Judgement Appeal (No. 52 of 1929) from a decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Central Provinces (April 8, 1926), reversing a decree of the District Judge of Hoshangabad (September 30, 1924). The appeal arose out of a suit for specific performance of a contract for the sale of a share of a mauza subject to the provisions of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act, 1920, " with sir and khudkast." The first appellant was the son of the vendor, who was defendant No. 1, the other appellants were mortgagees from him. The respondents were the assignees of the purchaser Masammat Jankibai, who was plaintiff in the suit. The facts, and the terms of s. 50, sub-s. 1, of the above Act, appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The appellate Court (reversing the trial judge) made a decree in favour of the plaintiff in the terms appearing in the present judgment. The assignment by Jankibai to the respondents was made after the decree, and the respondents names were ordered to be substituted for hers as respondents to the present appeal. 1930. July 17, 18. Dunne K.C. and Wallach for the appellants. De Gruyther K.C. and Parikh for the respondents. July 29. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR LANCELOT SANDERSON. This is an appeal from a decree of. the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Central Provinces, dated April 8, 1926, which reversed a decree of the District Judge of Hoshangabad dated September 30, 1924, and decreed the plaintiffs suit with costs. The appeal is brought by Seth Motilal, the son of Seth Sobhagmal (who was the first defendant in the suit and is now dead), and Seth Lachmandas and Seth Manakchand, the second and third defendants in the suit. The respondents are the assignees of the plaintiff, Mst. Jankibai, widow of Govindram Chaudhari. The plaintiff assigned all her interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the decree appealed against to the respondents, whose names by order of the Court dated October 7, 1927, were substituted for that of the plaintiff, as respondents in the appeal. The material facts are as follows — On July 9, 1914, Mst. The plaintiff assigned all her interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the decree appealed against to the respondents, whose names by order of the Court dated October 7, 1927, were substituted for that of the plaintiff, as respondents in the appeal. The material facts are as follows — On July 9, 1914, Mst. Jankibai, the plaintiff, had agreed to buy from Seth Jiwandas and the latter had agreed to sell to the former a four annas and four pies share of mauza Raisalpur, including sir and khudkast lands, with cultivating rights in the sir, for Rs.46,100. Mst. Jankibai paid Rs.5000 as earnest money, but being unable to raise the balance of the purchase money, arranged with Seth Sobhagmal (defendant 1) that he should have the benefit of her contract with Jiwandas, pay the balance, take the sale-deed in his name, and convey to her the said share at any time within ten years on her paying him (Sobhagmal) Rs.41,100. On August 25, 1914, Seth Sobhagmal accordingly took a sale-deed from Jiwandas and paid him the balance of the purchase money. On September 4, 1914, two agreements were executed, one by Seth Sobhagmal in favour of Jankibai, and the other by the latter in his favour, stating the arrangement already mentioned. On March 18, 1918, Seth Sobhagmal mortgaged a four anna share to the defendants 2 and 3. On October 9, 1919, Jankibai gave notice to Sobhagmal that she was prepared to pay him the price, and called upon him to carry out his contract with her, but he took no notice of it. Consequently the plaintiff instituted the present suit against Seth Sobhagmal and his mortgagees (the second and third defendants), praying for a decree that the defendants should be ordered to execute a sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff for the said share of the said village with cultivating rights in the sir land, after obtaining sanction under the Central Provinces Tenancy Act for the transfer of the sir lands on payment by her of the sum of Rs.41,100 and other sums that might be due under the agreement. The plaint contained other alternative reliefs, which it is not necessary to mention in detail at present. At the trial many issues were raised ; most of them are not now material. The learned District Judge dismissed the suit. The plaint contained other alternative reliefs, which it is not necessary to mention in detail at present. At the trial many issues were raised ; most of them are not now material. The learned District Judge dismissed the suit. He came to the conclusion that the litigation was speculative and opposed to public policy ; that it had been engineered by Seth Nanhelal, the first respondent, to get the defendants out of the village, as they were undercutting him by lending grain and money at lower rates than he did in the village. With regard to this ground, it is only necessary to say that it is not relied upon by the appellants in this appeal. The plaintiff appealed to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, which allowed the appeal, and on April 8, 1926, made a decree in the plaintiffs favour as follows " The decree of the lower Court is set aside and it is ordered that the first defendant Sobhagmal shall apply within one month to a revenue-officer for sanction to transfer to the plaintiff Jankibai the cultivating rights in the sir pertaining to the share in the village of Raisalpur mentioned in the agreement of the 4th of September, 1914, and further that within one month of receipt of that sanction he shall convey to the plaintiff the said share in accordance with the terms of that agreement, after redeeming the mortgage on the share held by the other defendants, Seth Lachmandas and Manakchand, and further that he shall pay the whole of the costs incurred by the plaintiff in both Courts by deduction from the amount to be paid to him for the transfer." From this decree the appellants have appealed. The first point urged on their behalf was that the agreements of September 4, 1914, between Mst. Jankibai and Sobhagmal did not cover the cultivating rights in the sir land, and therefore that the plaintiff was not entitled to call for a conveyance thereof from Sobhagmal. This is a question of construction. The first point urged on their behalf was that the agreements of September 4, 1914, between Mst. Jankibai and Sobhagmal did not cover the cultivating rights in the sir land, and therefore that the plaintiff was not entitled to call for a conveyance thereof from Sobhagmal. This is a question of construction. The agreement signed by Sobhagmal was as follows [so far as is material ] "I will execute a sale-deed in your favour in respect of the entire four anna and four pie share of this mauza with sir and khudkast at any time you pay in full, within ten years, Rs.41,100 cash together with registration and other expenses of the sale-deed and rental arrears that may be due to me from tenants.....If I fail to execute a sale-deed after the full amount as above is paid, you may pay the amount in Court and get a sale-deed executed by me through Court under this deed of agreement." It is to be noted that this agreement was made on September 4, 1914, ten days after the deed by which Jivandass sold the share in the village to Sobhagmal. There is no doubt that by the last mentioned deed the cultivating rights in the sir land were transferred by Jiwandass to Sobhagmal, with the sanction of the revenue-officer. The recitals in the agreement of September 4, 1914, the price which Mst. Jankibai was to pay, Rs.41,100, which, added to the Rs.5000 earnest money already paid by her, made up the total of Rs.46,100, which corresponded to the purchase price of the sale-deed, and the operative words of the agreement go to show, in their Lordships opinion, that the subject matter of the agreements of September 4, 1914, between Mst. Jankibai and Sobhagmal was the same as the subject matter of the sale-deed of August 25, 1914. As already stated, there is no doubt that by the said sale-deed the cultivating rights in the sir land were conveyed to Sobhagmal, and their Lordships are of opinion that the true construction of the agreements of September 4, 1914, is that Sobhagmal agreed tc transfer to Mst. Jankibai the cultivating rights in the sir land as well as the share in the village and the other matters specifically mentioned therein. Jankibai the cultivating rights in the sir land as well as the share in the village and the other matters specifically mentioned therein. It is to be noted that this opinion agrees with the construction placed upon the agreements by the learned District Judge, and that, so far as can be ascertained from the judgment of the appellate Court in India, the above mentioned construction was not disputed in that Court. The next point on which the appellants relied was that a decree for specific performance of the agreements of September 4, 1914, should not be made, because such performance would necessitate an application by or on behalf of the defendants or one of them to the revenue-officer for sanction to transfer the cultivating rights in the sir land, and that the Court had no jurisdiction to require the defendants or any one of them to make such an application. The material section which was in force at the time of the agreements was s. 45, sub-s. 2, of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act (XL of 1898). That Act was repealed by the Central Provinces Act of 1920, and the corresponding section of the 1920 Act is s. 50, sub-s. 1, which is as follows " If a proprietor desires to transfer the proprietary rights in any portion of his sir land without reservation of the right of occupancy specified in s. 49, he may apply to a revenue-officer and, if such revenue-officer is satisfied that the transferor is not wholly or mainly an agriculturist, or that the property is self-acquired or has been acquired within the twenty years last preceding, he shall sanction the transfer." In view of the above mentioned construction of the agreements of September 4, 1914—namely, that Sobhagmal agreed to transfer the cultivating rights in the sir land—there was, in their Lordships opinion, an implied covenant on his part to do all things necessary to effect such transfer, which would include an application to the revenue-officer to sanction the transfer. It is not necessary for their Lordships to decide whether in this case the application for sanction of transfer must succeed, but it is material to mention that no facts were brought to their Lordships notice which would go to show that there was any reason why such sanction should not be granted. It is not necessary for their Lordships to decide whether in this case the application for sanction of transfer must succeed, but it is material to mention that no facts were brought to their Lordships notice which would go to show that there was any reason why such sanction should not be granted. In these circumstances their Lordships are of opinion that the appellate Court had jurisdiction under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act to make the decree against which the appeal is directed, and that the terms of Order xxi., r. 32 (5.), are sufficient to provide for the decree being carried out. Inasmuch as their Lordships are of opinion that the decree for specific performance of the agreements was properly made, it is not necessary to consider or express any opinion upon the point raised on behalf of the appellants with regard to the question of damages. For these reasons their Lordships are of opinion that this appeal should be dismissed with costs, and they will humbly .advise His Majesty accordingly.