JUDGMENT Kendall, J. - The circumstances out of which this application has arisen are somewhat unusual. The applicant Badal Khan sued Mr. and Mrs. Torpey, husband and wife, for arrears of wages. He obtained a decree against the wife alone. In execution of this decree he attached some property belonging to the Alliance Hotel. An objection was made by the husband Mr. Torpey that the property was his and not Mrs. Torpey's. This objection was filed on 23-12-31 and was dismissed in default on 11-1-32 without any notice being sent to the decree-holder. On 18-1-32 a second objection in practically the same terms was made by Mr. Torpey, and in the order sheet it is noted that the objection is made under Order 21, Rule 58., CPC and a notice was sent to the decree-holder signed by Mr. Torpey's Counsel which also quoted Order 21, Rule 58. This objection was allowed, and according to the case for the applicant, i.e. the decree-holder, he was misled by the references to Order 21, Rule 58, and filed a regular suit for a declaration. The Munsif in whose Court the suit was filed found on the merits that the property belonged to the judgment-debtor, but held that the suit did not lie because it was barred by Section 47 Code of Civil Procedure. The decree-holder therefore it is said has been compelled to resort to the present application to have the order of the executing court which is said to be under Order 21, Rule 58, set aside on the ground that it was without jurisdiction. 2. The argument for the applicant was that the proceeding in which the executing court allowed Mr. Torpey's objection was a proceeding under Order 21, Rule 58, and that the decision was barred by the doctrine of res judicata as an objection by Mr. Torpey had already been dismissed. Section 11, Code of Civil Procedure, however clearly does not cover the case, because the first objection which was dismissed in default was not an adjudication on a matter substantially in issue between the parties, and moreover there is plenty of authority for holding that Section 141 CPC does not apply in execution proceedings, which are governed by the numerous provisions of Order 21. I need only refer to the decision in the case of Thakur Prasad v. Fakir Ullah (1895) 17 All. 106 : 22 Ind. App. I need only refer to the decision in the case of Thakur Prasad v. Fakir Ullah (1895) 17 All. 106 : 22 Ind. App. 44 (P.C.). In this pronouncement their Lordships were guided by the provisions of the old CPC Code, but in the case of Bharat Chandra Nath v. Lasin Sarkar (1917) 41 Ind Cas. 586: 21 C.W.N. 769, the same doctrine has been held to apply in the case of the Code of 1908; and also in the case of Narendra Nath Chatterji Vs. Rakhal Das Tarafdar and Others, AIR 1925 Cal 510 . Both these Calcutta decisions have been referred to on behalf of the applicant as authority for holding that the dismissal of the first objection for default is to bar a second objection, but they had reference to cases under Order 21, Rule 58, and the same reasoning will not apply to proceedings u/s 47. 3. If the proceedings were under Order 21, Rule 58, Mr. Torpey's first objection having been dismissed in default, he would apparently have been debarred from making a second objection by the provisions of Order 21, Rule 63. There is however no reason whatever for supposing that the proceedings were under Order 21, Rule 58, for the provisions of Section 47 make it clear that all questions arising between the parties to the suit and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree have to be determined by the Court executing the decree. The mere fact that a reference to Order 21, Rule 58, is entered in the order sheet and on the notice issued to the decree-holder could not give the Court jurisdiction to proceed under Order 21, Rule 58, with the decision of a matter arising between the parties to the suit in defiance of the clear provisions of the Code. It was for the decree-holder no object to the form of the proceedings and if he was over-ruled by the Court to make an appeal. It is argued that the proceeding was a summary proceeding and that the decree-holder was thereby prejudiced and also that the decision of the Munsif shows that the equities are in his favour. Unfortunately however he did not pursue the right remedy at the right time. 4. It is argued that the proceeding was a summary proceeding and that the decree-holder was thereby prejudiced and also that the decision of the Munsif shows that the equities are in his favour. Unfortunately however he did not pursue the right remedy at the right time. 4. As the proceedings must be held to have been u/s 47, it follows that the provisions of Section 141 of the Code will apply, and that the procedure provided in regard to suits had to be followed. I have said that the first objection made by Mr. Torpey was dismissed in default without the issue of notice to the decree-holder, so that it is evident that the objection was dismissed under Order 9, Rule 3. The objector then under Rule 4 had the choice between two courses. He might apply to have the order of dismissal set aside, or in the alternative he might make a fresh objection, and this is in fact what he did. It cannot be he d therefore that if the Court was acting u/s 47 it acted without jurisdiction in accepting a second objection inspite of the fact that the first objection had been dismissed in default and had not been set aside. The result is that the application fails and is dismissed with costs.