Judgement Appeal (No. 90 of 1928) from two judgments or orders of the High Court (March 14, 1927, and May 11, 1927) upon a reference under s. 66, sub-s. 2, of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. The three questions referred are set out in the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The ten items mentioned in question I. were (1.) Jalkar or rents received from fisheries ; (2.) Ground rent from land used for potteries; (3.) Ground rent from land used as brick fields ; (4.) Fees received from the tying up of boats against the assessees land; (5.) Fees received from lands used for storing purchases of crops (paiali); (6.) Fees received from cart stands ; (7.) Punyaha nazar or nazar paid by tenants of agricultural holdings at the beginning of the zamindari year; (8.) Nazar for petitions presented to the zamindar dealing with questions of succession, settlement, and partition; (9.) Ground rent for permanent shops at hats and bazars ; (10.) Stall fees paid by temporary (daily) sellers at hats and bazars. On May 21, 1926, Sanderson C.J. and Rankin J. referred questions II. and III. to the Full Bench, as there were conflicting decisions of two Division Courts with regard to the point in question III. In Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Barua (( 1924) I. L. R. 51 C. 504.) it was held by Rankin J. (Page J. dissenting) that income derived from a permanently settled estate was liable to income-tax notwithstanding the permanent settlement regulations, the view of Rankin J. prevailing under clause 36 of the letters patent; while in King-Emperor v. Indu Bhusan Sarkar (( 1926) 1. L. R. 53 C. 524.) Cuming and Page JJ. held that where income from fisheries within an estate was included in assets upon which the jama had been assessed at the permanent settlement, that source of income was not liable to assessment to income-tax. The learned judges of the Full Bench delivered judgment on March 14, 1927. The majority of the Court (Ghose, Buckland and Panton JJ.), in a judgment delivered by Ghose J., answered both questions II. and III. in the affirmative. The judgment of the minority (Mukerji and Suhrawardy JJ.) was delivered by Mukerji J.; they held that question III. should be answered in the negative, and that therefore question II. did not arise. The proceedings are reported at I. L. R. 54 C. 863. and III. in the affirmative. The judgment of the minority (Mukerji and Suhrawardy JJ.) was delivered by Mukerji J.; they held that question III. should be answered in the negative, and that therefore question II. did not arise. The proceedings are reported at I. L. R. 54 C. 863. The reference then went back to the Division Bench (Rankin C.J. and Majumdar J.) for decision upon question I. The learned judges delivered judgment on May 11, 1927, holding that none of the items of income set out were " agricultural income5? so as to be exempt under s. 4, sub-s. 3 (viii.). 1930. March 21, 25, 27, 28; April 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10. E. B. Raikes K.C., G. D. McNair and Graham Dixon for the appellant. The third question is fundamental and should be considered first. It is submitted that the imposition of income-tax upon income arising from a permanently settled estate is contrary to guarantees and assurances given at the permanent settlement and contained in the Bengal regulations. By Ben. Reg. I. of 1793, s. 3, the zamindars were notified that the jama on their lands was " fixed for ever," and s. 7 declared that no demand should ever be made by the Government for an augmentation of the assessment in consequence of the improvement of the estate ; by Ben. Reg. II. the " public demand " upon each estate was no longer to be liable to variation. [Reference was made also to Reg. VIII. of 1793, s. 49, and Reg. II. of 1819, ss. 1, 2.] The question, or the same question as to the corresponding Madras regulation, has recently been considered in the following cases, in addition to that now under appeal Commissioner of Income-tax v. Zamindar of Singampatti (( 1922) I. L. R. 45 M. 518.) ; Emperor v. Probhat Chandra Barua (( 1924) I. L. R. 51 C. 504.) ; Maharajadiraj of Darbhanga v. Commissioner of Income-tax (( 1924) I. L. R. 3 P. 470.) ; Emperor v. Indu Bhusan Sarkar. (( 1926) I. L. R. 53 C. 524.) There was a substantial balance of judicial opinion in favour of the view now submitted. (( 1926) I. L. R. 53 C. 524.) There was a substantial balance of judicial opinion in favour of the view now submitted. The majority in the present case did not recognize the difference between a tax on a landowner in respect of income from his estate, and a tax on him which he has to pay out of that income ; the appellant does not contend that the latter kind of tax would be contrary to the regulations. The adverse decisions were based mainly upon the view that the jama which the regulations declared should not be increased was a rent or rent-charge and not a tax. But the ownership of the soil was not in the sovereign, whose authority the East India Company was exercising Fields Introduction to the Regulations, § 54, footnote; judgment of Lord Lyndhurst L.C. in Freeman v. Fairlie (( 1828) 1 Moo. I. A. 305, 342.), which was approved by the Board in Gunga Gobind Mundul v. Collector of 24 Pergunnahs. (( 1867) 11 Moo. I. A. 345.) [Reference was made also to Shores Minute (Firminger, vol. ii., p. 3); and Phillips Law relating to Land Tenure in Lower Bengal, p. 274.] The ruling power not being owner could not impose a rent or rent-charge, although it could impose a tax. Throughout the regulations " rent" is distinguished from " revenue," " jama," " assessment," the word " rent" being used only as to payments by the raiyats to the zamindar. The appellants view of the meaning of " jama " in the regulations is supported by Haringtons Analysis, vol. ii., p. 144, and Ben. Reg. XV. of 1797, s. 3. Before the settlement the zamindars do not appear to have been subject to any " public demand," except that which by the regulations was to be discharged by the jama and was to be invariable. If the Government had imposed a tax in 1794 upon the profits from zamindaris, that would have been regarded, and rightly regarded, as contrary to the regulations, even though the tax was general in character. Of the judges who have dealt with the question in India Rankin J. only has taken the view that the Act of 1922 impliedly repealed the guarantee. A statute of general application takes away a particular right or exemption only if it does so by explicit language London Corporation v. Netherlands Steamship Co. Of the judges who have dealt with the question in India Rankin J. only has taken the view that the Act of 1922 impliedly repealed the guarantee. A statute of general application takes away a particular right or exemption only if it does so by explicit language London Corporation v. Netherlands Steamship Co. ([ 1906] A. C. 263.); Associated Newspapers v. London Corporation ([ 1916] 2 A. C. 429.) ; Pole-Carew v. Craddock ([ 1920] 3 K. B. 309.); Blackpool Corporation v. Starr Estates Co. ([ 1922] 1 A. C. 27.). The facts in Attorney-General v. Exeter Corporation ([ 1911] 1 K. B. 1092.) are distinguishable. Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Co. v. Minister of Finance and Customs ([ 1922] 2 A. C. 176.) has no bearing; in that case an exemption from export tax was held not to exclude liability to a tax which was not an export tax. The Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, does not impose a tax upon income from a permanently settled estate ; in any case it does not do so clearly enough to repeal the express guarantee in the regulations. The head " property " in s. 6, the charging section, is limited by s. 9 to buildings and lands appurtenant thereto; the head "other sources" in s. 6 must mean sources other than those which the section has named, and thus excludes property. It cannot have been intended by s. 12 to include what was expressly excluded by s. 9. There is no provision for a deduction in respect of the jama, though that would be expected if zamindari income [was intended to be taxed. It is well settled that a subject is not liable to taxation unless it is imposed upon him in clear and unambiguous language. Acts passed in 1860 and between 1867 and 1871 imposed a tax on the profits of zamindaris, but the Acts were passed with the assent of the more important zamindars to meet financial difficulties arisingfrom the mutiny and famine. It was not sought to charge the zamindars under the Acts of 1872 or 1886, or after that date until 1918. Acts passed in 1860 and between 1867 and 1871 imposed a tax on the profits of zamindaris, but the Acts were passed with the assent of the more important zamindars to meet financial difficulties arisingfrom the mutiny and famine. It was not sought to charge the zamindars under the Acts of 1872 or 1886, or after that date until 1918. It is true that when zamindars were charged to cess upon mining profits (see Manindra Chandra Nandi v. Secretary of State for India (( 1907) I. L. R. 34 C. 257,)) they did not claim immunity under the permanent settlement regulations, but that was because their title to the minerals was not secure. The reasons for answering question III. in the negative apply with greater force to question II. There is not sufficient evidence to enable question I. to be dealt with. A jalkar may include a right to cultivate as well as a right to fish Amriteswari Debi v. Secretary of State for India. (( 1897) L. R. 24 I. A. 33.) Dunne K.C. and Wallach for the respondent. The permanent settlement regulations provided that the assessment then made of the share to which the Government was entitled out of the produce of the land should be fixed for ever, but contained no promise, express or implied, that the income which the zamindar might derive from the estate should be immune from general taxation. The contention for the appellant that the jama was a tax not a rent or a rent-charge is based upon the view that the ruling power was not owner of the soil. That view is not established. The statement relied on from Fields Introduction, § 54, conflicts with the view of Phillips, an authority of equal weight. In Freeman v. Fairlie (( 1828) 1 Moo. I. A. 305.) the question was merely whether land in Calcutta devolved according to English law; the observations relied on were obiter, moreover the decision was upon evidence as to foriegn law, and is therefore one of fact. Gunga Gobind Mundul’s case (( 1867) 11 Moo. I. A. 345, 359.) related to a grant of land in the 24 Perganas, and Lord Lyndhursts judgment in the above case was referred to merely in support of the view that a private person could own land in the 24 Perganas against the Government. Gunga Gobind Mundul’s case (( 1867) 11 Moo. I. A. 345, 359.) related to a grant of land in the 24 Perganas, and Lord Lyndhursts judgment in the above case was referred to merely in support of the view that a private person could own land in the 24 Perganas against the Government. But it is not necessary in this case to decide the question whether the ruling power owned the soil. It is sufficient that the ruling power had some proprietary interest in the land, enabling it to make a grant, and to impose a rent-charge. That is shown by decisions of the Board in Secretary of State for India v. Srinivasa Chariar (( 1920) L. R. 48 I. A. 56.); Juggut Mohini Dossee v. Sokheemoney Dossee (( 1871) 14 Moo. I. A. 289.); Collector of Trichinopoly v. Lekkamani. (( 1874) L. R. 1 I. A. 282, 300.) The settlement constituted a contract by which the zamindars obtained a title under the regulations, which, for the first time, was permanent, heritable, and alienable, subject to the payment of a fixed assessment secured upon the land. [Reference was made to Phillips Land Tenure of Lower Bengal, pp. 216 to 320, especially pp. 282 to 284, 316, 317 ; Haringtons Analysis, vol. iii., pp. 255 to 258; and Lelanund Singh v. The Bengal Government. (( 1855) 6 Moo. I. A. 107.)] The statement in Fields Introduction, §. 54, means only that the sovereign was not owner of the soil, as understood in English law, though entitled to the royal share of the produce. Field in a footnote to § 81 himself states as to the imposition of income-tax on zamindars in 1860, that " of the justice and propriety of that decision there cannot be a doubt." The zamindars were subject at the time of the settlement to taxes for police service, octroi, excise (distillation) and customs see Colebrokes Digest Supp., p. 478. The Act of 1922 purported to impose the tax on profits, not being agricultural income, of a zamindari. No question raising a contrary view was referred. Any possible doubt as to what was included in " other sources " in s. 6 is dispelled by s. 12, sub-s. 1. If the taxation of income from "property" was wholly restricted by s. 9, sub-s. 1, there was no need to exempt agricultural income by s. 4, sub-s. 3. No question raising a contrary view was referred. Any possible doubt as to what was included in " other sources " in s. 6 is dispelled by s. 12, sub-s. 1. If the taxation of income from "property" was wholly restricted by s. 9, sub-s. 1, there was no need to exempt agricultural income by s. 4, sub-s. 3. A zamindar is entitled under s. 12, sub-s. 2, to a deduction in respect of a proportionate part of the jama. [The various income-tax Acts between 1860 and 1886 were discussed.] If, contrary to the belief of the Government, the tax involves the breach of a promise contained in the regulations, a decision is desired on the question whether the Act to that extent repeals the regulations, in order that the Government may take appropriate steps to maintain its good faith. It is submitted that upon the test laid down by Viscount Haldane in Blackburn Corporation v. Starr Estate Co. ([ 1922] 1 A. C. 27, 34.) there was an implied repeal. Whichever way question III. is answered question II. does not arise. On question I. there is n ground for interfering with the decision. E. B. Raikes K.C. in reply. That the ruling power had no right in the soil is supported by Vyakunta Bapuji v. Government of Bombay (( 1875) 12 Bom, H. C. Appx. 1.), the same considerations applying in Bombay as in Bengal. The fixing of the jama was not a matter of contract between the Government and the zamindar, but was a matter of legislation by the East India Company under the authority delegated to it. Rent was unknown to Mahomedan rule, and the Mahomedan land-tax or khiraj was settled by legislation. The jama is never termed "rent" in the regulations, and none of the remedies appropriate to a rent or rent-charge were available to Government until Reg. XI. of 1822. If the jama is neither a rent nor rent-charge it must be a tax, and being fixed no further tax can be imposed upon the income of the zamindars. [Reference was made also to Mayor of Lyons v. East India Co. (( 1836) 1 Moo. XI. of 1822. If the jama is neither a rent nor rent-charge it must be a tax, and being fixed no further tax can be imposed upon the income of the zamindars. [Reference was made also to Mayor of Lyons v. East India Co. (( 1836) 1 Moo. I. A. 174, 273, 278.), Ranjit Singh v. Kali Doli Debi (( 1917) L. R. 44 I. A. 117, 122.) Secretary of State for India v. Maharaja of Burdwan (( 1921) L. R. 48 I. A. 565.), also to provisions of Ben. Regs. VIII. of 1793, XIX. of 1793, XXV. of 1793, II. of 1819]. May 26. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN. The appellant is zamindar of the permanently settled estate of Gouripur, and he appeals to His Majesty in Council in the circumstances herein set forth. By an assessment note of the income-tax officer of Dhubri dated August 28, 1925, the appellant was assessed under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, to income-tax in respect of income arising from his said estate. On appeal the assess ment was confirmed by order of the Assistant Commissioner dated December 22, 1925. At the request of the appellant the Commissioner of Income-tax, Assam, acting under s. 66 of the said Act, submitted certain questions for the decision of the High Court. The questions so submitted were three in number, and (as amended in the course of the hearing) they were in the following terms — "I. Whether the following sources of income are agricultural and therefore exempted from assessment to income-tax under s. 4, sub-s. 3 (viii.), of the Act ? [Then follow 10 items which it is unnecessary to set out here.] "II. Whether income derived from such of the above sources as were not taken into consideration at the time of fixing the jama at the permanent settlement is assessable for income-tax purposes ? "III. Whether, having regard to the terms of the permanent settlement regulation, income derived from land in permanently settled estates, subject to the exemptions provided by the legislature, is liable to assessment to income-tax ? " In view of a diversity of judicial opinion already existing in regard to the proper answer returnable to the third question both questions II. and III. " In view of a diversity of judicial opinion already existing in regard to the proper answer returnable to the third question both questions II. and III. were, by an order of May 21, 1926, referred for decision of the Full Bench, the consideration of question I. being in the meantime deferred. The case was argued before the Full Bench consisting of five judges of the High Court, with the result that Ghose, Buckland and Panton JJ. took one view and Mukerji and Suhrawardy JJ. took a different and opposite view. The majority of the judges held that questions II. and III. should both be answered in the affirmative. In the opinion of the minority, question III. should be answered in the negative, from which answer it would follow that question II. would not arise. By order dated March 14, 1927, the reference to the Full Bench was disposed of in accordance with the opinion of the majority of the Court. The remaining question I. was decided by the High Court on May 11, 1927. The appellant confined his claim for exemption to three items out of the specified ten items, but the High Court held that none of the three items were exempted as agricultural income, and accordingly question I. was answered in the negative. By an order of the High Court dated November 7, 1927, the application of the appellant for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council against the said judgments or orders of May 21, 1926, March 14, 1927, and May 11, 1927, was granted. It is in these circumstances that the matter came before this Board. There can be no doubt as to the importance or difficulty of this case, which, in their Lordships opinion, depends primarily, if not entirely, upon the consideration of question III. It is sufficient to state that the problem of the correct answer to question III. has been now considered before different High Courts in Madras, Patna and Calcutta by thirteen judges. As their Lordships read the various decisions, it would appear that five of the thirteen judges would answer question III. in the affirmative and eight would answer it in the negative. The argument for the appellant on question III. was presented to their Lordships in great, but not excessive, detail, and covered a wide ground. As their Lordships read the various decisions, it would appear that five of the thirteen judges would answer question III. in the affirmative and eight would answer it in the negative. The argument for the appellant on question III. was presented to their Lordships in great, but not excessive, detail, and covered a wide ground. It may be summarized thus — That at the time of the permanent settlement in 1793 definite guarantees and assurances were given by the governing authority, and were embodied in the Bengal regulations of 1793 (hereinafter alluded to as the regulations) to the effect that the income of the zamindar from his estate would not, beyond payment thereout of the jama, be further touched or taxed ; that the imposition of a tax on the income of a zamindar derived from his zamindari would be a breach of those guarantees and assurances ; that the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, does not, according to its true construction, purport to impose a tax on the income of a zamindar derived from his zamindari; and that, if such a tax could be said to be imposed under or by virtue of the language used in the Act, nevertheless the language used was not so clear and explicit as to operate as a repeal of the legislative provisions of the regulations. Such in outline was the appellants contention. Incidentally to this argument the Board was invited to consider, and indeed pronounce upon, the question, mainly historical, of the position of the governing authority immediately before the permanent settlement in regard to ownership of the land or of some proprietary interest therein. The attention of their Lordships was called to the various viewsexpressed in such works and documents as Fields Regulations of the Bengal Code, Phillipss Land Tenures of Lower Bengal and Shores Minutes. Their Lordships were also referred to certain reported decisions of the Courts. Their Lordships, however, are of opinion that there is here no occasion for any pronouncement by them upon the question of the exact nature of the rights and interests in relation to the land which existed in the governing authority before 1793, but that this appeal falls to be determined upon a consideration of the language of the regulations and of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. In view of the argument that the Act does not according to its terms purport to impose a tax on the income of a zamindar derived from his zamindari, their Lordships pro pose in the first instance to examine the language of the Act, and then, if the Act does according to its terms, actually impose such a tax, to consider if the imposition of the tax is to any, and what extent, inconsistent with the provisions of the regulations. The Act of 1922 is a consolidation and amendment Act. Sect. 1 refers to its title, sphere of operation and commencement. Sect. 2 is a definition section. The rest of the Act is divided into ten chapters, of which only Chapters I. and III. seem relevant to the present purpose. Chapter I. is entitled " Charge of income-tax," and consists of ss. 3 and 4. Sect. 3 is so framed as to charge income-tax at the rate which may from time to time be enacted. The income-tax is stated to be "in respect of all income, profits and gains of the previous year of every individual. Sect. 4, sub-s. 1, provides that the Act is to apply to all income profits or gains as described or comprised in s. 6 from whatever source derived, accruing or arising or received in British India or deemed under the provisions of the Act to accrue or arise or to be received in British India. Sect. 4, sub-s. 2, affords an instance of profits and gains accruing or arising without British India being deemed to accrue or arise in British India. Sect. 4, sub-s. 3, enumerates a list of classes of income to which the Act shall not apply. Income derived from a zamindari is not included in the list, but " agricultural income " is included. It would appear that the purpose of s. 3 is to charge income-tax at the current rate for the time being, and that the purpose of s. 4 is (by sub-s. 1) to confine the tax to income actually or artificially accruing or arising or received in British India, and (by sub-s. 3) to exempt specified classes of income from tax. Although Chapter I. is entitled " Charge of income-tax," the real charging section would appear to be s. 6, which occurs in Chapter III. Chapter III. is entitled " Taxable income," and is composed of ss. Although Chapter I. is entitled " Charge of income-tax," the real charging section would appear to be s. 6, which occurs in Chapter III. Chapter III. is entitled " Taxable income," and is composed of ss. 6 to 17 inclusive. Sect. 6 provides that " save as otherwise provided by this Act, the following heads of income profits and gains shall be chargeable to income-tax, in the manner hereinafter appearing—namely (i.) Salaries; (ii.) Interest on securities ; (iii.) Property ; (iv.) Business ; (v.) Professional earnings ; (vi.) Other sources." Each of the next following six sections deals severally with each of the six heads of income profits and gains specified in s. 6, and states with greater particularity the items in respect of which the tax shall he payable by the assessee under the particular "head," and gives details of allowances and exemptions in regard to the different heads. Sect. 9 accordingly deals with the head " property," and a perusal of it makes it clear that the " income profits and gains " charged under the head " property," are confined to the annual value of " buildings or lands appurtenant thereto," in other words to the annual value of what may be conveniently called house property. The income of a zamindar derived from his zamindari would not be chargeable under that head. If chargeable in the result it would be under the head " other sources." Sect. 12 deals with that head, and requires close attention. Sect. 12, sub-s. 1, provides that the tax shall be payable by an assessee under that head "In respect of income profits and gains of every kind and from every source to which this Act applies (if not included under any of the preceding heads)." These words appear to their Lordships clear and emphatic, and expressly framed so as to make the sixth head mentioned in s. 6 describe a true residuary group embracing within it all sources of income, profits and gains provided the Act applies to them, i.e., provided that they accrue or arise or are received in British India or are deemed to accrue or arise or to be received in British India, as provided by s. 4, sub-s. 1, and are not exempted by virtue of s. 4, sub-s. 3. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the income derived from a zamindari was never brought into charge at all, because, in s. 6, the words " other sources " must mean sources other than those described above, and therefore could not include any source which could properly be described as " property." Incidentally it may be pointed out that this argument, if successful, could not be confined to the income derived from a zamindari; it would free from liability to income-tax all income derived from land which did not consist of buildings or lands appurtenant thereto, and it would seem to render unnecessary the specific exemption of agricultural income. Their Lordships, however, feel unable to accede to the argument. In s. 6 the words " other sources " used in relation to the word " property " would naturally mean sources other than the source which the word " property " connotes in this Act. But if there were any doubt on this score, it would disappear in the light of s. 12, the meaning and effect of which have been indicated above. Upon this part of the case therefore their Lordships are of opinion that the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, by ss. 6 and 12, brings into charge for the purposes of income-tax the income derived from a zamindari, and that a zamindar is assessable in respect of income, profits and gains derived from that source. Before leaving this part of the case their Lordships deem it right, in view of discussions in the course of the arguments before the Board, to make a further statement as to the liability of the appellant to pay income-tax upon the income derived from his zamindari. The tax is upon " income, profits and gains." It is not a tax on gross receipts. With this fact in view, each section which deals with one of the first five " heads " specified in s. 6 contains, where proper, specific provisions for the necessary deductions and allowances to be made for the purpose of arriving at the taxable balance. Sect. With this fact in view, each section which deals with one of the first five " heads " specified in s. 6 contains, where proper, specific provisions for the necessary deductions and allowances to be made for the purpose of arriving at the taxable balance. Sect. 12, which deals with the general residuary group, is necessarily framed in general terms and authorizes the allowance of any " expenditure (not being in the nature of capital expenditure) incurred solely for the purpose of making or earning such income, profits or gains." Their Lordships were unable to ascertain upon what footing the appellant had been assessed in respect of the income derived from his zamindari, i.e., whether on the gross income or after some allowance had been made in respect of the jama assessed and paid upon the lands. Their Lordships are of opinion that, in assessing the appellant to income-tax in respect of the income derived from his zamindari, his income, profits and gains from that source should be computed after making proper allowance in respect of the jama assessed and paid. Their Lordships now proceed to consider the question whether the imposition of income-tax in respect of the income derived from the zamindari is to any and what extent inconsistent with the provisions of the regulations. In regard to this part of the case their Lordships desire to make this observation. The Bengal Regulations of 1793 are lengthy and numerous. In the course of the arguments before the Board attempts were made to support the respective arguments by a phrase picked from one regulation or a passage chosen from another, even though the particular regulation only purported to deal with some matter incidental to the permanent settlement. In the opinion of their Lordships this part of the case falls to be determined primarily upon a consideration of the language of Reg. 1 of 1793. While bearing in mind the passages in other regulations to which their attention was drawn, their Lordships feel that the above mentioned regulation is the master regulation for the immediate purpose before the Board, and that its provisions constitute the overriding feature in the present case. It bears date May 1, 1793, but is retrospective and operates as from March 22, 1793. This last mentioned date was the date of a proclamation, to certain articles of which the regulation gave legislative effect. It bears date May 1, 1793, but is retrospective and operates as from March 22, 1793. This last mentioned date was the date of a proclamation, to certain articles of which the regulation gave legislative effect. In so far as it relates to the case of the appellant, the regulation may be conveniently summarized. Arts. I. and II. of the proclamation (ss. 2 and 3 of the regulation) contain a notification by the Governor-General in Council to all zamindars in the province of Bengal that he has been empowered by the Court of Directors for the affairs of the East India Company to declare the jama which has been or may be assessed upon their lands under the regulation for the decennial settlement of the public revenues of Bengal passed on September 18, 1789, fixed for ever. Art. III. of the proclamation (s. 4 of the regulation), contains a declaration to the zamindars with whom a settlement had been concluded under the regulation of September 18, 1789, that at the expiration of the term of the settlement no alteration will be made in the assessment which they have engaged to pay, but that they and their heirs and successors will be allowed to hold their estates at such assessment for ever. Art. VI. of the proclamation (s. 7 of the regulation), is of great importance and appears to their Lordships to embody the legislative statements and provisions which are most favourable to the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant. The first sentence recites as facts well known in Bengal (1.) that the public assessment upon the land has never been fixed ; (2.) that the rulers have from time to time demanded an increase of assessment from the proprietors of land ; (3.) that for the purpose of obtaining this increase not only have frequent investigations been made to ascertain the actual produce of the estate, but it has been the practice to deprive the proprietors of the management of their lands. The second sentence of art. VI. recites that the Court of Directors considers these usages and measures detrimental to the prosperity of the country, and states that the zamindars with whom a settlement has been or may be, concluded, are to consider the orders fixing the amount of the assessment as irrevocable and not liable to alteration. The second sentence of art. VI. recites that the Court of Directors considers these usages and measures detrimental to the prosperity of the country, and states that the zamindars with whom a settlement has been or may be, concluded, are to consider the orders fixing the amount of the assessment as irrevocable and not liable to alteration. The third sentence runs as follows " The Governor-General in Council trusts that the proprietors of land, sensible of the benefits conferred upon them by the public assessment being fixed for ever, will exert themselves in the cultivation of their lands, under the certainty that they will enjoy exclusively the fruits of their own good management and industry, and that no demand will ever be made upon them, or their heirs or successors, by the present or any future Government, for an augmentation of the public assessment, in consequence of the improvement of their respective estate." It is upon this third sentence of art. VI. that the appellant mainly relies for his contention that the imposition of income-tax in respect of the income derived by him from his zamindari would be a breach of and inconsistent with the provisions of the regulations. He alleges that the jama was a tax and not a rent or rent-charge, and that by the regulations a legislative assurance or guarantee was given that no tax beyond the amount of the fixed jama would be imposed upon the income of the permanently settled estate. To this contention the respondent makes answer (1.) that what the permanent settlement accomplished was to fix for ever the quantum of the Governments share of the produce of the land ; and (2.) that upon their true construction the regulations do not purport to exempt the zamindar from taxation in respect of the income derived from his zamindari. Their Lordships, after careful consideration of the regulations, have arrived at the conclusion that the argument of the appellant cannot succeed. Their Lordships, after careful consideration of the regulations, have arrived at the conclusion that the argument of the appellant cannot succeed. They are unable to find in the regulations any statement or assurance that a zamindar will never be liable to taxation in respect of the income derived from his zamindari, or (to put the matter from another point of view) that a zamindar will, as to so much of his property as consists of income derived from his zamindari, be exempt from schemes of taxation applicable generally to the incomes of the inhabitants of British India. The language used in Reg. 1, art. VI., does not, in their Lordships opinion, mean anything other than this " You have in the past been liable to have the amount of the jama increased according as the actual produce of the estate increased ; to enable the Government to obtain this you have been subjected to frequent investigations to ascertain the actual produce and you have even been deprived of the management of your estates. All this shall cease. You shall have fixity of payment and fixity of tenure. If you improve the revenue of your zamindari you shall enjoy the fruits of your improvements without fear of the Government claiming that because the revenue produced by the estate has increased the payment you make to Government as a condition of holding that estate shall be increased also." Their Lordships have ventured to paraphrase art. VI., but they think that their paraphrase expresses with sufficient accuracy the true intent and meaning of the article. In their Lordships opinion, while the regulations contain assurances against any claim to an increase of the jama, based on an increase of the zamindari income, they contain no promise that a zamindar shall in respect of the income which he derives from his zamindari be exempt from liability to any future general scheme of property taxation, or that the income of a zamindari shall not be subjected with other incomes to any future general taxation of incomes. Their Lordships agree with the views expressed by Ghose J. in the following passage from his judgment "There was no promise or engagement of any description whatsoever by which the Government of the day surrendered their right to levy a general tax upon incomes of all persons irrespective of the fact whether they are zamindars with whom the permanent settlement was concluded or not." It follows that in their Lordships opinion question II. and question III. should both be answered in the affirmative. Question I. was but faintly argued before the Board. As to it their Lordships need only say that they have not been furnished either with materials or reasons which would justify them in suggesting that any of the ten specified items could properly be described as agricultural income within the definition of agricultural income contained in s. 2, sub-s. 1, of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922. Their Lordships accordingly agree with the negative answer which has been given to question I. For the reasons given their Lordships are of opinion that this appeal fails and should be dismissed, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly. There will be no order as to the costs of this appeal.