JUDGMENT Mukerji and Bennet, JJ. - These are two first appeals from orders brought by Mst. Indermani on behalf of her miner son Radhey Shyam. There were two suits filed, one for dissolution of partnership, and the other for recovery of money, by the minor under the guardianship of his mother and by one Matru Mal, who was his paternal uncle. The parties made an application for arbitration which was refused by the Court on the ground that the arbitrators lived at a distance in Jaipur. Then the parties referred the matter to arbitration without the intervention of the Court. An award was given, and the parties applied on the 23rd April, 1931, for the award to be filed in Court as a compromise between the parties. On the following day, the 24th April, 1931, Mst. Indermani made an application for permission under Order 32, Rule 7, for the compromise to be made on behalf of the minor. On this the Court passed the order "Allow." On the 27th April, 1931, Mst. Indermani made an application that she had been prevailed upon to file her previous application and that she did not accept the coripromise. The Court passed the following order in regard to the compromise: Disa1lowed as no compromise can be acted upon unless and until it is properly verified in Court. 2. Matru Mai and Baijnath brought two first appeals from this order to this Court and this Court set aside that order and remanded the case under Order 41, Rule 23, for disposal. this Court stated in its order of remand: That the trial Court did not enter into the question whether the compromise has been entered into by Mst. Indermani for herself and for her minor son. And as regards the compromise made by her personally, Mst. Indermani was bound by it and she could not be permitted to resale from it. 3. Another question in the case was whether Radhe Shyam minor was bound by the compromise. Accordingly the lower Court has re-considered the. matter and has taken evidence of one of the arbitrators Chhajju Ram. He sets forth in detail the benefits which accrued to the minor. The lower Court did not come to a finding on this evidence, but accepted the position that sanction had been given under Order 32, Rule 7, on the 24th April, and that Mst. matter and has taken evidence of one of the arbitrators Chhajju Ram. He sets forth in detail the benefits which accrued to the minor. The lower Court did not come to a finding on this evidence, but accepted the position that sanction had been given under Order 32, Rule 7, on the 24th April, and that Mst. Indermani had accepted the award on behalf of herself and her infant son and that she was accordingly bound by the compromise. 4. In these two appeals Learned Counsel has referred to the ruling in Gulab Dei and Another Vs. Vaish Motor Company and Another, AIR 1925 All 570 and argued that the sanction accorded on the 24th April, 1931, was not a sanction sufficient as it merely consisted of one word 'Allow', and that before the compromise had been accepted by the Court, Mst Indermani had resiled from her position. The facts in the ruling quoted are somewhat different from the present case and we consider that each case must be decided on its own merits As some doubt arises as to whether the Court on the 21th April, 1931, did apply its mind to the question as to whether the Compromise was for the benefit of the minor we have gone into the matter for ourselves and have given Learned Counsel for the minor an opportunity to lay the matter before us today. We have examired the evidence of Chhajju Ram, one of the arbitrators. We note that the arbitrators were related to the parties End that Kashi Ram arbitrator is the brother of Mst. Inderrmni. It is not, therefore, probable prima ficie that the ardirators would make an award which was unfair to the minor. In the evidence of Cahaijju Ram he explains that the minor Radhe Shyam benefited by the award in three ways: (1) He was saved from the cost of litigation; (2) The minor and his mother possessed ornaments in excess of their shares to the extent of Rs. 13,000 and no share of -this was awarded to the other parties Matru Mai and Baijnath. The reason for this was that Radhe Shyam had been made to contribute to the loss in business which we consider natural. The third point was that Matru Mai and Radhey Shyam had to contribute Rs. 13,000 and no share of -this was awarded to the other parties Matru Mai and Baijnath. The reason for this was that Radhe Shyam had been made to contribute to the loss in business which we consider natural. The third point was that Matru Mai and Radhey Shyam had to contribute Rs. 3,000 under the award to the mess account as they had messed jointly with the widow and her son Radhey Shyam, and the total messing account came to Rs. 6,000. This amount of Rs. 6,000 was entered in the account book and apparently came out of the joint family fund. Half of this amount, therefore, to be paid by the award to the widow and her son, appears to be undoubtedly for the benefit of the minor. Cross-examination of the arbitrator Chhajju Ram did not show that the award was in any way against the interests of the minor. We consider, therefore, that it is clearly shown by this evidence that the award was for the benefit of the minor. Therefore, the order of the Court of 24th April, 1931, according sanction to the guardian to make this compromise on behalf of the minor was correct. 5. It was further argued by Learned Counsel for the minor that the permission of the Court should have been granted to a guardian before a guardian enters into an agreement for compromise. But it would be impossible for the Court to decide whether the matter was for the benefit of the minor until all the terms were known, and if all the terms are known, it is a matter of indifference whether sanction is given before or after the terms are formally agreed to by the parties, because the terms having been agreed on already no difference can arise from the procedure. The normal procedure is that the parties should enter into the compromise and sign it and apply for it to be filed into Court, and another application should then be made to sanction the compromise. That procedure was adopted in the present case and it appears to be in accordance with Order 32, Rule 7. No further point arises in these appeals. Accordingly we dismiss these appeals with costs.