JUDGMENT Niamatullah, J. - This appeal has arisen from execution proceedings taken the Respondent, Mst. Moorti, for recovery of a certain maintenance allowance, which the Appellant agreed to pay under a compromise arrived at in a suit brought by her for cancellation of a deed of gift executed by her husband in favour of the Appellant his son-in-law. The compromise became merged in the decree passed on foot thereof. 2. The Respondent had impugned the deed of gift on certain ground, which it is not necessary to mention in detail. The deed of gift related inter alia to a house. The compromise provided that the Defendant would pay Rs. 11 a month with effect from 1st. June, 1930, during the lifetime of Mst. Moorti and that the maintenance would be a charge on the house to which the gift related. The compromise made reference to other matters, which are not relevant to the controversy now before me. As already stated, a decree was passed on foo. of the compromise. Mst. Moorti applied for recovery of anears of maintenance by execution of the consent decree in her favour. The Appellant objected on the ground that the stipulation awarding maintenance to Mt. Moorti was wholly outside the scope of the suit, the object of which was to obtain cancellation of the gift, and could not be enforced in execution. It was urged that the decree, as such, could take effect and be capable of execution so far as the matter in dispute in the suit was concerned and that in so far as the compromise related to any matter outside the scope of the suit, it could not be given effect to by the decree, and if it is embodied therein, the decree cannot be executed to that extent and a separate suit should be brought. Cases were relied on before the Courts below in support of this contention. The lower appellate Court relied on a case of this Court, and distinguished the case of Hemanta Kumari Devi v. Midnapur Zamindari Company (1919) 17 Cal. 485 : A.I.R 1919 P.C. 79 : 53 Ind. Cas 534 : 17 A.L.J. 1117 3. Cases were relied on before the Courts below in support of this contention. The lower appellate Court relied on a case of this Court, and distinguished the case of Hemanta Kumari Devi v. Midnapur Zamindari Company (1919) 17 Cal. 485 : A.I.R 1919 P.C. 79 : 53 Ind. Cas 534 : 17 A.L.J. 1117 3. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant has argued before me that the Privy Council case, above referred to, is fully applicable to the circumstances of the present case and that cases of this Court to the contrary are no longer good law. I am relieved of the necessity of expressing an opinion on this point, as in my opinion the clause relating to the maintenance allowance entered in the compromise cannot be said to be outside the scope of the suit in which it was arrived at. Mst. Moorti had sued for cancellation of the deed of gift on the ground that the same was fictitious, claimimg to be the owner in possession of the house to which it related. She claimed an interest in the house as owner. The compromise between the parties reserved to her some interest falling very much short of full ownership; but nevertheless it was an interest out of full ownership claimed by her. To my mind, Mst. Moorti's claim was in substance decreed to the extent of the interest given to her by the compromise and dismissed as regards the rest. If the parties had agreed to divide the house in equal shares and her claim had been decreed to the extent of one half and dismissed as regards the rest, it could not have been contended that the compromise travelled beyond the scope of the suit so far as the share given to her was concerned. For precisely the same reason, it can be considered that, if an interest carved out of full ownership is reserved for her, the same consideration applies. Just as in one case the gift would have been virtually cancelled to the extent of one half and upheld to the extent of the other half so in the other case the gift should be deemed to have been cancelled to the extent of the interest given to Mst. Moorti and upheld as regards the rest. In this view, the compromise, in so far as it created a charge in favour of Mst. Moorti and upheld as regards the rest. In this view, the compromise, in so far as it created a charge in favour of Mst. Moorti, cannot be considered to have travelled beyond the scope of the suit. The Learned Counsel for the Appellant has pointed out that the compromise contained a personal convenant which binds the Appellant to make a monthly payment. This convenant is, however, inseparable from the clause creating a charge in favour of Mst. Moorti. 1 am clearly of opinion that the decree, so far as it gives effect to that part of the compromise which creates a charge in favour of Mst. Moorti and makes the Appellant responsible for payment of the maintenance allowance, was not extraneous to the suit. This being so, the decree can be executed, and it is not necessary for Mst. Moorti to institute a separate suit for enforcement of the compromise. 4. The result is that this appeal is dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal under the Letters Patent is allowed.