Judgement Appeal (No. 48 of 1929) from a decree of the High Court (June 19, 1928) affirming a decree of the District Court of Insein (March 8, 1928). The appellant instituted a suit against the respondents, J. G. Robinson and the appellants brothers and sister, for partition and possession of a one-sixth share in certain land, about 30 acres in extent, at Kokine in Rangoon. Law. Rep. 57 Ind. App. 208 ( 1929- 1930) J. A. Vertannes V. Robinson 60 A preliminary issue was framed in the following terms " Is the plaintiffs claim to the land in suit res judicata by virtue of the final decision in Civil Regular Suit No. 35 of 1921 ? " The decision so referred to was that of the Judicial Committee in 1927 in the appeal Vertannes v. Robinson. (L. R. 54 I. A. 276.) The material facts appear from the present judgment of the Judicial Committee, and the judgment reported as above stated. The High Court, affirming the decision of the District Judge, held that the suit was barred by res judicata, as the previous decision of the Judicial Committee in 1927 had finally determined the rights of the parties. 1930. Feb. 27, 28. Dunne K.C. and E. B. Raikes for the appellant. At the date of the previous suit the appellant was in possession under the lease, and was therefore precluded from raising the question in issue in this suit, consequently he is not now barred by s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Courts in Burma misinterpreted the judgment of the Board in 1927. The Board did not intend to hold that the appellant was for ever debarred from recovering his share, but merely that he was estopped in that suit from denying the first respondents title. The estoppel under s. 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, exists only so long as the relation of landlord and tenant continues Bilwas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh. (( 1915) L. R. 42 I. A. 202, 207.) The lease has now ended and possession has been restored to the first respondent. The estoppel under s. 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, exists only so long as the relation of landlord and tenant continues Bilwas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh. (( 1915) L. R. 42 I. A. 202, 207.) The lease has now ended and possession has been restored to the first respondent. The English authorities, upon which s. 116 is founded, establish that a tenant is estopped from denying his landlords title only so long as the lease continues, and only in a suit for ejectment Doe v. Smythe ((1815) 4 M. & S. 347.) ; Clark v. Adie (No. 2) (( 1877) 2 App. Cas. 423, 435.) ; Doe v. Baytup. ((1835) 3 Ad. & E. 188.) The same view has been taken in India Vasvdev Daji v. Bavaji Ranu (( 1871) 8 Bom. H. C. 175.); Baiganta v. Himmat. (( 1916) 24 Cal. L. J. 103,108.) It is very unlikely that the Board in 1927 intended to decide that the estoppel for ever barred the appellant without hearing any argument upon that point. The appellants petition to alter the terms of the proposed Order in Council was dismissed, not because their Lordships were of opinion that the appellant was for ever barred, but because in their view the Order had not that effect and rightly expressed the terms of the judgment. It is conceded that the defendants would be entitled to contend in the suit that the appellant was barred by s. 115. Vaisey K.C. and Pennell for the first respondent. The judgment of the Board in 1927, and the Order in Council, state in clear terms that the first respondent is the owner of the share now in suit. The language used, and the provision for a partition at the instance of the first respondent, are consistent only with the Board having finally determined the ownership of the share now in suit. It is an established principle of res judicata that the Court does not consider the reason for the judgment relied on as an estoppel. At the date of the petition to alter the terms of the Order the lease had ended and possession had been given up, yet the Board thought that no alteration should be made. The result of the former judgment is not so contrary to principle as to warrant the Board in treating the clear terms as being used inadvertently. At the date of the petition to alter the terms of the Order the lease had ended and possession had been given up, yet the Board thought that no alteration should be made. The result of the former judgment is not so contrary to principle as to warrant the Board in treating the clear terms as being used inadvertently. It is not an unreasonable view under s. 116 that as the denial of title was maintained until the decree an estoppel arose permanently establishing the landlords title against the appellant. Dunne K.C. replied. March 21. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN. The matter under appeal before their Lordships is a decree dated June 19, 1928, of the High Court of Judicature at Rangoon, affirming a decree of the District Law. Rep. 57 Ind. App. 208 ( 1929- 1930) J. A. Vertannes V. Robinson 61 Court of Insein, dated March 8, 1928. The last mentioned decree dismissed, on a preliminary issue, a suit brought by the appellant to establish against the first respondent his title as absolute owner to a quarter of two-thirds (or an undivided one-sixth share) in certain lands. The appellant claimed to be entitled to such share as one of the four children of Sarkies Vertannes who had died intestate as to the land on May 18, 1897. The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs action on the ground that a judgment of this Board on appeal in a suit to which the present appellant and first respondent were parties, had finally dealt with the question of the ownership of the said share. The High Court affirmed this dismissal on the same grounds. The said judgment of the Board was delivered on the occasion of an appeal in an ejectment suit in which the present first respondent (hereinafter called " Robinson") ought as owner of the said land to obtain a decree of ejectment against the present appellant (hereinafter called " Vertannes "), the three other children and the widow of the said Sarkies Vertannes. Robinson, whose title to the land was derived under a conveyance to him by the widow (and executrix) of Sarkies Vertannes, had granted a lease to Vertannes of the said land, upon which he and the other defendants were residing. Robinson, whose title to the land was derived under a conveyance to him by the widow (and executrix) of Sarkies Vertannes, had granted a lease to Vertannes of the said land, upon which he and the other defendants were residing. The Board was of opinion that the conveyance by the widow operated to pass to Robinson only her interest as widow in one-third of the said land, and not the beneficial interests of the children. As regards the four children, Robinson contended that as against them his title was complete by estoppel under s. 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, and that in any event as regards the share of Vertannes, Vertannes being his tenant was estopped under s. 116 of that Act. The Board held that as regards the children, other than Vertannes, no case of estoppel under s. 115 had been established ; and that as regards Vertannes, he being clearly estopped under s. 116, their Lordships were relieved from the necessity of considering whether he might also be held estopped under s. 115. Their Lordships humbly recommended His Majesty that the judgments of the District Judge and of the High Court should be discharged and that in lieu thereof Robinson should have a decree for ejectment against Vertannes and the widow, and that it be declared that Robinson was entitled to one-third and one-quarter of the remaining two-thirds of the property in suit; and that the three children, other than Vertannes, were each entitled to one quarter of the two-thirds, with liberty to Robinson or to any of the last mentioned three children to apply for a partition. Vertannes seeks by his present suit to obtain a decision that the one-quarter of two-thirds so declared by this Board to be the property of Robinson is the property of Vertannes, not by any title acquired by him subsequently to the date of the Boards decision, but by virtue of a title then existing in him as one of the children of the intestate. He claims that the estoppel under s. 116, which prevented him from asserting his title in the ejectment action, was temporary only, and ceased to operate when he gave up possession of the land and when his tenancy accordingly came to an end. He claims that the estoppel under s. 116, which prevented him from asserting his title in the ejectment action, was temporary only, and ceased to operate when he gave up possession of the land and when his tenancy accordingly came to an end. He claims that being no longer estopped under s. 116, he is now entitled to assert and obtain a declaration of his ownership, and that the matter is not res judicata. In view of the wording of the previous judgment of this Board in the ejectment action, their Lordships are unable to accede to these contentions. The language is clear and unambiguous, and according to its tenor the judgment of this Board purported to determine finally and conclusively the ownership of the share now claimed by Vertannes in the new action. Not only did the Board declare that share to belong to Robinson, but their Lordships classed it with the widows one-third and made provision for partition of the entirety of the land among Robinson and the three children other than Vertannes. Law. Rep. 57 Ind. App. 208 ( 1929- 1930) J. A. Vertannes V. Robinson 62 In these circumstances, it is not open to Vertannes to seek to obtain in fresh proceedings a declaration of ownership of the share in question which would be inconsistent with the previous judgment of the Board in proceedings between the same parties. While their Lordships think that the intention of the Board finally to determine the ownership of the share in question is clear from the language of the original judgment, this intention seems to be established beyond all doubt by subsequent proceedings before the same Board. The judgment of the Board was delivered on March 31, 1927. Subsequently, Vertannes presented a petition alleging that he had, before the appeal had been heard, given vacant possession to Robinson, and asking to have the order on the appeal so framed as to make it clear that their Lordships were not deciding that Vertannes was not entitled to assert his title as one of the next of kin of his father against Robinson. The Board heard this petition on July 1, 1927, and it was dismissed with costs. The Board heard this petition on July 1, 1927, and it was dismissed with costs. From the language used by Lord Phillimore in announcing the Boards decision on that occasion, their Lordships to-day are satisfied that the Board intended that the decision on the appeal should, as between Robinson and Vertannes, finally and conclusively determine the ownership of the one-quarter of two-thirds which is the subject-matter of the new suit. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine why, unless that was the Boards intention, no relief should have been granted on the petition. Their Lordships feel themselves constrained, without expressing any views as to the construction or effect of s. 116, to hold that the appellant is prevented by the judgment delivered on March 31, 1927, and the Order in Council made thereon, from obtaining the relief sought by him in the new action. For these reasons their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal fails, and should be dismissed with costs.