Judgement Appeal (No. 66 of 1928) from a decree of the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction (February 7, 1927) affirming a decree of the Court in its original jurisdiction (May 3, 1926). The suit related to the validity of a transfer of rights under a deed of settlement executed in 1908 by U Ohn Ghine, a merchant of Rangoon, who was a Kalai and died in 1911. The provisions of the deed sufficiently appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. Questions as to the right of succession to the settlor and the validity of the settlement were raised by suits in 1913. By a judgment of the Judicial Committee in 1921, reported at L. R. 48 I. A. 553, it was held that the settlor was not a Hindu within the meaning of the Burma Laws Act, 1898, s. 13, and that the settlement was valid. In 1919 Maung Chit Maung, the eldest son of the settlor, sold and transferred to Mahomed Ebrahim Moolla " all his undivided share of inheritance right and interest in and to the estate of U Ohn Ghine, deceased, and in the rents profits investments or income thereof and all his right and interest under the trusts of the said settlement .... with all income, rents investments and profits of the said trust estate." The youngest child of the settlor attained the age of twenty in March, 1921. 87 Law. Rep. 57 Ind. App. 10 ( 1929- 1930) Ma Yait V. Official Assignee 188 In 1925 M. E. Moolla brought the present suit in the High Court against the present appellants, the trustees of the settlement; he claimed a declaration that he had acquired the rights of Maung Chit Maung under the settlement, an account, and payment. The substantial defence was that, having regard to the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, 8. 6 (a) and (e), Maung Chit Maung could not validly assign his interest under the settlement. The trial judge granted the relief prayed. An appeal was dismissed by Rutledge C.J. and Brown J. by a judgment reported at I. L. R. 5 R. 145. Subsequently to the above appeal the official assignee was brought on the record in place of the plaintiff who had been adjudicated an insolvent. 1929. Oct. 28. Dunne K.C. and E. B. Raikes K.C. for the appellants. Upjohn K.C. and G. A. Rink for the respondent. Subsequently to the above appeal the official assignee was brought on the record in place of the plaintiff who had been adjudicated an insolvent. 1929. Oct. 28. Dunne K.C. and E. B. Raikes K.C. for the appellants. Upjohn K.C. and G. A. Rink for the respondent. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD ATKIN. This an appeal from the High Court of Judicature at Rangoon in a suit which was brought originally by one Mahomed Ebrahim Moolla, who was the assignee of one Maung Chit Maung. The plaintiff claimed to have a declaration of the interests of the assignor under a settlement made by the assignors father in the year 1908. The defendants, who are the present appellants, are the trustees of the settlement, and the defence to the suit was an allegation that the assignment was invalid by reason of its being in breach of s. 6 of the Transfer of Property Act, Act IV. of 1882, which applies to the dispositions of this particular settlor. The clauses relied on are cl. (a) of s. 6, which says " The chance of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate, the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy on the death of a kinsman, or any other mere possibility of a like nature, cannot be transferred " ; and cl. (e), which says that a mere right to sue cannot be transferred. The question at issue was whether the rights that were given, if any, to the assignor of the plaintiff, the eldest son, were a possibility of a like nature of an heir-apparent succeeding to an estate, and so forth, or were a right to sue. That turns upon the construction of the settlement. Without going into it in detail, it may be described as an ordinary settlement made in the settlors lifetime, by which the settlor transferred to the trustees a large amount of property, in substance, probably, the whole of his property, in trust to allow the settlor during his lifetime to manage the property, and to have the sole benefit of the income both from the immovable and movable property. The settlement then proceeded to declare certain trusts that should come into operation after his death. The settlement then proceeded to declare certain trusts that should come into operation after his death. The trusts to come into operation after his death were that, as to the property comprised in three schedules, the trustees, during the life of the widow and until the youngest child attained the age of twenty, were to distribute the income in the manner provided—namely, that they were to pay Rs.1000 a month to the widow, and to divide the remainder amongst the children, including the eldest son, Maung Chit Maung, the assignor of the plaintiff. After the youngest child attained the age of twenty, the property was to be sold, and the proceeds were to be divided in equal shares between the children then surviving, the issue of any child who was dead to represent his fathers share. There was a slight alteration in the trusts in relation to the property comprised in the fourth schedule, because in that case the property was not to be distributed until the death of the youngest child, and it was to be divided then amongst the children living at that date. Now, it is plain that the result of this disposition was to create, first of all, a vested interest in all the 87 Law. Rep. 57 Ind. App. 10 ( 1929- 1930) Ma Yait V. Official Assignee 189 children in the income of the property; secondly, it created a contingent interest in all the children in the corpus in respect of all the property until, at any rate, the youngest child reached the age of twenty. When the youngest child reached the age of twenty, the children who were alive at that date obtained a vested interest and a right to have the proceeds distributed among them as to the property in the first, second and third schedules. As to the property of the fourth schedule, all the children took a contingent interest until the death of the youngest child, and, as soon as the youngest child died, the children then surviving, and, of course, their issue, obtained a vested right to have the property distributed among them. As to the property of the fourth schedule, all the children took a contingent interest until the death of the youngest child, and, as soon as the youngest child died, the children then surviving, and, of course, their issue, obtained a vested right to have the property distributed among them. That is a very plain and ordinary settlement, and it gives very plain and well understood rights to all the parties who benefit under the settlement a vested right in the income, contingent rights in the corpus ; and it appears to their Lordships to be plain that the contingent interest which the children took, whether they took it under the first, second and third schedules or under the fourth schedule, was something quite different from a mere possibility of a like nature of an heir-apparent succeeding to the estate, or the chance of a relation obtaining a legacy, and also something quite different from a mere right to sue. It is a well ascertained form of property— it certainly has been transferred in this country for generations —in respect of which it is quite possible to raise money and to dispose of it in any way that the beneficiary chooses. Their Lordships think, therefore, that the defence failed, and that the Courts were perfectly right in making the decree which was eventually asked for, not by the assignee himself, but by his assignee in bankruptcy, who succeeded to his rights. Their Lordships think it desirable to say that they are not prepared to accede to the whole of the reasoning of the Courts below, who seem, with great respect, to have treated the interest in the corpus as being a vested interest at the time of the assignment, when, quite plainly, in their Lordships view, it was not; nevertheless, it being of the nature that their Lordships have described, it was such an interest as could be assigned, and the Courts were, in their Lordships opinion, quite right in making the decrees complained of. It is not unnatural, as it appears to their Lordships, that when the matter comes to be carefully looked at, counsel for the appellants find it impossible to put any different view before their Lordships from that which they have already expressed ; the case is indeed unarguable. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal be dismissed with costs.