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1929 DIGILAW 95 (SC)

SADASHEO (DEFENDANT NO. 1) v. VITHOBA

1929-11-22

LORD DARLING, LORD TOMLIN, SIR BINOD MITTER, SIR GEORGE LOWNDES, VISCOUNT DUNEDIN

body1929
Judgement Appeal (No. 42 of 1928) from a decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Central Provinces (July 11, 1925), reversing a decree of the Additional District Judge, Amraoti, which affirmed a decree of the Munsifs Court. Respondent No. 1 brought a suit against the appellant alleging that he and his predecessors had for a period of about fifty years cultivated certain fields, of which the appellant was the landlord, and that he had been wrongfully ejected during 1921. He prayed for a declaration that he was a permanent tenant under s. 47 of the Berar Alienated Villages Tenancy Law, 1921 (1), and for possession. The other respondents, whom the appellant had put into possession, were joined as defendants. The appellant by his written statement admitted that respondent No. 1 had been in possession since before 1895, but alleged that he had voluntarily given up possession. He pleaded further that the above Law. Rep. 57 Ind. App. 45 ( 1929- 1930) Sadasheo V. Vithoba 212 Act did not apply, as the possession had terminated before January 1, 1922, when the Act came into force; he also pleaded limitation. The Additional District Judge, affirming the Munsif, held that as the plaintiff was not holding the land when the Act came into operation, s. 47 did not apply. An issue whether the plaintiff had surrendered the fields voluntarily or had been forcibly dispossessed therefore was not determined. The Judicial Commissioner, upon a further appeal, stated that the appeal had been argued upon the assumption that there had been a forcible dispossession. In his opinion s.47, sub-s.1, applied, and the suit was not barred by s. 75. He accordingly made a decree as prayed. 1929. Oct. 17. Dunne K.C. and Parikh for the appellant. The respondents did not appear. Nov. 22. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by VISCOUNT DUNEDIN. This is an appeal ex parte. The suit was brought by the first respondent, who does not appear, in March, 1923, in the Court of the Munsif of Kelapur, against the appellant, who is his landlord, to have it declared that he is permanent tenant of certain fields by virtue of the provisions of the Berar Alienated Villages Tenancy Law, 1921. The suit was brought by the first respondent, who does not appear, in March, 1923, in the Court of the Munsif of Kelapur, against the appellant, who is his landlord, to have it declared that he is permanent tenant of certain fields by virtue of the provisions of the Berar Alienated Villages Tenancy Law, 1921. By s. 47 of that Act, which came into force on January 1, 1922, it is provided "A tenant, other than an ante-alienation tenant or a sub-tenant, who, at the commencement of this law, has either by himself or by himself and through his predecessor in title, sub-tenant or mortgagee in possession, held land continuously from a date previous to June 1, 1895, shall, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary executed prior to the commencement of this law, be deemed to be a permanent tenant of such land." Admittedly the first respondent has held the fields con tinuously from a date prior to January 1, 1895, up to the spring of 1921. In March, 1921, the appellant gave him notice to quit. What followed after that is a matter of controversy. The appellant says that he voluntarily quitted the fields in April. The first respondent says that he did not do so, but was forcibly and wrongfully ejected in May. The sections of the Act to which reference has been made, beside s. 47, are ss. What followed after that is a matter of controversy. The appellant says that he voluntarily quitted the fields in April. The first respondent says that he did not do so, but was forcibly and wrongfully ejected in May. The sections of the Act to which reference has been made, beside s. 47, are ss. 74 and 75; they are in the following terms— 74 " Any tenant who has been ejected from his holding or from any portion thereof otherwise than in accordance with this law, or whose holding has been treated as abandoned under s. 37, may, on application to a Revenue Officer made within one year from the date on his ejectment, or from the first day of the agricultural year next after the entry by the landlord, as the case may be, be reinstated in possession of such holding or portion thereof." 75 "Any tenant who has been ejected on or after January 1, 1916, from his holding or any portion thereof, under decree or order of a Civil Court, and who, if he had not been so ejected, would be deemed under s. 47 to be a permanent tenant thereof, may apply to a Revenue officer, within one year from the commencement of this law, to be reinstated in possession of such holding or portion thereof." The Munsif took the view that s. 74 applied only to ejectment after the Act, and that the only reinstatement which could bring with it permanent tenancy was s. 75. He therefore considered it unnecessary to decide the controverted question of fact as to which he had granted an issue. Law. Rep. 57 Ind. App. 45 ( 1929- 1930) Sadasheo V. Vithoba 213 Appeal was then taken to the Court of the District Judge, who took the same view and dismissed the appeal. The appeal was then taken to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner. He held that it had been practically admitted that the plaintiff had been forcibly dismissed and that upon that assumption he held that the plaintiff still held the land, although he had not cultivated or possessed it, and he gave a declaration of permanent tenancy as craved. Their Lordships think that the view as to the law of the Judicial Commissioner is substantially right. They do not think that the matter depends on either ss. 74 or 75, but only on s. 47. Sect. Their Lordships think that the view as to the law of the Judicial Commissioner is substantially right. They do not think that the matter depends on either ss. 74 or 75, but only on s. 47. Sect. 74 gives a summary remedy; s. 75 deals with another state of affairs altogether. But the true view depends upon s. 47, and in their Lordships opinion a person who being a tenant is forcibly dispossessed is still a tenant holding land. But the learned Judicial Commissioner erred in assuming that the question of forcible disposition was ceded. It was not; and a separate issue as to this had been framed, although, owing to the view of the learned judges in the Courts below as to ss. 74 and 75, it was not disposed of. The case must therefore go back in order to have the disputed question of fact decided. If the plaintiff was forcibly dispossessed he was a tenant in terms of s. 47 ; if he volun tarily ceded possession after receiving the notice he had no such right and the action must be dismissed. Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal ought to be allowed, the decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner discharged, and the case referred back in accordance with the directions given above. The costs already incurred and to be incurred in the Courts in India should abide the result of the further proceedings there, and there should be no costs of this appeal.