Judgement Appeal (No. 124 of 1928) from a decree of the Chief Court of Oudh (December 13, 1927) affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Fyzabad (January 29, 1926). The appellants, as reversionary heirs of Gaind Singh, who died in 1880, sued for possession of immovable property in Oudh which had been sold by Gaind Singhs widow Agind Kuar in 1881 and had passed to the respondents. The sole question arising was whether a deed of gift executed by Gaind Singh in favour of Agind Kuar in 1877 conferred upon her a power to alienate the property. The terms of the deed are fully set out in the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The Chief Court of Oudh, affirming a decree of the Subordinate Judge, dismissed the suit, holding that the deed conferred a power to alienate the property. 1930. June 26. De Gruyther K.C. and Jopling for the appellants. The deed of gift should be construed according to the ordinary notions of Hindus in relation to property Under Hindu law a gift by a husband to his wife of immovable property confers on her only the right to enjoy possession of it and not a power to sell or make gift of it, in the absence of an express power of alienation Maynes Hindu Law, para. 664. No power to alienate was given expressly, although it was in deeds of gift which Gaind Singh executed in favour of his daughters earlier. The Board no doubt has held that a power to alienate can be inferred if the words of gift are of sufficient amplitude Surajmani v. Rabi Nath Ojha (( 1907) L. R. 35 I. A. 17.) (which was explained in Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao (( 1923) L. R. 49 I. A. 129,135.)) ; Fateh Chand v. Rup Chand (( 1916) L. R. 43 I. A. 183.); Bhaidas Shivdas v. Bai Gulab (( 1921) L. R. 49 I. A. 1.) ; Sasiman Chowdhurain v. 8Mb Narayan Chowdhury. (( 1921)L. R. 49 I.A.25.) But in all the cases in which it has been so held the words used were "maliq" or “maliq-o-qabiz," or "maliq with full proprietary powers." [SIR GEORGE LOWNDES. (( 1921)L. R. 49 I.A.25.) But in all the cases in which it has been so held the words used were "maliq" or “maliq-o-qabiz," or "maliq with full proprietary powers." [SIR GEORGE LOWNDES. In the judgment in Shalig Ram v. Charanjit Lal (1) just delivered the word used was merely "waris" (heir).] It is conceded that the deed gave the widow a heritable estate, but it does not appear that she was to have any right to alienate. Maynes Hindu Law, 7th ed., para. 397, states " Gifts by a husband to his wife of immovable property, even though accompanied by express words of inheritance, are not alienable unless distinctly declared to be so." [SIR JOHN WALLIS. A different view is expressed in the 9th ed., paras. 396, 397.] Dunne K.C., Dube, and A. P. Sen for the respondents were not called upon. July 22. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR GEORGE LOWNDES. In this appeal the Board have again to consider a question which has been discussed under different guises in a number of cases within the last few years —namely, whether, under Hindu law, a woman taking immovable property by gift from her husband has power to alienate it. The most recent decision on the subject is in Shalig Earn v. Charanjit Lal (( 1930) supra, p. 282.), which cited and followed the judgment of Lord Buckmaster in Bhaidas Shivdas v. Bai Gulab. (L. R. 49 I. A. 1.) Reference was also made to Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao (L. R. 49 I. A. 129, 135.), in which Lord Buckmaster made certain remarks explanatory of the decision in Surajmani v. Rabi Nath Ojha (L. R. 35 I. A. 17.), another case in which a widows power of alienation had been called in question, but their Lordships have no doubt that these remarks were not intended to qualify in any way the pronouncement in Bhaidas Shivdas v. Pai Gulab. There is also an exhaustive judgment of Sir John Edge in Sasiman Chowdhurain v. Shib Narayan Chowdhury (L. R. 49 I . A. 25.), to which Lord Buckmaster was a party and which was heard a few days only after Bhaidas Shivdas case. Under these circumstances their Lordships feel that the doctrine upon which the decision of the present appeal depends is so well established that no further discussion of the authorities is required. A. 25.), to which Lord Buckmaster was a party and which was heard a few days only after Bhaidas Shivdas case. Under these circumstances their Lordships feel that the doctrine upon which the decision of the present appeal depends is so well established that no further discussion of the authorities is required. If, as in the present case, the donor does not confer upon the lady express power of alienation, such power may nevertheless be deduced from the terms of the gift if the words used are sufficient to confer upon her absolute ownership, unless the circumstances or the context show that such absolute ownership was not intended. There is, their Lordships think, no magic in the use of any particular word or form of words ; the document must be construed as a whole, and its fair import deduced in the ordinary way, and if the conclusion come to is that it confers the estate out and out with no reservation, the right of alienation will be included just as much as any of the other incidents of ownership, and just as much where the gift is to a female as where it is to a male. In the present case, one Gaind Singh executed a deed of gift dated May 7, 1877, in favour of his wife Musammat Agind Kuar. The subject-matter of the gift was part of an estate in Oudh known as Bhiti Risalpur, of which Gaind Singh was the proprietor. He had no son and had already made over other considerable portions of his estate to his two daughters. After her husbands death, Musammat Agind Kuar by a sale deed of September 8, 1881, transferred a portion of the property to one Chedi Ram Misr, whose interest is now represented by the respondents. The sole question raised for determination by their Lordships is whether she had power so to do. The appellants claim as the ultimate reversioners to whom the property would pass if the alienation was invalid. The deed of gift is in the following terms — "I am Gaind Singh, son of Nokhe Singh, caste Chhattri Bais, resident of Mauza Mareman, pargana Pachhamrath, and Seerdar and Taluqdar of Bhatti, pargana Tanda, district Fyzabad. The appellants claim as the ultimate reversioners to whom the property would pass if the alienation was invalid. The deed of gift is in the following terms — "I am Gaind Singh, son of Nokhe Singh, caste Chhattri Bais, resident of Mauza Mareman, pargana Pachhamrath, and Seerdar and Taluqdar of Bhatti, pargana Tanda, district Fyzabad. "Whereas the entire village Fatehpur and half of village Nau Sanda constitute my zamindari Haqiat without any co-parcenership which are in my exclusive possession, having been granted by the Government as reward for my loyalty, and I am in proprietary possession and enjoyment thereof up to the time of the execution of this deed ; whereas I am now old and no reliance can be placed on this borrowed life ; whereas I am afraid that this estate might be destroyed after me as I have no male issue and whereas Musammat Agind Kuar is my lawfully wedded wife besides whom I have no other co-sharer and co-parcener, so, with a view to safeguard the aforesaid property, I, while in the enjoyment of sound health and unimpaired intellect, without reluctance and coercion, have specifically gifted the zamindari in the aforesaid villages with all the original and accreted rights, cultivated and uncultivated lands, seer, saer, jalkar, bankar and all the rights held by me, to my wife Musammat Agind Kuar, and I do hereby covenant and reduce to writing that the said lady shall, generation after generation, remain in possession and enjoyment of zamindari Haqiat in the said villages on payment of the Government revenue. Now, after the execution hereof, if I or any one of my heirs and co-sharers lays any sort of claim to the aforesaid property against the donee, the same shall be deemed false and untenable by the powers that be. With the exception of the lady-donee, no one else shall have any power of interference and meddling with regard to the gifted property. " Wherefore these few presents have been reduced to writing by way of a specific deed of gift, so that it may serve as an authority and be of use when required." Their Lordships have no doubt that reading this deed as a whole it must be construed as conferring upon Musammat Agind Kuar an absolute estate in the property. " Wherefore these few presents have been reduced to writing by way of a specific deed of gift, so that it may serve as an authority and be of use when required." Their Lordships have no doubt that reading this deed as a whole it must be construed as conferring upon Musammat Agind Kuar an absolute estate in the property. Both the Courts in India by whom the case was heard came to the same conclusion, and their Lordships think it unnecessary therefore to discuss the document in detail. They would, however, remark that not only does the donor transfer to her all his rights in the property, but he says that she is to remain in possession and enjoyment of it "from generation to generation," words which have come to have almost a technical meaning in many parts of India as conveying a heritable and alienable estate Ram Lal Mookerjee v. Secretary of State for India (( 1881) L. R. 8 I. A. 46, 61) ; Lalit Mohun Singh Roy v. Chukkan Lal Roy. (( 1897) L.R. 24 I. A. 76, 88) In their Lordships opinion the appeal fails and should be dismissed with costs, and they will humbly advise His Majesty accordingly.