JUDGMENT Mukerji and Bennet, JJ. - This is a second appeal from order by a creditor against a first appeal order in insolvency. The facts are that one Zainul Abdin was adjudged an insolvent on the 8th may, 1931, the application in insolvency being dated 4th February, 1931. Accordingly the effect of the adjudication dates back to the 4th February 1931. One week prior to that date, on the 29th January 1931, the insolvent along with his brother executed a sale-deed in favour of Abdul Ghani, the Respondent. This sale-deed purported to transfer certain property which had already been transferred by the two executants on the 8th July, 1927, to the same vendee. The earlier sale-deed was for a sum of Rs. 5,000 and it purported to be an out and out sale, and the Respondent Abdul Ghani in his application states that he was put in possession of the property sold as vendee. On the same date the vendors took a lease of the property agreeing to pay Abdul Ghani Rs. 75 P.M. as rent, and an agreement was made to re-transfer the property to the vendors on repayment of the purchase money within a specific time. The objection further sets forth that the money was not paid, nor was the rent, and the objector Abdul Ghani was advised that the transaction amounted to a mortgage by conditional sale. Accordingly his case is that as the property had been attached in execution under the decree of the present Appellant made on the 29th January, 1931, a sale-deed was made of the property absolutely to him, Abdul Ghani. This sale-deed sets forth five items of consideration which are, firstly, the Rs. 50,000 consideration of the sale of 1927; secondly, Rs. 2500 to be paid to one Sheonarain, a creditor of the insolvent; thirdly, Rs. 1300; fourthly Rs. 800 set off against two promissory notes executed by the vendors for arrears of rent; and fifthly Rs. 1000 set off against arrears of rent. The rent had been raised from Rs. 75 P.M. to Rs. 100 per mensem. The lower Court has found that there was no question of giving preference to one creditor over another, and it is contended for the Respondent that there is no evidence on this point. 1000 set off against arrears of rent. The rent had been raised from Rs. 75 P.M. to Rs. 100 per mensem. The lower Court has found that there was no question of giving preference to one creditor over another, and it is contended for the Respondent that there is no evidence on this point. On the other hand what we have to consider is whether the terms of these transactions indicate that the transactions are fraudulent and that they give a preference to particular creditor over other creditors. In Section 54 of the Provincial Insolvency Act it is laid down that in cases like the present where the deed is made within three months of the presentation of the application in insolvency, if the transactions are with a view to giving a creditor a preference over other creditors, the transactions shall be deemed fraudulent. What we have to see, therefore, is whether the transaction gives preference to one creditor over other creditors. Now, prima facie, the payment of Rs. 2,500 to Sheonarain creditor is giving him a preference over other creditors. Learned Counsel for Respondent argued that it was not shown whether this was a portion of the whole debt due to Sheonarain or not. But the clause in the sale-deed does not say that Rs. 2500 is paid to Sheonarain in lieu of a larger sum in full satisfaction. Accordingly as the transaction stands, it does give a preference to Sheonarain over other creditors, because it purports to pay him a sum of money in lieu of his debt and there is no stipulation that is to be in satisfaction of a larger sum. It was for the Respondent to show that the transaction was one which would not be fraudulent u/s 54 in view of the details already set forth in regard to it. 2. Now in regard to the transactions of arrears of rent. The rate of interest of Rs. 100 P.M. on Rs. 5,000 amount to Rs. 2 P.c.P.M. There was ample security, as it is now alleged that the property which was transferred for Rs. 5,000 is really worth Rs. 10,000, The rate of interest therefore was extraordinarily high in view of such security, and we consider that from the high rate of interest alone there is an induction that the transaction was fraudulent. 2 P.c.P.M. There was ample security, as it is now alleged that the property which was transferred for Rs. 5,000 is really worth Rs. 10,000, The rate of interest therefore was extraordinarily high in view of such security, and we consider that from the high rate of interest alone there is an induction that the transaction was fraudulent. This is also supported by the fact that there is a relationship between the parties, Abdul Ghani being the mother's son of Zainul Abdin, the insolvent. Further there is the fact that these arrears of rent and the promissory notes executed in lieu of arrears of rent were ordinary debts of an unsecured nature which should rank along with the debts of the other creditors, and by the transaction in question these debts appear to have been satisfied in fall. This again is an undue preference to one creditor against another. There is also the fact that the Respondent Abdul Ghani puts forward in his application in paragraph 5 that the sale-deed of 8th July, 1927, was a sale-deed of the property, and that he was put in possession of the property. He does not suggest that there was any idea of pledging the property as security for a loan. It is from the intention of the parties that the circumstances would arise which would make the transaction a mortgage by conditional sale. If there is no intention of pledging the property then the transaction amounts to a conditional sale and not to a mortgage by conditional sale. But paragraph 7 sets forth that it was only when legal advice was given to Abdul Ghani that the transaction might be so regarded as a mortgage by conditional sale that he began to consider that possibility in the year 1931. We, therefore, consider that these two transactions must be both considered as out sales. In view of that it appears that one or other of the transactions must be fictitious. It is not possible for the same property to be sold twice by the same person unless the property has been reconvened in the interval, and it is specifically stated by Abdul Ghani that the property was not reconvened. Accordingly no matter which may we look at it, either the first sale was fictitious or the second sale was fictitious. It is not possible for the same property to be sold twice by the same person unless the property has been reconvened in the interval, and it is specifically stated by Abdul Ghani that the property was not reconvened. Accordingly no matter which may we look at it, either the first sale was fictitious or the second sale was fictitious. If we take the first sale as fictitious then the whole transaction of the second sale must also be fictitious. No matter which way we regard the matter, it appears to us that both these transactions are fraudulent on the other creditors and are fictitious in their nature. 3. Some objection was made on behalf of the Respondent that no second appeal lay, and if a second appeal lay, that the creditor was not entitled to file it. u/s 75(3), it is stated that any such person aggrieved by a decision of the District Court on appeal from a decision of a subordinate Court, u/s 4 could appeal to the High Court. Section 4 relates to the decision of matters like the present which involved questions of title. Accordingly a second appeal lies. "Any such person aggrieved", refers to any "debtor, creditor, receiver or any other person aggrieved " The Appellant Umed is a creditor and therefore he is entitled to appeal. Some argument was made also that Umed was barred in some manner by his proceedings as decree-holder in execution. It is a fact that in execution of his decree No. 512 of 1930 he had attached this property, but when the application was made in insolvency and the judgment-debtor was adjudged an insolvent the proceedings in execution did not continue, and therefore no further result arises from them in this case. Umed is acting not as a decree-holder on his own behalf but as one of the creditors, and his second appeal is brought on behalf of all the creditors and of the official receiver. 4. Accordingly we allow this appeal with costs in all the courts and we set aside the decree of both the lower courts, and we allow the objection which was framed in the first instance by the official receiver, and we hold that both these sale-deeds of 29th January, 1931, and 8th July 1927, are fictitious, and we hold that the property is available to the official receiver for distribution among the creditors.