JUDGMENT Shah Muhammad Sulaiman Kt., C.J. and King, J. - This is a Defendants' appeal arising out of suit for possession of certain immovable property. The plaintifs' case was that Sewa Ram was the last male owner of the property in suit and that on his death, about 63 years ago, his widow Mst. Jumna succeeded to the property as a Hindu widow and when she died, about 47 years ago, she was succeeded by her daughter Mst. Sobha. Mst. Sobha died in 1928 and the Plaintiffs claim the property as next reversioners. The Plaintiffs also allege that Chhittar Singh, a cousin of Sewa Ram, borrowed some money from Kishen Singh the predecessor of the Defendants first party on a simple money bond in which he fraudulently joined Mst. Jumna although Mst. Jumna took no part of the loan. In the year 1881 Girdhar Singh and Ors., the heirs of Kishen Singh sued Chhittar Singh and Mst. Jumna on the money bond and obtained a decree. After Mst, Jumna's death, the decree-holders executed the decree against Mst. Sobha and her son Khub Singh and put the property to sale and purchased it themselves in the year 1889. Khub Singh pre-deceased his mother Mst. Sobha. Defendants, second party, are also reversioners to the estate of Sewa Ram but as they have not joined in the suit, they have been arrayed among the Defendants. Only the Defendants first party contested the suit. They pleaded that the last male owner of the property was Fateh Singh, as Sewa Ram had died in Fateh Singh's lifetime. On Fateh Singh's death Mst. Jumna took possession of the property without title and perfected her title by adverse possession. It was also pleaded that Fateh Singh transferred his property to Mst. Jumna by a will. It was further contended that Mst. Jumna borrowed the money from Chhittar Singh for legal necessity and that the auction sale in execution of the decree against Mst. Jumna passed an absolute title to the auction purchasers. The contesting Defendants further pleaded that they had discharged a prior charge on the property. The trial Court found that the Plaintiffs were entitled to maintain the suit as next reversioners of Sewa Ram. It also found that Sewa Ram survived his father Fateh Singh and was the last male owner of the property. No will executed by Fateh Singh in favour of Mst. The trial Court found that the Plaintiffs were entitled to maintain the suit as next reversioners of Sewa Ram. It also found that Sewa Ram survived his father Fateh Singh and was the last male owner of the property. No will executed by Fateh Singh in favour of Mst. Jumna was proved. As it was held that Mst. Jumna succeeded to the estate as Sewa Ram's widow, the plea of adverse possession was repelled. As to the loan in consequence of which the property was sold in 1889, it was held that the loan was contracted by Mst. Jumna and Chhittar Singh jointly and that the loan had been taken for legal necessity. It was held that the auction sale of 1SS9 did not bind the reversioners but passed only the limited interests of Mst. Sobha. The Plaintiffs' suit was therefore decreed for possession of the property subject to the condition of their paying a specified sum on account of the prior charge which had been discharged by the contesting Defendants. 2. The contesting Defendants come to this Court in appeal and two points have been pressed. The first question in whether the trial Court was right in finding that Sewa Ram survived his father Fateh Singh. As the deaths of Fateh Singh and Sewa Ram took place so long ago one cannot expect any satisfactory oral evidence to be produced. The Plaintiffs produced four witnesses who deposed that Sewa Ram died one or two years after the death of his father Fateh Singh. We are not disposed to place much reliance upon the testimony of these witnesses, but even the Defendants' witnesses Kallu and Net Ram have made certain statements in cross-examination which tend to show that Sewa Ram must have survived his father. It is admitted that the name of Mst. Jumna was entered in the revenue papers as the wife or widow of Sewa Ram. The Plaintiffs' case is that she succeeded lawfully as Sewa Ram's widow. The Defendants' case is that Mst. Jumna succeeded without any right or title as she was merely the daughter-in-law of Fateh Singh the last male owner. We think it should be presumed that Mst. Jumna succeeded rightfully as a widow in the absence of evidence to the contrary. The Plaintiffs' case is that she succeeded lawfully as Sewa Ram's widow. The Defendants' case is that Mst. Jumna succeeded without any right or title as she was merely the daughter-in-law of Fateh Singh the last male owner. We think it should be presumed that Mst. Jumna succeeded rightfully as a widow in the absence of evidence to the contrary. When it is a question whether a person obtained possession lawfully or unlawfully, a presumption should be made in favour of lawful possession. The presumption therefore is in favour of the Plaintiffs' case and although the oral evidence adduced by the Plaintiffs is not very strong it is at least stronger than that produced by the Defendants. We therefore agree with the Court below in finding that Sewa Ram survived his father and was the last male owner of the property. 3. Whe must mention that the Appellants applied for permission to produce fresh evidence on this point in this Court. They produced a document purporting to be an uncertified copy of the khewat of the year 1867 which is said to have been obtained from a member of the family of the late lambardar. The document is said to have been found among some old papers. As the document purports to be an uncertified copy of a khewat it cannot be produced as legal evidence to prove the contents of the khewat. Moreover, we are not convinced that the Defendants were unable to produce this document at the trial of the suit if they had exercised due diligence. We may add that we are not impressed by the appearance of the document. In view of all the circumstances we have refused permission to put this fresh document into evidence at this stage. 4. The next question is whether the auction-sale of 1889 conveyed a full title to the auction-purchasers and was binding upon the reversionary interest. The copy of the bond (Ex. 2) dated the 24th of June, 1878, shows that Mst. Jumna and her deceased husband's cousin Chhittar Singh jointly borrowed a sum of Rs. 95 from Kishen Singh and executed the bond in his favour. The recitals contained in the bond show that the money was borrowed for payment of arrears of revenue and for agricultural expenses, The first question is whether the money can be said to have been borrowed for purposes of legal necessity. 95 from Kishen Singh and executed the bond in his favour. The recitals contained in the bond show that the money was borrowed for payment of arrears of revenue and for agricultural expenses, The first question is whether the money can be said to have been borrowed for purposes of legal necessity. There is no reliable, oral evidence on this point. The only witness produced by the contesting Defendants has been characterized as "obviously a downright liar". In the absence of oral evidence the trial Court has relied upon the recitals in the bond and has therefore held that the loan was taken for legal necessity. This finding has been challenged on behalf of the Respondents. But in the view that we take of this case the question is not of much importance and it can be assumed for the sake of argument that the money was borrowed by the widow for purposes of legal necessity i.e for purposes that would justify an alienation of immovable property by the widow. It is worth noting that the bond was executed by Ms. Jumna and Chittar Singh jointly and they purported to take the loan jointly. The trial Court has also found that they were joint borrowers. Hence although the share of the loan taken by Mst, Jumna may be held to have been taken for legal recessity, it is not clear how the whole loan can be said to have been taken by the widow fof legal necessity because she was only one of the joint borrowers. This point however has net been discussed by the trial Court and it is not of much importance in the view we take of the rights of the parties. In the year 1881, Girdhar Singh and others, the heirs of Kishen Singh, brought a suit against Chittar Singh and Mst. Jumna on the basis of the bond and obtained a compromise decree on the 11th May, 1881. Execution of the decree was not taken out in Mst. Jumna's lifetime but after her death the decree-holders applied to execute the decree by sale of the property which had been owned by Mst. Jumna and was then in possession of Mst. Sobha her daughter and Khub Singh her daughter's son. Apparently Mst. Sobha raised no objection and the property was put to sale and purchased at auction by the decree-holders themselves on the 20th December, 1889. Jumna and was then in possession of Mst. Sobha her daughter and Khub Singh her daughter's son. Apparently Mst. Sobha raised no objection and the property was put to sale and purchased at auction by the decree-holders themselves on the 20th December, 1889. The question then arises what interests in the property passed to the auction purchaser*. If the sale had taken place in the life-time -of Mst. Jumna the position would have been clear. The decree shows that it was a purely personal decree passed against Mst. Jumna and Chittar Singh ordering them to pay the entire amount claimed by half-yearly instalments. If thu decree had been put into ex-acution during Mst. Jumna's lifetime and the property had been sold, the sale would have passed nothing more than Mst. Jumna's life interest. In Jugul Kishore v. Jotendra Mohun Tagore (1883) 10 Cal. 985: 11 Ind. Appt 66 (P.C.), their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the question whether on the sale of the right, title and interest of the widow in execution of a decree, the whole interest or inheritance in the family estate does or does not pass depends on the nature of the suit in which the execution of the decree takes place. If the suit is a personal claim against the widow, then merely the widow's limited estate is sold. The same principle was re-affirmed by their Lordships in AIR 1927 41 (Privy Council) where it was held that where a creditor files a suit against a limited owner as such and not against the estate of the last male owner and a decree is passed personally against the limited owner, the decree and the auction sale of property following thereon, does not bind the reversioner, although the foundation of the decree be a liability which might bind the reversioner. We may also refer to the case of Kallu v. Faiyaz Ali Khan (1908) 30 All. 394 : 5 A.L.J. 367 : 1908 A.W.N. 173, in which a Bench of this Court held that where money is lent to a Hindu widow on her personal security, a decree for such a debt and a sale of property late of the widow's husband in, execution of such decree binds only the widow's estate, notwithstanding that the original debt may have been incurred for legal necessity. 5. 5. The difficulty in this case is that although the decree was obtained against Mst. Jumna, execution was not taken out until after her death. It is not easy to determine what rights and interests passed to the decree-holders at the auction sale held in 1889. Obviously, the life interest of Mst. Jumna could not have been sold since she had already died. It is doubtful whether the decree-holders would have succeeded in having the property put up for sale in execution of the decree if Mst. Sobha had contested the execution proceedings. She was apparently made a party to the execution procceedings as if she were the legal representative of Mst. Jumna deceased and as if she had inherited.the property from Mst. Jumna. She could not be properly treated as Mst. Jumna's legal representative or heir as she had succeeded to the property as next heir of her father Sewa Ram. As Mst. Jumna had not charged the property in any way it is notieasy to see how the depree-holders could have law fully sold the property in execution of their decree after Mst. Jumna's death. However this may be, it is clear that Mst. Sobha was made a party to the execution proceedings and that she at least must be held bound by the confirmation of sale. In our opinion, however, the auction sale cannot be held binding upon the Plaintiffs as next reversioners. The order of the execution Court cannot be put on a higher footing than a decree passed against Mst. Sobha. It is true that Mst. Sobha was at that time representing the estate as a limited heir and if a decree had been passed against heir after a bona fide contest in which the question of title had been put in issue, then it would have been binding upon the reversioners. In the present case, however, there is no evidence to show that Mst. Sobha ever contested the decree-holder's right to sell the property in execution of his money decree against Mst. Jumna. It is clear that the decree-holder's right to sell the property could well have been contested and as it does not appear to have been contested, we cannot treat the proceedings of the execution Court and the auction sale as binding upon the Plaintiffs. Jumna. It is clear that the decree-holder's right to sell the property could well have been contested and as it does not appear to have been contested, we cannot treat the proceedings of the execution Court and the auction sale as binding upon the Plaintiffs. No case has been cited before us in which the facts were similar, ''that is, in which a Hindu widow took an unsecured loan for purposes of legal necessity, and had a decree passed against her for recovery of the money, but the decree was executed after her death. In our opinion Mst. Sobha was bound by the execution proceeding as she was a party, but the reversioners are not bound. It may be; mentioned that Khub Singh pre-deceased his mother Mst. Sobha and therefore never had any vested interest in the property. He does not appear to have been a necessary party to the execution proceedings. 6. The result is that we dismiss the appeal with costs.