ORDER Curgenven, J. 1. This application was filed for the stay of further proceedings in pursuance of an ex parte decree passed in O. S. No. 84 of 1930 on the file of the Sub-Court of Vellore pending disposal of an appeal against an order refusing to set that ex parte decree aside. When the stay application came up for the issue of ex parte orders, I understand that it was held by the learned Judge who disposed of it, following Bhagwat Rajkoer v. Sheo Golam Sahu [1904]31Cal.1081 and some cases of this Court, that this Court has no power in proceedings of this nature to stay execution of a decree Under Order 41, Rule 5. Accordingly the application was converted into one for an injunction to restrain the respondent from executing the decree, and the question has been raised before me whether an application of this kind will lie. So far as a Court which is restricted to the terms of the Code of Civil Procedure is concerned, it has been held by Phillips, J., in Varadacharyulu v. Narasimhacharyulu A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 268, which I had occasion to follow in Ayyaperumal Nadar v. Muthuswami Pillai AIR1927Mad687 , that if an injunction cannot be passed under the provisions of Order 39, Rule 1 or Rule 2, it is not permissible to seek the power Under Section 151 of the Code in order to justify such an order. It has however been argued now that a High Court is not restricted to the terms of the Code, but possesses an equitable power, otherwise derived, to control the proceedings in other Courts. There can bo no doubt that in England a power of this character exists and a discussion of the nature of it will be found in Ellerman Lines Ltd. v. Read [1928] 2 K.B. 144. There can bo no doubt that in England a power of this character exists and a discussion of the nature of it will be found in Ellerman Lines Ltd. v. Read [1928] 2 K.B. 144. In that case the question arose as to whether a British subject could be restrained from enforcing a foreign judgment, in execution, and the Court of appeal answered the question in the affirmative, the principle upon which the matter was decided being clearly explained in the judgment of Atkin, L.J., namely, that the Court in granting injunctions does not seek to assume jurisdiction over the foreign Court or arrogate to itself some superiority which entitles it to dictate to the foreign Court, or that it seeks to criticize the foreign Court or its procedure The English Court has regard to the personal attitude of the person who has obtained the foreign judgment. If the English Court finds that a person subject to its jurisdiction has committed a breach of covenant, or has acted in breach of some fiduciary duty or has in any way violated the principles of equity and conscience, and that it would be inequitable on his part to seek to enforce a judgment obtained in breach of such obligations, it will restrain him, not by issuing an edict to the foreign Court, but by saying that ho is in conscience bound not to enforce that judgment.