JUDGMENT Kendall, J. - This is an application for the revision of an order of the Judge of the Small Cause Court of Gorakhpur dismissing the Plaintiff's suit. The case for the Plaintiff was that he had advanced money to the Defendant on 29.6.29, and that on the following day the Defendant had executed a promissory note and receipt in his favor. The promissory note was not properly stamped and could not be produced in evidence or made the basis of the suit. Consequently the Plaintiff claimed that he could prove by other evidence that the loan had been advanced to the Defendant. The trial court after considering the evidence came to the conclusion that the Plaintiff's story that the money had been advanced one day before the execution of the promissory note and receipt was not true, and that as a matter of fact the advance of the money Land the execution of the promissory note and receipt were all part of the same transaction. 2. The question whether the advance of a loan may be proved by other evidence when the promissory note which was the best evidence for the advance of the money is not admissible has been much discussed, and it would be idle to pretend that the law on the subject is very easy either to understand or to apply. It has however now been definitely laid down by a decision of a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Nazir Khan and Another Vs. Ram Mohan Lal and Another that Where the Plaintiff would not have lent money without the promissory note, the making and handing over of the note and the payment of the money are 'concurrent conditions' (i.e. part and parcel of the same transaction), and if the promissory note turns out to be inadmissible in evidence for any reason (such as the absence of a proper stamp), it is not open to the Plaintiff to recover his money by proving orally the terms of the contract, in the teeth of the provisions of Section 91 of the Evidence Act. In other words where the debt is separable from the promissory note (i.e. the transaction is truly independent and not part of the transaction of the promissory note), the debt could be proved although the promissory note was not admissible in evidence. 3. In other words where the debt is separable from the promissory note (i.e. the transaction is truly independent and not part of the transaction of the promissory note), the debt could be proved although the promissory note was not admissible in evidence. 3. In the present case the Judge has found on the evidence that the Plaintiff had failed to prove a separate and independent transaction, and it follows that his decision was in accordance with the law as stated in the Full Bench ruling. 4. It has been argued that there are certain aspects of such a transaction which were not considered by the Full Bench, as for instance that although u/s 91 of the Evidence Act the terms of the contract cannot be proved otherwise than by the document in which they are embodied, the contract itself may be proved by other evidence. If we are to distinguish between the contract and the terms of the contract we shall be in danger of making a distinction without a difference. The argument is that in spite of the fact that the promissory note was inadmissible in evidence it was open to the Plaintiff to prove aliened that the money had been advanced. If this principle were to be accepted it would enable the Plaintiff in every such case to ignore the promissory note and to prove the advance of the money by oral evidence. I am of opinion however that the distinction which the Learned Counsel has sought to make is an illusory one. The terms of the contract undoubtedly include the passing of consideration on either side-on one side the execution of a promissory note and on the other the lending of money. If it was permissible to prove by oral evidence that the money was lent it would also be permissible to prove by oral evidence that the promissory note was executed., I need not however elaborate the matter further because I consider that in any case I am bound by the decision of the Full Bench and the finding of fact of the trial court. The result is that the application fails and is dismissed with costs,