JUDGMENT Iqbal Ahmad, J. - This is a Defendants' appeal and arises out of a suit in which one of the relief's claimed was recovery of possession of a shop. The Plaintiff's case was that the shop in dispute was built by his father 13 or 14 years before the date of the suit and that the site of the shop was given by the zamindar to the Plaintiff's father for the construction of the shop. The Plaintiff alleged that by the high handed action of the Defendants he was obliged to give up the shop. The Defendants resisted the suit on the allegation that the zamindar gave the shop to them and that the Plaintiff was the licensee on their behalf and that they had revoked the license. The lower appellate court definitely overruled the contention of the Defendants that the Plaintiff was a licensee on their behalf. It held that this allegation of the Defendants was not proved. While dealing with this point it made the following observations: If Defendants are the lessors Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act applies.... 2. It accepted the case put forward by the Plaintiff that the site was given by the zamindar to the father of the Plaintiff. The finding recorded by the lower appellate court on this point is as follows: I am inclined to think that the Plaintiff's father did take the site from Ochey Lal (zamindar) at any rate not from the Defendants. 3. The findings recorded by the lower appellate court are findings on questions of fact and are binding on me in second appeal. But the Learned Counsel for the Appellants insists that the lower appellate Court misdirected itself as it proceeded to consider the case on the assumption that the case was one u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act. He argues that there is no finding whatever recorded by the lower appellate court on the question of proprietary title to the shop set up by the Plaintiff. He, therefore, argues that the decree of the lower appellate court is unsustainable. I am wholly unable to agree with the Learned Counsel. He argues that there is no finding whatever recorded by the lower appellate court on the question of proprietary title to the shop set up by the Plaintiff. He, therefore, argues that the decree of the lower appellate court is unsustainable. I am wholly unable to agree with the Learned Counsel. It is true that at one place in the judgment the lower appellate court has made reference to Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act but that court has followed that observation by the following remarks: As a matter of fact, as I have already attempted to show above, I find that the Plaintiff holds the site from Mst. Mulo or her predecessor-in-interest. 4. This remark puts it beyond doubt that the learned Judge did not approach the consideration of the case on the assumption that the claim was u/s 9 of the Specific Relief Act. He was conscious of the fact that the Plaintiff in order to succeed must prove his proprietary title. The finding recorded by him that the Plaintiff holds the site from the zamindar necessarily implies that the shop in dispute belongs to the Plaintiff. In my judgment there is no force in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed under Order 41, Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure. Leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is refused.