JUDGMENT Mitter, J. - This Rule was obtained at the instance of the Plaintiffs and arises out of a suit commenced by them in the Court of the Sadar Munsif of Silchar for recovery of a sum of Rs. 281-9 annas as the amount clue on a khata account and Rs. 18 as compensation. The case of the Plaintiffs was that the Defendant Opposite Party No. 1 and his son Opposite Party No. 2 were carrying on business jointly and that they used to take articles from the Petitioners' firm upon credit and that the amount of Rs. 281-9 annas was due from the Defendants. The account, it is said, stood in the name of Opposite Party No. 2 with the consent of his father. The suit was instituted against both the Defendants-Defendant No. 1 and Defendant No. 2. The Court of first instance dismissed the suit against Defendant No. 2 but decreed the suit against Defendant No. 1. Against this decision an appeal was taken by Defendant No. 1 to the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Silchar. To this appeal Defendant No. 2 was also made a party. The lower Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the Plaintiffs had failed to establish their case against Defendant No. 1. The Subordinate Judge was of opinion that the accounts being in the name of Defendant No. 2 the Plaintiffs had to show clearly and definitely that the father, i.e., Defendant No. 1 should be responsible for the act of the son. The Subordinate Judge did not decide finally on the liability of Defendant No. 2 in respect of the accounts between the years 1332 and 1334. He accordingly dismissed the Plaintiffs' suit. Against this decision the present application for revision was preferred by the Plaintiffs and it is contended that a decree should have been passed against Defendant No. 2, although the Plaintiffs had not preferred any appeal against the decree of the first Court dismissing the suit against the Defendant No. 2. Regard being had to the provisions of Or. 41, r. 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it seems to me that this contention is well-founded. The learned Advocate for the Opposite Party however has referred to the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Mahomed Khaleel Shirazi and Sons v. Les Tanneries Lyonnaises ILR 49 Mad. 41, r. 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it seems to me that this contention is well-founded. The learned Advocate for the Opposite Party however has referred to the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Mahomed Khaleel Shirazi and Sons v. Les Tanneries Lyonnaises ILR 49 Mad. 435 ; s. c. 31 C. W. N. 1 (P. C.) (1926) and he contends that the Plaintiffs are really seeking in effect to get an appeal against the decision of the Munsif dismissing the suit against Defendant No. 2. He further contends that this they cannot be permitted to do even under the provisions of Or. 41, r. 33 of the Code. An examination of this decision, however, will show that the Judicial Committee was unwilling to pass a decree against Marret under Or. 41, r. 33 as there could not be any appeal against Marret direct from the decree of the District Judge dismissing the Plaintiffs' suit against him except with regard to costs under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Under those circumstances their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that Or. 41, r. 33 of the Code was not intended to apply to such an appeal. The passage which is relevant for the present purpose may be quoted here. "As to the objection especially raised by the learned Counsel for Marret, that as the Plaintiffs had not appealed against the decree of the trial Judge dismissing the suit, excepting as to costs, against Marret, no appeal lay against him, their Lordships have been referred to the CPC Or. 41, r. 33, Gangadhar Muradi v. Banabashi Padihari 22 C. L. J. 390 (1914) and Bhaidas Shivdas v. Bai Gulab L. R. 48 I. A. 181 : s. c. 25 C. W. N. 605 (1921). Their Lordships think that this appeal to His Majesty in Council in so far as Marret is concerned, is, in effect, an appeal direct to His Majesty in Council from the decree of the trial Judge which is not allowable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or under the Letters Patent of the High Court, and they hold that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Or. 41, r. 33, was not intended to apply to such an appeal, and they accordingly decide that the appeal, so far as Marret is concerned, should be dismissed, but without costs." See bottom of pages 438 and 439 of the report (Madras series). The case cited has no application to the controversy now before me, for the question which has to be considered is as to whether Defendant No. 2 being a party to the appeal which was preferred by Defendant No. 1 against the Plaintiffs, a decree could be passed in favour of the Plaintiffs as against Defendant No. 2 although they (the Plaintiffs) had not preferred an appeal against the decree dismissing the suit against Defendant No. 2. The illustration to Or. 41, r. 33 seems to clarify the point and this illustration shows that it was competent to the lower Appellate Court to pass a decree in favour of the Plaintiffs against Defendant No. 2 if a case was made out as against him. The illustration runs as follows: "A claims a sum of money as due to him from X or Y and in a suit against both obtains a decree against X. X appeals and A and, Y are Respondents. The Appellate Court decides in favour of X. It ha power to pass a decree against Y." This really is the present case. I am therefore inclined to think, having regard to the finding of the lower Appellate Court that a proper case has been made out for passing a decree against Defendant No. 2, that a decree should be passed against Defendant No. 2-a decree which should have been passed by the lower Appellate Court. The findings as to the amount of Defendant. No. 2's liability however are not definite and it would have been necessary to remand the case for a further investigation but for the circumstance that the learned Advocates on both sides agree to abide by the sum which may be fixed by this Court as determining the liability of Defendant No. 2. In the present suit the claim is laid at Rs. 281. Considering all the circumstances and having regard to the submissions made by the learned Advocates on both sides regarding this matter I think I should be justified in fixing the liability of Defendant No. 2 at Rs. 150. In the present suit the claim is laid at Rs. 281. Considering all the circumstances and having regard to the submissions made by the learned Advocates on both sides regarding this matter I think I should be justified in fixing the liability of Defendant No. 2 at Rs. 150. A decree therefore is passed in favour of Plaintiff for Rs. 150 against Defendant No. 2. The decree of the lower Appellate Court dismissing the Plaintiffs' suit as against Defendant No. 1 will stand. 2.The Rule is made absolute to this extent only. There will be no orders as to costs.