JUDGMENT Bajpai, J. - The parties to this litigation are husband-and wife. Beth of them have obtained decrees one against the other. The husband has obtained a decree against the wife for restitution of conjugal rights, and the wife has obtained a decree against the husband for the recovery of a certain sum of money as dower. The husband put his decree in execution on the 17th of October, 1930, and prayed that his wife's decree against himself be attached under Order 21, Rule 32. This was so done and later on a prayer was made to the effect that the said decree be sold. It may be mentioned that in the original application for execution the two prayers for attachment and sale were combined, but the executing Court at first passed an order for attachment and then, after the attachment had remained in force for the statutory period, proceeded to pass a subsequent order on the 24th March, 1931. This subsequent order was to the effect that it fixed a date for the determination of compensation under the provisions of Order 21, Rule 32(3). It also definitely held that under the provisions of Order 21, Rule 23, the attached decree being a decree for money only, could not be sold. The husband not being satisfied with the order of the trial court went in appeal before the lower appellate court and therein a preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the wife to the effect that no appeal lay, inasmuch as the order of the trial court was only an interlocutory order. This preliminary objection was overruled and the learned Judge entertaining the appeal ultimately allowed the same and passed an order to the effect that the husband's execution application for the sale of the Respondent's dower decree be set aside. 2. The husband has come here in second appeal and, although this point has not been definitely taken by either of the parties before me, I have suo motu considered the question whether an appeal lay against the decision of the trial court. I am unhesitatingly of the opinion that no such appeal lay. 2. The husband has come here in second appeal and, although this point has not been definitely taken by either of the parties before me, I have suo motu considered the question whether an appeal lay against the decision of the trial court. I am unhesitatingly of the opinion that no such appeal lay. It is true that the decision of the trial court was a decision u/s 47, Code of Civil Procedure, but it did not conclusively determine the rights of the parties, and it is well settled that every order u/s 47 is not appealable unless it fulfils the requirements of decree as defined in Section 2-see Moti Chand and Others Vs. Mahabir Prasad I am therefore of the opinion that no appeal lay to the lower appellate Court and in entertaining that appeal the Court below has acted without jurisdiction and, in second appeal I am entitled to take that point and to declare the decision of the lower appellate Court as absolutely ultra virus. The position therefore is that the decision of the Court of first instance must be held to be unaffected by any orders passed by the lower appellate Court. It does not however follow that I give my full approval to the decision of the trial Court. He will now proceed to consider the relevant provisions of law and decide the controversy between the parties according to the strict letter of law. The result is that I allow this appeal, set aside the order of the lower appellate Court and restore that of the Court of first instance, who will bear my observations in view. The Respondent is not to blame in this matter. I am not called upon to after here with the decision of the lower appellate Court on the; question of costs, inasmuch as there are no cross-objections by the Respondent. But in view of the fact that the husband filed an appeal in the lower appellate Court which was incompetent and had to come to this Court because of his own ill-advised action dragging the Respondent the latter is entitled to the costs of this appeal. The Appellant will bear his own costs of the appeal.