Judgement Appeal (No. 14 of 1929) from a decree of the High Court (June 9, 1926) affirming in substance a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Farrukhabad. The question arising upon the appeal was whether the appellants, who were the heirs and representatives of a Mahomedan woman who had retained possession of her husbands estate in lieu of dower, were entitled to interest upon the dower debt, having regard to the circumstances, more particularly a decree of 1896 in a suit between the widow and the heir through whom the present respondent claimed possession. Law. Rep. 57 Ind. App. 181 ( 1929- 1930) Nawasi Begam V. Dilafroz Begam 42 The material facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The High Court affirmed the view of the trial judge that the defendants (appellants) were not entitled to interest; the decree was varied only by allowing the defendants 10 per cent, for the cost of collection in place of 7£ per cent. The learned judges (Mears C.J. and King J.) were of opinion that under the decision of the Judicial Committee in Hamira Bibi v. Zubaida Bibi (( 1916) L. R. 43 I. A. 294.) the widow was not entitled to interest as a matter of course, but that the Court had a discretion to allow it upon equitable grounds. They considered that interest should not be allowed in the present case, as the dower debt far exceeded the value of the estate. Apart from that consideration they held that a claim to interest was barred by res judicata in that it had not been made in the earlier suit. 1930. March 13. Dunne K.C. and Dube for the appellants. Under the judgment of the Board in Hamira Bibi v. Zubaida Bibi (( 1916) L. R. 43 I. A. 294.) credit should be given for interest upon the dower debt upon taking an account of the profits of the estate. The equitable principle there laid down is independent of the amount of the debt or the value of the estate. The claim to interest was not barred by res judicata. The decree of 1896 related to the right to possession and ceased to be operative as it had not been put into execution within three years. The equitable principle there laid down is independent of the amount of the debt or the value of the estate. The claim to interest was not barred by res judicata. The decree of 1896 related to the right to possession and ceased to be operative as it had not been put into execution within three years. The judgment raises a res judicata only as to the amount of the dower, and the appellants do not need to rely upon it as there is a finding in this suit that the amount was Rs.50,000. Further, the only right to interest which could be affected by the decree of 1896 was the interest then accrued. The real controversy in the earlier suit was whether the dower was Rs.50,000 or Rs.1000, and there is no ground for holding that in that suit the present or any claim to interest " ought to have been made " within s. 11, expl. 4 of the Code. It has been held in Hadi Ali v. Akbar Ali (( 1898) I. L. R. 20 A. 262.) that a widows lien for dower is purely personal, but that contention was not raised in the suit. Abdul Majid for the first respondent was not called upon. March 13. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD BLANESBURGH. The property which is the subject-matter of the suit out of which this appeal has arisen belonged to one Afzal Shah, who died on October 9, 1881, leaving him surviving his widow Zamani Begam and his cousin Mansur Shah. According to the Mahomedan law, one-fourth of the property of the deceased devolved upon his widow and three-fourths upon Mansur Shah, while the widow being so entitled took possession of the whole of the estate in lieu of her dower which, as she claimed, amounted to Rs.50,000. According to the Mahomedan law, one-fourth of the property of the deceased devolved upon his widow and three-fourths upon Mansur Shah, while the widow being so entitled took possession of the whole of the estate in lieu of her dower which, as she claimed, amounted to Rs.50,000. Thereafter Mansur Shah, having assigned a one-half share out of his three-fourths interest to Usman Shah and Zamani Khan, joined with them in April, 1892, in filing a suit against the widow in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Farrukhabad, alleging that her dower amounted to no more than Rs.1000, and that it had long ago been discharged from her usufruct of the estate, and claiming (1.) that possession should be delivered to them unconditionally of a three-fourths share of the estate, and (2.) that if any portion of Musammat Begams dower was found to be due a decree should be passed in their favour for possession on payment of the dower due. The suit went to judgment. The District Judge by his order dated April 17, 1893, decreed it against the widow. She died on June 7, 1894, and thereafter an appeal against the decree was preferred to the High Court at Allahabad by the present appellants who are her heirs and legal representatives. That Court allowed the appeal; it held that the dower was Rs.50,000, and on June 2, 1896, it made the following decree, on which the whole question now at issue turns. " It is ordered and decreed that this appeal be allowed, and in modification of [the decree appealed from] it is ordered Law. Rep. 57 Ind. App. That Court allowed the appeal; it held that the dower was Rs.50,000, and on June 2, 1896, it made the following decree, on which the whole question now at issue turns. " It is ordered and decreed that this appeal be allowed, and in modification of [the decree appealed from] it is ordered Law. Rep. 57 Ind. App. 181 ( 1929- 1930) Nawasi Begam V. Dilafroz Begam 43 that the plaintiff-respondents do receive possession of the property specified in the said decree on payment by them to the defendants-appellants of the sum of Rs.35,223 minus the amount of the profits arising from the plaintiff-respondents three-fourths share of the property in the possession of the defendants-appellants from the date of the lower Courts decree up to the date when possession may be obtained by the plaintiff-respondents." With reference to that decree it is agreed that, in arriving at the figure of Rs.35,223 as the sum which had to be paid if the widows claim to dower was to be extinguished, no interest upon the dower in arrear was taken into account; in fact, in that suit no claim was put forward either by the widow herself or by the present appellants, as her successors in interest, that she was entitled to any such interest, and the amount to be paid was assessed upon the footing that no such claim existed. Now the present suit is brought by a plaintiff who has succeeded to an interest in the three-fourths which formerly belonged to Mansur Shah. She is therefore his successor in interest. Her claim is that upon the taking of proper accounts possession may be delivered to her of her share of the estate with mesne profits, interest and costs, all on the footing that the widow and her representatives have already been paid in full the amount of her dower through the usufruct of the estate of which she and they have had continuous possession. It has, upon that claim, been made clear from the discussion which has taken place before the Board, that upon the pleadings the only real question which has now to be decided between the parties is whether those representing the widow, in taking the account of the amount still remaining due in respect of dower, are entitled to charge any interest in respect of the period during which dower remained unpaid. Both by the Subordinate Judge and by the High Court it has been held that no interest can be charged by them if only for the reason that no claim for interest was in the former suit made by or on behalf of the widow, and that any claim for interest is now res judicata. It is agreed that if that view be correct, the appeal must fail, whatever view might be taken by the Board of the other reasons assigned by the Courts below for the same conclusion. And their Lordships are of opinion that that view is correct. It is quite clear, as it appears to them, that in the first suit, the widows claim to interest was one which might, and which ought to, have been made ground of defence ; and under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, where that is so of a claim in a suit by the decree in which the parties to the second suit are bound (as is the case here), then such a claim may not again be reopened in the later suit. It follows that the appeal fails, and their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that it be dismissed with costs.