JUDGMENT Kendall, J. - This is an application for the revision of an order of the Judge of the Small Cause Court of Cawnpore deciding that in application for execution was within time. A suit had been filed against five persons, four of whom were the principal debtors and the fifth a surety. On the 6th of October, 1922 the date fixed for hearing Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 were absent but Defendant No. 5 the surety was present. The Court gave an ex-parte decree against the four absent Defendants with costs, making the condition that the decree should not be executed against the surety until the decree-holder's remedy against the other Defendants was exhausted. Sabsequently two of the other Defendants made an application to have the ex-parte decree set aside and on 12-11-25 this was allowed, and the suit was dismissed as against Defendants Nos. 1 to 4 with the remark that the decree already passed against Defendant No. 5 would stand. The application for execution with which we are now concerned was filed on 15-11-28, and by reason of some holidays is within time if it is regarded as an application for the execution of tie decree of 12-11-25. It is argued however for the applicant that the decree that was to be executed was that of 6-10-22. 2. The argument appears to be that the second decree does not show the amount due either as principal or interest or costs, and consequently this decree cannot be executed, and I have been referred to a decision in the case of Jadu Nandan Ram Vs. Parsotam Ginning Co. Ltd. That case however is clearly distinguishable. A decree had been passed against five Defendants of whom three made an appeal and it was held that the period of limitation against the two who had not appealed had begun to run from the date of the decree against them, and not of the subsequent decree against the three who had appealed. The reply to the present application is clearly that the first decree was a conditional decree and it could not be executed against the surety until the decree-holder had exhausted his remedy against the other Defendants. The reply to the present application is clearly that the first decree was a conditional decree and it could not be executed against the surety until the decree-holder had exhausted his remedy against the other Defendants. The first decree was kept alive between 6-10-22 when it was pronounced, and in my opinion it is clear that limitation could not begin to run against the surety until the decree-holder's remedy against the other Defendants were exhausted by the second decree, which dismissed the first ex parte decree against them. There is some analogy in the case of Musammat Rukmina Kuar and Others Vs. Sheo Dat Rai and Another, AIR 1919 All 224 In this case a decree was passed in lS9jj, directing the Plaintiffs to be entitled to get possession on payment of Rs. 750 which could be paid "in any Jeth." The payment was made in 1915, and a Bench of this Court held that the right to apply could accrue only when the payment was made, and as in this case it was made in 1915 the application which was made within three years of that date was not barred by limitation. Similarly in the case of Rameshvar Singh v. Homeshvar Singh (1921) 59 Ind. 636 : A.I.R 1921 P.C. 31 : 19 A.L.J. 26 (P.C.), their Lordships held that the period of three years within which a decree has to be enforced refers only to an order or decree made in such a form as to render it capable in the circumstances of being enforced. The decree in that case could not be enforced until a certain contingency, and the period of limitation therefore began to run from the date of the contingency. 3. The result is that the present application has no force and is dismissed with costs.