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1931 DIGILAW 57 (CAL)

Kazimuddin Sheikh v. King-Emperor BR The Emperor @APPELLANT

1931-02-18

body1931
JUDGMENT Lort-Williams, J. - In this case there is a reference under sec. 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in favour of Jabed Shikdar and there are six appeals on behalf of Kazimaddin Sheikh, Elamdi, Abbas Khan, Azimuddi, Chandi Charan Behara and Imanali Shikdar. This reference and these appeals arise out of an alleged case of dacoity which was tried before the Additional Sessions Judge of Faridpur and a jury. The accused were charged under secs. 395 and 412 of the Indian Penal Code. The jury by a unanimous verdict found all of them guilty under sec. 395 except Abbas and they found him guilty under that section by a majority of 4 to 1. They found none of the accused guilty under sec. 412. The learned Judge accepted the verdict with regard to all except Jabed and sentenced them each to four years' rigorous imprisonment. Jabed's case has been referred to this Court on the ground that in the Judge's opinion there was no evidence against him and that he should have been acquitted. The case for the prosecution can be stated shortly: The essential facts are that the house of one Jagabandhu Nundy was attacked by dacoits at about mid-night when all the occupants of his house were asleep. There were several men in the house and a number of women. The dacoits chained up the doors of the rooms of the men and prevented them from coming out with the result that they were not able to identify any one. They went into the rooms of some of the women and took away a large number of articles of clothing, furniture, ornaments and so on. None of the women had ever seen any of the dacoits before, nor had they ever heard their names. It is said that they used torches and remained in the rooms committing this robbery for a considerable time and that during this time the women had an opportunity of noticing their features. It is further alleged that many of them had cloths tied round their faces. Identification under such circumstances must always be extraordinarily difficult and it is not surprising to find that there were many contradictious and discrepancies in the evidence of identification. Some of the women were unable to identify any of the dacoits at the test identification although they succeeded in identifying them in Court. Identification under such circumstances must always be extraordinarily difficult and it is not surprising to find that there were many contradictious and discrepancies in the evidence of identification. Some of the women were unable to identify any of the dacoits at the test identification although they succeeded in identifying them in Court. Such identification is useless, because the mere fact of the prisoners being in the custody of the Court is likely to lead to their identification. The fact that they have been arrested and are in custody points to the likelihood that they are among the number of those who had committed dacoity. Some of the identifications seem to be satisfactory, that is to say, the women succeeded in picking them out at the test identification. In addition to this evidence two articles were found in the possession of Jabed and Kazimuddin respectively. They consist of a silk cloth and a chaddar and they were identified as being the property of some members of the house. The marks by which they were identified are not, however, of an unusual character and might be found on other articles of the same kind. Further, there is a confession by Abbas who states facts which go to show that he was employed by others who were not among the accused to commit this dacoity and that he stood outside the house while the dacoity was being committed. None of the prime offenders mentioned by him was arrested or charged, and it is curious that none of the present accused was mentioned by him as having taken any part in the dacoity except Jabed against whom the Judge thinks that there was no evidence. Two women identified Kazimuddin-one of them is dead and could not be cross-examined. There is evidence to show that the other woman Priyabala was very much frightened and possibly had little opportunity of seeing the face of any of the dacoits. Elamdi was identified only by one witness, Basanta Kumari, the mother of some of the women and by Triyadasi, the witness who died. 2. The evidence against Azimuddin, Chandi and Imanali consists of evidence of identification and it is true that in their case more than one witness identified each of them. Elamdi was identified only by one witness, Basanta Kumari, the mother of some of the women and by Triyadasi, the witness who died. 2. The evidence against Azimuddin, Chandi and Imanali consists of evidence of identification and it is true that in their case more than one witness identified each of them. As I have already pointed out the evidence against these accused practically consists only of identification by the women, which is based upon the opportunity which they had of seeing them by the light of torches during the dacoity and this kind of identification can never be very satisfactory and in many cases it would be unsafe to rely upon it alone. Apart, therefore, from the other aspects of this case which I shall deal with later and the fact that the evidence is principally of this kind of identification in addition to the small piece of evidence about a silk article and a chaddar and the confession of Abbas which only affects him, we should be inclined to say that it would be dangerous to convict the accused upon this evidence alone. Especially in view of the fact that the Judge himself seems to have formed a strong opinion that the evidence was unsatisfactory, he should have directed the jury in favour of the accused, and in the consideration of these matters we have to bear in mind that the confession by Abbas was retracted at the earliest opportunity. But in addition to these facts we are of opinion that the charge by the learned Judge is altogether insufficient. Whether it is that learned Judges in the Mofussil have too much work to do or have insufficient time to discharge their duty when delivering a charge to a jury, or whether it is that they do not take the trouble, or whether it is that they are incompetent to discharge their duty, I do not know, nor am I in a position to say. But we have had occasion several times before to draw the attention of the Sessions Judges to the unsuitability of many of their charges to the jury which came up before us, and apparently up to the present, with little effect. But we have had occasion several times before to draw the attention of the Sessions Judges to the unsuitability of many of their charges to the jury which came up before us, and apparently up to the present, with little effect. This charge is just as defective as the others already referred to, and for similar reasons, and it appears in this case that the Judge had gone to the trouble of writing out in his own hand the whole of the charge to the jury. It can hardly be said, therefore, that he has not taken pains to discharge his duty. The pity of it is that such pains should not have resulted in something more useful. As I have already said the charge suffers from defects which we have had to refer to before. It is little more than a long rambling statement of the evidence as it came from the mouths of the several witnesses who were called. Facts, relevant and irrelevant, important and unimportant, are all mixed up together. No attempt was made to sift one from the other no attempt to weigh or value the facts deposed to or to discard from consideration those which were absolutely unimportant and irrelevant. Everything has been gone into. But no attempt whatsoever had been made, so far as I can see, to direct the jury's attention to the vital facts of the case, and to discard and remove from their attention the facts which are unimportant and irrelevant so that their minds might be concentrated upon the essential points of the case. The learned Judge did not even attempt to put the facts deposed to in chronological form. Really it does not matter what order you put the facts in, provided some kind of order is followed. He did not attempt to marshal the various facts deposed, to under separate heads or sections or according to the various topics which he has dealt with in his charge. All these essential facts are to be found in his charge if one looks through it. But they are scattered all over the place in his charge which occupies 28 foolscap pages of type-writing. It must be obvious that this kind of direction to a jury is quite useless. All these essential facts are to be found in his charge if one looks through it. But they are scattered all over the place in his charge which occupies 28 foolscap pages of type-writing. It must be obvious that this kind of direction to a jury is quite useless. When the jury had heard the whole of the evidence, they were in just as good a position to give their verdict as when they had heard the whole charge in addition to the evidence. All that the Judge did was to repeat what they had already heard. In the circumstances, we have to consider whether this case should go back to be retried or whether the verdict of conviction should be set aside. Personally I am not disinclined to send this case back in order that the learned Judge's attention may be drawn to the things which are essential in a proper charge to a jury. But this may entail a great deal of time and trouble and may probably result in the acquittal of all the accused if the attention of a jury of reasonable men were properly directed to what facts really remained, if the evidence had been properly sifted and if the irrelevant facts had been, discarded. This being the position we have come to the conclusion that it is not desirable to put the authorities to the expense and trouble of a second trial and to put these persons into further jeopardy upon evidence such as this. 3. In the circumstances the verdict of conviction must be set aside. The appeals are allowed and the reference is accepted and consequently all the accused are acquitted and discharged. S.K. Ghose, J. I agree.