JUDGMENT Sulaiman, C.J. - This is a Plaintifffs' appeal arising out of a suit for preemption. The Plaintifffs are the widows and daughters of two deceased brothers Hira Lal and Panna Lal; the vendor is the third brother Jawahir Lal and the vendees are strangers to the Mahal, In the plaint it was alleged that all (lie five Plaintifffs that is the two widows and their daughters were co-sharers in the two villages Parsia and Sakrahta, The sale-deed covered other villages which were sold completely and in which the Plaintifffs could not have had any right of pre-emption. Before the sale took place the vendees asked the vendor to serve notices on the co-sharers and two notices were sent, one to the widow and daughter of Hira Lal and the other to the widow and two daughters of Panna Lal. Both the notices were jointly addressed but the envelopes were addressed to the two widows only. 2. The Defendants in their written statement denied that the daughters of the two deceased brothers of the vendor were co-sharers in these villages and also pleaded that the Plaintifffs were estopped from cLalming pre-emption. 3. The learned Subordinate Judge has held that the notices given by the vendor were defective and were not in accordance with the provision of law and therefore did not operate to create an estoppel against the Plaintifffs. He further held that it was not proved that the daughters were co-sharers in these Mahals and that inasmuch as the two widows had joined with them persons who had no right of pre-emption, they also lost their right. He accordingly dismissed the claim. 4. On appeal before us it is contended that the evidence shows that all the Plaintifffs were co-sharers and that in any case an opportunity should have been given to the Plaintifffs to produce, further documentary evidence. 5. It will be convenient to dispose of the question of esioppel in the first instance, as in case that plea succeeds the suit would fall without^ any further finding. 6. The notice sent by Jawahiv Lal is printed on page 85. It recites that the vendor had arranged to sell 1MS Zamindari together with all the rights and interests and arrears due by tenants in Rajmalpur and Pachawar and shares in Parsia and Sakrahta for a lump sum of Rs. 6. The notice sent by Jawahiv Lal is printed on page 85. It recites that the vendor had arranged to sell 1MS Zamindari together with all the rights and interests and arrears due by tenants in Rajmalpur and Pachawar and shares in Parsia and Sakrahta for a lump sum of Rs. 56,700 calculated at the rate of about four anna per cent to Babu Gauri Shankar Prasad and his brothers. As Rajmalpur and Pachawar were complete villages no right of pre-emption would accrue on their sale. It is also admitted now that Babu Gauri Shankar Prasad had only one brother and not more than one brother. That notice was neither signed nor initialled but the heading showed that it was sent on behalf of Javvahir Lal. 7. Section 14 of the pre-emption Act requires that when a co-sharer proposes to sell any land in any case in which such sale would give rise to a right of pre-emption, he may give notice by registered post to all persons having a right of pre-emption in respect of the such sale. Obviously the Defendants intended that the notice should be given to co-sharers who had a right of pre-emption in land in respect of which the sale took place. Without knowing the exact price of the property which a co-sharer can pre-empt, it would be impossible for him to make up his mind whether he should or should not purchase it. It follows that without a specification of the price settled as regards the land in which the person served with notice has a right of preemption, no fair opportunity would be given to him to decide whether he should or should not purchase it. It is clear that the notice sent by Jawahir Lal did not specify the price settled as regards the shares in Parsia and Sakrahta, which alone the pre-emptors could take. 8. The widow and daughter of Hira Lal replied to this notice and their reply is printed on page 71. In that they clearly informed the vendor that they were willing to purchase his share. 9. They however pointed out that it was necessary to consult their relations who were at some distance, and asked for a detail of the rental and revenue of the share as well as copies of Khatauni and Khewat in order to know the amount of profits. 9. They however pointed out that it was necessary to consult their relations who were at some distance, and asked for a detail of the rental and revenue of the share as well as copies of Khatauni and Khewat in order to know the amount of profits. They also asked for time till the 15th October, 1926. In that they certainly intimated that they were willing to purchase the property. The other notice addressed to the widow and daughters of Panna Lal and which was sent to the widow of Panna Lal appears to have been replied to by her son-in-law. There is evidence to show that the widow was living in her house with her son-in law at the time but there is no direct evidence to show that the son-in-law communicated the contents of the notice to the widow. It must be conceded that the daughters to whom notices were not sent separately cannot be deemed to have been served with any notice at all. 10. Leaving aside the question that notices were not duly signed by the vendor, there is this further difficulty that the name of the brother of Gauri Shanker Prasad, who was to be one of the vendees was not mentioned and instead it was stated that the property would be sold to his brothers. 11. We, therefore, agree with the Court below that the notice was defective and did not fulfil the requirements of Section 14, of the Pre-emption Act and that therefore there was no extinction of the right of Pre-emption u/s 15, of the Act. As stated above the pLalnt merely alleg, ed that all the Plaintifffs were co-sharers. But on the day the written statement was filed the Vakil for the Plaintifff was questioned and he stated that the daughter of Hira Lal had become a co-sharer by virtue of a written will executed by Hira Lal before his death and that there was a will in favour of the daughters of Panna Lal also, although the Vakil was not sure whether it was in writing or not. He asked the permission to file the papers on the next day The Vakil for the Defendant No. 3 also stated that on that date he had no papers and would file them later. The Court ordered "that they be filed up to the 5th December, 1927". He asked the permission to file the papers on the next day The Vakil for the Defendant No. 3 also stated that on that date he had no papers and would file them later. The Court ordered "that they be filed up to the 5th December, 1927". This apparently amounted to giving permission to both the parties to file their documentary evidence upto that date. 12. On the 4th December, 1927, an application was filed on behalf of the Plaintiff's filing some papers and stating that they had not till then procured the original wills of the deceased brothers and prayed that time might be allowed to them to file "the originals or copies of the wills". On this the Court ordered to file by the 20th January 1928''. Obviously the Court granted permission to file the originals or copies till that date. 13. On the 20th January, 1928, the Plaintifff's pleadei filed a certified copy of a registered will of Hira Lal and a certified copy of an affidavit alleged to contain the contents of oral will of Panna Lal, The learned Subordinate Judge allowed permission to file the first document but as to the second he considered that no permission had been taken with regard to it. He accordingly ordered that the Plaintifffs should file it or payment of Rs. 15 as costs. The costs were not paid by the Plaintifffs ind this second document was returned to their pleader. We think that he Court put rather too narrow an interpretation on the order of the 4th December 1927. The term "Copy of will" might well have been wide enough to include a certified copy of a registered affidavit containing the contents of the oral will. 14. The fact, however, remains that even if the affidavit had been admitted it would not by itself have proved the oral will and could only have been used as corroborative evidence if the widow who swore it was put in the witness box. The affidavit if admitted would however have shown that it was alleged in July 1913, that Panna Lal had made an oral will in favour of his daughters and that Panna Lal was dead by that time. The statement of Jawahir Lal shows that Hira Lal died in 1911. The affidavit if admitted would however have shown that it was alleged in July 1913, that Panna Lal had made an oral will in favour of his daughters and that Panna Lal was dead by that time. The statement of Jawahir Lal shows that Hira Lal died in 1911. Thus by the time the sale-deed in question was executed more than 12 years might have been expired from the date of the deaths of the two brothers. 15. The evidence produced by the Plaintifffs to prove that the daughters were co-sharers consisted of the oral statement of the vendor Jawahir Lal that Mst. Puran Debi, Shyam Kumari and Prem Kumari were co-sharers in the village at the time of the notice and sale, and they are co-sharers even now. This oral statement was contradicted by one of the vendees namely Hira Lal that the daughters of the two brothers are not proprietors in Mahal Budhwanti or Mahal Jiwan Devi. But in cross-examination he cut a very sorry figure. He first admitted that he, had received the partition lot from the vendor Jawahir Lal before the sale and then stated that the names of the daughters were not entered in the Khewat, then modified his statement and said that he had since come to know that the names of the daughters had been entered in the papers but could not say whether before or after his purchase. When further pressed he said that he came to know from the partition papers that the widows alone were owners and not the daughters. He said that he came to know it from the order of the partition Court. He then admitted that probably he had received this paper before the sale. 16. That these statements are untrue is demonstrated by the fact that the names of all the three daughters are entered in the khewats in respect of both the villages. These khewats are on pages 124 and 125 for Sakrahta and pages 134, 131 and 133 for Parsia. 17. The partition proceedings are printed on pages 47 onwards and on page 52 the names of the two widows with their daughters are shown in the column of cosnarers as persons entitled to the shares in the two mahals. These khewats are on pages 124 and 125 for Sakrahta and pages 134, 131 and 133 for Parsia. 17. The partition proceedings are printed on pages 47 onwards and on page 52 the names of the two widows with their daughters are shown in the column of cosnarers as persons entitled to the shares in the two mahals. Part of this paper was torn but the khewats prepared after the partition of the village Parsia (pages 131 and 133) show that the widow of Panna Lal was entered as owning a half share and her daughter as owning the other half; and the widow of Hira Lal was shown as owning two-thirds and her daughter as owning the remaining one-third. These entries are with regard to Parsia. There was no partition with regard to Sakrahta. The khewats produced however take us up to 1930 Fasli corresponding to 1923 A.D. and no attempt was made to produce any earlier khewats. 18. Nodount u/s 4(1) of the Preemption Act, in order to be a cosharer a person has to establish that he is entitled as proprietor to a share in the Mahal. Mere possessory title would not be sufficient--Bachchi Lal v. Debt Din (1929) 27 ALJ 430. There can also be no doubt, as observed by their Lordships of the Privy Council, that a mere entry of names in the khewats would not necessarily be evidence of full title as distinct from mere possession of proprietor. But in this present case we have much more than mere entries in the khewats. We have already pointed out that as regards Parsia there is documentary evidence to show that the village had been partitioned into separate Mahals, that the daughters of both the brothers have been recognised by the partition Court as cosharers in the Mahals and have been allotted not only shares jointly with their mothers but distinct and separate shares. The statement of Jawahir Lal was also in their favour. The contrary statement of Hira Lal was based entirely on papers which on an examination show that he was not justified in basing his inference on them. The order of the partition Court referred to by him shows the names of the widows along with others. He could not, without finding out who the other parties were, seriously conclude therefrom that the daughters were not cosharers. 19. The order of the partition Court referred to by him shows the names of the widows along with others. He could not, without finding out who the other parties were, seriously conclude therefrom that the daughters were not cosharers. 19. In addition to these pieces of evidence we have the circumstance that before the sale took place the vendees were definitely informed by the vendor that the daughters were their co-sharers. Possibly at first Jawahir Lal had given to the vendees the names of the two widows only. But he admittedly sent a joint notice to the widows and the daughters, and the reply was received from the widow of Hira Lal and her daughter expressing willingness to purchase the share and a copy of this reply was forwarded to the vendees. On the 2nd September 1926 Jawahir Lal again wrote to one of the vendees that the widow of Hira Lal and her daughter were pressing him to show them the partition papers, in another letter of the 4th September 1926 he pointed out that owing to ignorance of law he bad issued a joint notice to the widow and her daughter and another joint notice to the other widow and her daughters although he ought to have sent separate notices. He also pointed out that the daughters were ready to purchase the property. Some of these notices have been produced by the Defendants themselves and there can be no doubt "s to their genuineness. We are therefore satisfied that even before the vendees took the sale they were duly informed by the vendor that the daughters of his deceased brothers were also co-sharers in the villages. We therefore think that there was prima facie evidence that the daughters were co-sharers in these villages. There was however this admitted fact that the properties had originally belonged to Hira Lal and Panna Lal and under the ordinary Hindu law in the absence of any bequests made by them the properties would descend to their widows and not to their daughters. There was however this admitted fact that the properties had originally belonged to Hira Lal and Panna Lal and under the ordinary Hindu law in the absence of any bequests made by them the properties would descend to their widows and not to their daughters. The daughters might however get shares under the wills of their father or they may get shares by gift or surrender from their mothers and they could be put in possession of distinct shares even without a proper registered document which after the lapse of 12 years would at least nature to a Hindu widow's estate to subsist during the life time of the widows. 20. This last question has not been gone into by the Subordinate Judge because the matter was not put prominently before him. On the other hand, there is the possibility that the names of these daughters were entered in the papers merely by way of consolation and the entries are fictitious and they have not had any title or real possession over the shares against which their names stand. If the widows acknowledged, whether rightly or wrongly, the title of the daughters to separate possession over specified shares or put I hem in possession as co-sharers their possession might be adverse against the widows personally and after the lapse of 12 years therefrom the daughter might at least acquire the status of co-sharers so long as the widows are alive. 21. We think that it would be unfair to dispose of the question whether the daughters are or are not co-sharers in these villages on the unsatisfactory state of the evidence, and we think that in order to pronounce our judgment it is necessary for us to have clear findings on the following issues: 1. Whether the names of the daughters of Hira Lal and Panna Lal or any of them are entered in the revenue papers fctitiously and they have not been in separate possession of any shares? 2. If all the three daughters have been in effective possession of the shares entered against their names, whether their possession lad continued for more than 12 years prior to the execution of the sale-deed in favour of the vendees, adversely to the widows interest? As these are new issues we allow the parties to produce any additional evidence which they may choose to produce. As these are new issues we allow the parties to produce any additional evidence which they may choose to produce. The Plaintifffs will lead evidence in the first instance. The findings will be returned within three months from this date, if convenient. On return of the findings the usual ten, days will be allowed for objections.