JUDGMENT Kendall, J. - This application for revision arises out of some proceedings in the Court of the Munsif of Etawah who had pronounced an ex parte decree. An application was made under Order 3, Rule 13, by the judgment-debtor to have the ex-parte decree set aside, and. this matter was compromised, the agreement being that if the judgment-debtor were to pay Rs. 500 plus Rs. 9 costs or damages by the 13th of October, 1931 the ex-parte decree would be set aside, but if payment were not so made on that date the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree was to be dismissed. It appears that the judgment-debtor, deposited with his Counsel a sum of Rs. 520 and the counsel deposited Rs. 500 in Court, but not being satisfied as to the amount of the damages failed to pay the balance within the prescribed time. An application was therefore made to the Munsif for an extension of time which the Munsif held that he had no jurisdiction to grant and he therefore refused to extend the time. An appeal was made to the Subordinate Judge, who decided that in spite of the fact that the date for payment had been fixed by the parties and not by the Court, the Court nevertheless had jurisdiction to extend the time and it extended it accordingly. It is argued in revision that there was no jurisdiction to extend the time. 2. u/s 48, Code of Civil Procedure. Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescr bed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from lims to time, enlarge such period even though the period originally fixed o ' granted may have expired. 3. In the pre lent case the opposite-party had obtained an ex-parte decree and in his agreement with the present applicant he had consented to forgo the advantage gained and to have the case re-opened on condition that a certain sum was deposited in Court by a certain date. The Court had nothing to do with this concession or with the fixing of the date and mere y recorded the compromise. Section 148, therefore, gave the Court no jurisdiction to ex(sic)nd time, but it is true that the powers of the Court to attend time need not be strictly limited by the provisions of that section. The Court had nothing to do with this concession or with the fixing of the date and mere y recorded the compromise. Section 148, therefore, gave the Court no jurisdiction to ex(sic)nd time, but it is true that the powers of the Court to attend time need not be strictly limited by the provisions of that section. I have been referred to a recent decision of a Bench of this Court- B. Kishen Prasad and Another Vs. Kunj Behari Lal in which the circumstances were somewhat similar, though the question arose in execution proceedings, and the question before the Court was whether a decree could be enforced. There had been an agreement between the parties for the payment of sums of money by certain dates, and the judgment-debtor relied on Section 74 and Section 55, of the Contract Act. The Court considered the applicability of Section 74, and appeared to be doubtful whether when there is a penal clause it will be open to the Court to examine the terms of the compromise decree before enforcing them. In the present case, however, there is no question of a penal clause, but I have been asked on behalf of the opposite-party to hold that as a time was not of the essence of the contract between the parties, it was discretionary with the court to go behind the strict terms of the agreement between the parties and to use its own discretion in allowing an extension of time. There is some support for this argument in the case of Mt. Nand Rani Kuer Vs. Durga Dass Narain, AIR 1924 Patna 387 where it is laid down as a proposition of law that where an agreement is for the payment of money on a prescribed date and default is made, time is not of the essence of the contract, and that the Court must determine upon the facts of the case whether relief against forfeiture is to be given or not. In the decision of this Court to which I have already referred, however, Section 55 was also considered, and it was held that in an agreement like the one in the present case time must be held to be of the essence of the contract. Mr. In the decision of this Court to which I have already referred, however, Section 55 was also considered, and it was held that in an agreement like the one in the present case time must be held to be of the essence of the contract. Mr. Justice Mukerji remarked: We are not aware of any case in which it has been held that where a person is conceding something to another on the ground of the latter performing his part of the contract within a specified period, the former is compelled to treat time as being not of the essence of the contract 4. and Mr. Justice Sulaiman (now Chief Justice) remarked: It must also be conceded that the true intention of the parties must have been that time was of the essence of the contract. When the Defendants did not make payments as directed by the compromise decree, they cannot compel the Plaintiffs to make the concession which they had agreed to make only if no default was made. 5. I am bound by the decision of this Court with which I am in entire agreement, though the view taken is contrary to that of the Patna High Court. I, therefore, accept the revision, set aside the order of the lower appellate Court and restore that of the Munsif. The applicant will receive his costs in all Courts.