JUDGMENT Mallik, J. - This Rule is directed against an order whereby the Petitioner's application for execution of a decree was dismissed on the ground of limitation. It appears that the Petitioner had obtained a decree on the 21st November 1922. On the 25th August 1925, there was an application for execution. On this application being filed notices were issued on the same date. There was an affidavit of service of notice on the 11th September 1925, but as no further steps were taken in the matter the application for execution was dismissed for default. Thereafter the Petitioner filed a second application for execution. This application is dated 7th September 1928, and it is the dismissal of this application that has given rise to the present Rule. The learned District Judge held that the application, dated the 7th September 1928, was barred by limitation under the provisions of Art. 182 (5) of the Limitation Act inasmuch as it was filed more than three years after the 25th August 1925 when the previous application for execution had been filed. The learned District Judge apparently overlooked the new provisions of Art. 182, sub-sec. (5) whereby the three years' time is to be calculated not from the date when the previous application is filed but from the date when the final order on such application is passed. The amendment in the law as contained in Art. 182, sub-sec. (5) of the Indian Limitation Act, was made under Act IX of 1927. 2. It was contended on behalf of the Petitioner that as 7th September 1928 was within three years from the 11th September 1925, on which date the final order on the previous application for execution had been passed, the Petitioner's second application for execution was within time. This contention seems to me to be well-founded. There is no doubt that the second application for execution was within time under the present law as it is found in Art. 182, sub-sec. (5). On behalf of the Opposite Party it was urged that the old law of limitation whereby the period of three years was to be calculated from the date of the previous application, is to be applied to the present case. This contention is, in my cpinion, not maintainable. (5). On behalf of the Opposite Party it was urged that the old law of limitation whereby the period of three years was to be calculated from the date of the previous application, is to be applied to the present case. This contention is, in my cpinion, not maintainable. It is a well-settled principle of law that the law of limitation applicable to a suit or proceeding is the law in force at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding unless there is a distinct provision to the contrary. The law of limitation at the date of the filing of the second application for execution was the law as it is to be found in the present Art. 182, sub-sec. (5). It cannot be said that the Petitioner's application for execution had been barred before the new law came into force. As I have observed before, the second application for execution was filed on the 7th September 1928, which was only about a fortnight more than three years from the 25th August 1925 and the new Jaw was enacted in the year 1927. The Petitioner's right to apply for execution, therefore, survived for several months after the new law was enacted. I would therefore hold that the Petitioner's application for execution was within time and the learned District Judge was clearly wrong when he held that it was barred by limitation. On behalf of the Opposite Party it was contended that the Petitioner's application could not come under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I am unable to give effect to this contention. The District Judge refused to entertain the Petitioner's application for execution on the basis of a law which had no existence at the time and it has been held that if a Court refuses to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law upon a misapprehension of the law or erroneous construction of a statute, the High Court has the power to interfere under sec. 115, C. P. C. The result therefore is that the Rule is made absolute with costs. Hearing-fee is assessed at two gold mohurs.