JUDGMENT Rachhpal Singh, J. - The Plaintiff-Appellant instituted a suit to recover a sum of Rs. 228 on account of rent of a house from the Defendant Appellant. The case of the Plaintiff, Appellant was that on 17th April, 1908, the Defendant-Respondent mortgaged to him one house with possession, and on the same date the Defendant-Respondent executed rent-note agreeing to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 4 per mensem. This rent-note shows that the tenancy was, created for a period of two years. It further provides that the Plaintiff would have the right to have the house vacated in case rent for a period of six month was hot paid.' The Plaintiff alleged in the plaint that after the expiry of the period of tenancy the Defendant continued in occupation-of the house and paid rent. The suit was instituted for the: recovery of rent for a period of six years prior to the date, of the suit. The first Court gave the Plaintiff a decree for the rent at the above mentioned rate for a period of three years. There was an appeal. The lower appellate Court held that the suit was not within limitation and therefore the appeal was-allowed. The Plaintiff has come up in second' appeal- before this Court. Both the Courts have found that the Defendant-Respondent never paid any rent to the Plaintiff. This is a finding of fact which must be accepted. The only question for consideration is whether or no the view of the Court "below on the question of limitation is correct. 2. After healing the Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant I am of opinion that the decision of the. district Judge cannot be disturbed. The Court; below has,; relied on a. rulling of this Court, Bisheshar Nath Vs. Kundan and Others, AIR 1922 All 318 in which it was held by two learned Judges that the suit, instituted to recover possession more than twelve years after the date of the determination of the tenancy was barred by. the provisions of Article 139, Limitation Act. The same view, was taken by Sir Lawrence Jankins C.J. in Chandri v. Daji Babu (1900) 24 Bom. 504 : 2 Bom. L.R. 491. the provisions of Article 139, Limitation Act. The same view, was taken by Sir Lawrence Jankins C.J. in Chandri v. Daji Babu (1900) 24 Bom. 504 : 2 Bom. L.R. 491. The view taken in these cases is that after the determination of the tenancy, the Defendant-Respondent remained in occupation as a "tenant by sufferance," and a suit for ejectment should have been instituted within a period of twelve y ears from the date of the determination of the tenancy, and admittedly this was not done in the case before me. The plea of the Plaintiff that the Defendant had been paying rent to him has not been accepted by the Court below and there is a definite finding that the Defendant never paid the rent to the Plaintiff. Article 139, Limitation Act, provides that a suit by a landlord to recover possession from a tenant should be instituted within a period of twelve years from the date when the tenancy is determined. In the present case the tenancy determined after the expiry of two years from the date of the rent note. In Indian Law there is no such thing as "tenant by sufferance", and after the determination of the tenancy the possession of the tenant will be that of a trespasser. 3. It is very important to remember that for however long a time the payment of rent by a tenant may be discontinued, the title remains in the lessor during the whole continuance of the lease, and the statute of limitation begins to run in favour of the lessee only from the date of the expiry of the lease, for the right of the lessor to bring in an action for recovery of land accrues only from the time at which his estate of interest becomes an estate or interest in possession, which will be only on the determination of the lease-Deo d. E. Davy v. Oxenham (1840) 7 MWR 131. The following important observations were made in Archbold v. William Scully (1860) 9 HLC 360, So long as the relation of landlord and tenant subsists the right of the landlord to rent is not barred by non-payment except that under 42 section of 3 and 4 Will, 4 c. 27, the amount to be recovered is limited to six years... It is not in the. It is not in the. power of a tenant by any action of his own to alter the relation in which he stands to his landlord. 4. It will thus be seen that in order to decide cases of this kind it is very necessary to keep before us the distinction existing between the cases in which the tenancy has determined and those in which the tenancy has not come to an end. If the tenancy has not determined then no question can arise. On the other hand where the tenancy has determined the limitation will begin to run against the landlord. In Adivi Sreenivasa Pantaloo v. Palatala Jogiraju (1913) 18 Ind. Cas. 243: 24 M.L.J. 188: 1913 M.W.N. 284, a learned Judge of the Madras High Court held that a mere voluntary abstention by the landlord from collecting rent from the tenant for a particular period would not bar his claim therefore for a future period ; and that, it was only where the tenant had denied the landlord's title to receive rent more than twelve years before the suit and had refused to pay, basing the refusal on such denial of title in the landlord to recover, that the claim would be barred. 5. A perusal, of this case would show that it was one to recover rent-dues payable by the Defendant, and there was no question about the determination of the tenancy. The Court below in that case had dismissed the suit because the landlord had abstained from recovering the rent for a number of years. Deokinandan Prasad v. Bindeshri Prasad (1912) 17Ind. Cas. 523 (All.), is a ruling of our own Court in which it was held that the mere non-payment of rent by a leant was generally insufficient to show that the tenant had inquired proprietary title against his landlord. This was also a case where there was no question of the determination of the tenancy. The amount recoverable was what is knoun as "parjawat" dues at the rate of 2 pice per mensem and the Court held that simply because the landlord did not take the trouble to recover these dues for a long time would not be in itself sufficient to prove that the Defendant had become the owner of the land by adverse possession. Another ruling on the point is the one reported in Abdul Karim v. Chunni Bibi (1913) 19 Ind. Another ruling on the point is the one reported in Abdul Karim v. Chunni Bibi (1913) 19 Ind. Cas. 119 (All.), where it was held that mere non-payment of ground-rent by the tenant, unless it was coupled with a refusal; to pay and a denial of the landlord's title, would not terminate the relation of landlord and tenant: or take away the landlord's right to recover rent. This was also a case in which it was found that the tenancy had not terminated. If in the case before me, it be held that the tenancy did not determine, then certainly the Plaintiff would be entitled to recover the rent for a period of, three years; for instance, in under a written agreement a tenancy is created for a period of, say, thirty years, and the landlord does not get rent for a period of 13 years and then institutes a suit for the recovery of rent or for ejectment because of the nonpayment of rent, then it would not be open to the Defendant to plead that the suit was barred because for a period of over twelve years he rent had hot been paid by him, the reason being that he accepted a tenancy from the landlord and he Would be stopped from denying the title of his lessor during the continuance of the lease; but the case would stand on a different footing altogether if the tenancy determined and the suit for ejectment or for the recovery of rent was instituted more than twelve years after the determination of the tenancy; then it would certainly be barred. 6. Now I proceed to consider the question as to whether or not the tenancy in this case terminated. As I have already mentioned, the rent-note was executed by the Defendant in favour of the Plaintiff for a period of two years. There cannot be the least doubt that the tenancy terminated on the expiry of that period. I do not agree with the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Appellant when he says that the tenancy in this case did not determine after the lapse of the two years. The Plaintiff in his plaint clearly stated that the rent-agreement was executed only for two years, that after the expiry of the term of the tenancy the Defendant continued to hold the house under the rent-note. The Plaintiff in his plaint clearly stated that the rent-agreement was executed only for two years, that after the expiry of the term of the tenancy the Defendant continued to hold the house under the rent-note. The words used by him in Para 2 of the plaint are: "yeh ki kirayanamah mazkoor wastay do sal tahrir hooa tha magar muddalam bad inqizai miad abhi takbazariya kirayahnamah mazkoor makan mazkoor par bamashahirah mazkoor qabiz hat". It was contended by the Appellant's Counsel that in this case no lease had been given by the Plaintiff to the Defendant and that it was only the Defendant who had executed a rent-note and so there could be no question of the determination of any lease. I disagree with this argument. It is true that no lease was executed; but it is perfectly clear that under the rent-note the Defendant became a lessee. He took the house on rent from the Plaintiff who accepted the terms mentioned in the rent-note. Such a contract would be nothing else but a lease though the parties did not choose to give that name to it. Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that a lease of immovable property determines by the efflux of time limited thereby. In the present case the lease had been given for a period of two years and as soon as that period was over it terminated. After that the Defendant continued to hold as a mere trespasser. As laid down in the ruling reported in Chandri v. Daji Babu (1900) 24 Bom. 504: 2 Bom. L.R. 491, a tenant held over after the termination of the fixed period of his lease is one by sufferance, and there is no privity between him and the landlord. In such a case the time will commence to run against the landlord as soon as the tenancy is determined, and if he does hot sue within a period of 12 years his right to eject the tenant would be barred under Article 139 of the Indian Limitation Act; and it would follow that his claim for rent under Article 110 of the Indian Limitation Act would be equally barred. The Learned Counsel of the Appellant has, however, contended in this case that u/s 116 of the Transfer of Property Act a fresh tenancy came into existence after the termination of the period fixed by the law. Section 116 runs as follows: If a lessee or under-lessee of property remains in possession thereof after the determination of the lease granted to the lessee, and the lessor or his legal representative accepts rent from the lessee or under-lessee, or otherwise assents to his continuing in possession, the lease is, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, renewed from year to year, or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property is leased as specified in Section 106. 7. I am, however, of opinion that the Plaintiff-Appellant has been unable to show that this section can apply to his case. He has faile 3 to establish that he accepted rent from the lessee after the termination of the period of the lease mentioned in the deed. He has equally failed to show that the lessee remained in possession with his assent. No act had been shown from which an inference might be justifiably drawn that after the termination of the lease the Defendant continued to remain in possession with his assent. The finding of the Court below is that the Defendant never paid any rent to the Plaintiff, not only after the determination of the lease but even for the period before its determination. In the circumstances of the case it would not be right to presume that the Defendant was in possession with the assent of the Plaintiff after the termination of the lease. On behalf of the Appellant reliance has been placed on a ruling reported in Munshi Safar Ali Master Vs. Abdul Majid and Another, AIR 1927 Cal 279 , in which a bench of two learned Judges of the Calcutta High Court held that in the circumstances of that particular case the Court was justified in drawing inference that the tenancy did not determine, and that the possession of the Defendant who must be taken to have been holding over was not that of a trespasser but of a person whose lights were to be determined on notice to quit. 8. In view, however, of the ruling of a Bench of this Court, reported in Bisheshar Nath Vs. 8. In view, however, of the ruling of a Bench of this Court, reported in Bisheshar Nath Vs. Kundan and Others, AIR 1922 All 318 I find myself unable to follow this, view. Plaintiff's claim for ejectment on the date of the suit was barred by the provisions of Article 139 of the Indian Limitation Act. It therefore follows that his claim to the recovery of rent under Article 110 of the Limitation Act was equally barred. 9. For the reasons given above, I am of opinion that the judgment of the lower appellate Court is correct, and the appeal therefore stands dismissed with costs.