JUDGMENT Niamatullah and Bennet, JJ. - This is a second appeal brought by two persons, Defendants 1 and 2. The suit was brought by the two Plaintiffs for a declaration that their share of certain property was one-half and that the share of the Appellants (Defendants 1 and 2) was only one-third. There was a deed of gift executed on 17th February, 1927, by a Hindu widow of a collateral of the parties. In this deed of gift the widow purported to make a gift of one-half of the property of her late husband in favor of the present Plaintiffs and one half in favor of Defendants 1 and 2, the Appellants. Subsequently, on the 15th June, 1927, another collateral, Defendant No. 3, brought a suit in which he alleged that the deed of gift was invalid. This suit was referred to a referee, and a decree was passed in accordance with the statement of the referee which was taken down in English. That statement was to the following effect: The share of Plaintiff and Defendants 6 and 7 in the property gifted away is one-sixth. The suit for the possession of this much share should be decreed, and the deed of gift should be declared as invalid to the extent of one-sixth. The rest five-sixths is of Defendants 2 to 5, and the gift deed is valid to the extent of five-sixths. The possession of all the parties is to remain joint according to the shares as stated above. 2. The remainder of his statement is in regard to costs. Now it is admitted that the referee was not correct in holding that the deed of gift was invalid to the extent of one-sixth, because the Hindu widow was entitled to make a deed of gift of her property for the period of her lifetime. After her death the deed of gift would become invalid, except if it was a deed of gift to accelerate succession, and that admittedly is not the case here. The referee apparently went on the principle that, after the death of the widow, the Plaintiff in the case and possibly his two nephews would be entitled to the share of one-sixth which he awarded them. The referee apparently went on the principle that, after the death of the widow, the Plaintiff in the case and possibly his two nephews would be entitled to the share of one-sixth which he awarded them. That, of course, would depend on the reversioners who happened to be alive at the time of the death of the widow, and the referee was doubtless wrong in spite of the fact that the Plaintiff before him was, at the time, the nearest reversioner - nearer than any of the other parties in the present case. Now the Plaintiffs have brought their suit based apparently on the deed of gift and on the statement of the referee. The Plaintiffs claim that, on these grounds, they are entitled to a declaration that their share comes to one-half and that the share of Defendants 1 and 2 comes only to two-sixths or one-third. Now in the statement of the referee there is no specification at all of the proportions in which the parties are to hold five-sixths, for which the deed of gift was held valid. The referee merely states that the gift was valid to the extent of 5/6th and that the parties are to hold it jointly. It was presumed by the lower appellate court that in awarding l/6th of the property to the Plaintiff in suit No. 66 of 1927 and his two nephews the referee intended to take that l/6th out of the share of the present Defendants 1 and 2. But the referee did not specify anything of the sort in his statement. He made no specification at all as to where the share of l/6th was to come from. We consider, therefore, that it is not correct to assume that the referee intended to state the shire of 1/6th was to come from the 1/2 share which the deed of gift awarded to the present Appellants. Now we turn to the deed of gift itself. It clearly states that one-half of the property given is to go to the present Plaintiffs and 1/2 is to go to the Defendants 1 and 2. The deed of gift, therefore, car not be a basis for the claim of the Plaintiffs that their share of 1/2 has not been affected by the decision of the referee. 3. It clearly states that one-half of the property given is to go to the present Plaintiffs and 1/2 is to go to the Defendants 1 and 2. The deed of gift, therefore, car not be a basis for the claim of the Plaintiffs that their share of 1/2 has not been affected by the decision of the referee. 3. It is to be noted that the deed of gift is only valid for the lifetime of the widow and the decision of the referee will also only be valid for the lifetime of the widow. Whatever rights arise on the death of the widow, when the succession opens ou., will not be affected either by the deed of gift or by the decision of the referee. 4. Accordingly we allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the lower appellate court, restore that of the court of first instance and dismiss the Plaintiff's suit with costs throughout.