressly referred to the statutory presumption under s. 5, sub-s. 5. If he had evidence proper for his findings notwithstanding the statutory presumptions then it seems to their Lordships that his findings of fact were final and conclusive see Kumeda Prosunna Bhuiya v. Secretary of State. (19 Cal. W. N. 1017.) Their Lordships will now consider whether there was before the learned District Judge evidence proper for his finding. If he had evidence proper for his findings notwithstanding the statutory presumptions then it seems to their Lordships that his findings of fact were final and conclusive see Kumeda Prosunna Bhuiya v. Secretary of State. (19 Cal. W. N. 1017.) Their Lordships will now consider whether there was before the learned District Judge evidence proper for his finding. It appears that the Menasakkans to whom the holding originally belonged conveyed their interest in 1873 to Jagendra Roy and others who in their turn sold in 1887 to Messrs. Louis Pay en & Co. Louis Pay en & Co. sold their interest in the holding to the appellants in 1913. It is a fact worthy of consideration, that in the present suit the zamindars or proprietors under whom the appellants hold, and also the sub-tenants under them, admitted that the appellants are occupancy raiyats. It appears from the final settlement report of 1890 that occupancy holdings in the mehal in which Char Narainpur is situate are by local custom transferable. Char Narainpur has been assessed to revenue from time to time by the Government. The appellants drew their Lordships attention to the rubokaris of March 27, 1851, February 23, 1861, and March 15, 1871, and the other papers prepared for purposes of such settlements. These settlements were for ten years respectively. The settlement of 1871 expired on March 31, 1880, but was extended to March 31, 1890. From these settlement records including the rubokaris it appears that the only tenants cultivating the land were Baldav Saha, Ram Prasad and Beni Prasad Hazari (who were also the zamindars of the mauza) and the Menasakkans. The zamindars were growing dofasli crops, and the Menasakkans were cultivating indigo. These settlement records were prepared under Reg. VII. of 1822, and although they may not have the same evidentiary value as the settlement records prepared under the Bengal Tenancy Act, still in their Lordships opinion they are evidence against the Secretary of State for India in Council. Mr. De Gruyther has drawn their Lordships attention also to certain ekrars executed by the tenants in favour of Louis Pay en & Co., as also to the account books ranging from 1887 to 1901. These account books show clearly that at any rate indigo was being cultivated on a portion of the land in question by Louis Pay en & Co. through hired labourers. These account books show clearly that at any rate indigo was being cultivated on a portion of the land in question by Louis Pay en & Co. through hired labourers. Suits had been instituted upon the ekrars, given by the various jotedars or tenants under Louis Payen & Co. and the tenants contested these suits, on the allegation that these ekrars in which Louis Payen & Co. were acknowledged to be occupancy raiyats were taken by force, but these ekrars were held to be valid. It is not necessary to go into further detail as regards the evidence, but their Lordships are satisfied after a careful examination of the record, that there was evidence before the learned District Judge proper for his finding. The learned District Judge did not discuss in detail the various settlement records and other evidence, oral and documentary, to which their Lordships attention has been drawn, but their Lordships have no reason to doubt that the learned District Judge fully considered them. Having regard to the practice of the High Court in second appeals it seems probable that the full record of the case which was laid before their Lordships was not placed before the learned judges of the High Court. The two other points that their Lordships have to decide are whether the suit is maintainable and whether the same is barred by limitation. The identical points came up for decision in the case of Raja Promoda Nath Roy v. Asiruddin Mandal (15 Cal. W. N. 896.), and the High Court decided that a suit like the present would come within the proviso to s. 111A of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and that the period of limitation applicable to such suits was that provided by art. 120, of Sch. I. of the Indian Limitation Act. Their Lordships concur in this decision and the reasons given in its support by Chatterjee J. For the reasons aforesaid, their Lordships are of opinion that the appeal should be allowed, the decree of the High Court set aside, and the decree of the District Court restored, with costs in all the Courts, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. The respondent will pay the costs of this appeal.