JUDGMENT Sulaiman, C.J. - This is a Plaintiff's appeal arising out of a suit for pre-emption. The claim has been dismissed on the ground that the share sold is in village Rasulpur which is a Notified Area and that no custom of pre-emption has been proved to exist in this case. In appeal the first point raised is that Rasulpur was an agricultural village and could not, therefore, become a Notified Area u/s 337 of the Municipalities Act (Act II of l916). But under Sub-Section 3 of that very section the decision of the Local Government that a local area is not an agricultural village is final and conclusive. Apart from this, u/s 4(6) of the Agra Preemption Act Notified Area merely means a local area in regard to which a Government notification has been issued. It is, therefore, not now open to the Plaintiff to urge that Rasulpur is not a Notified Area at all. 2. The second ground is that the Court below wrongly rejected certain additional evidence which was tendered before it. The Plaintiff's case was that these important pieces of evidence, of which the Plaintiff had had no previous knowledge, were newly discovered and could not have been found after the exercise of due diligence. He attempted to bring his case within the scope of Rule 1, Order XLVII. The lower Appellate Court declined to admit fresh evidence in the appeal and rejected the application. 3. It seems to me that if the lower Appellate Court itself did not require the production of this evidence in order to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause, it could not have admitted it. 4. No doubt in the case of Indrajit Pratap Sahi v. Amar Singh (1923) 50 Ind. App. 183 : AIC 1923 PC 128: 21 ALJ 554 P.C., their Lordships of the Privy Council at p. 191 (of 50 Ind. 4. No doubt in the case of Indrajit Pratap Sahi v. Amar Singh (1923) 50 Ind. App. 183 : AIC 1923 PC 128: 21 ALJ 554 P.C., their Lordships of the Privy Council at p. 191 (of 50 Ind. App.) referred to Order XLVII, Rule 1 and pointed out that under that rule a party has a right to apply for a review of judgment to the Court that has decided the case before an appeal has been preferred and observed: In the present case an appeal had been preferred and a review, therefore, was it of the question, and the Defendants took the only and proper course namely, apply to the High Court, which was in possession of the case, to admit the additional evidence either under the general principles of law or under the specific provisions of Rule 27. 5. Their Lordships admitted the fresh evidence although it had been rejected by the High Court on the ground that it had no power under Rule 27 to admit it. This case was understood in India to confer on an Appellate Court jurisdiction to admit fresh evidence even if it does not require it, but the evidence should be such as has been newly discovered and could not with due diligence have been discovered by the party offering to produce it. 6. But Indrajit Pratap Sahai's case (Supra), was subsequently explained by their Lordships in AIR 1931 143 (Privy Council) where it was laid down that the language of Rule 27 is very strict and it is only where the Appellate Court "requires" it (finds it needful) that additional evidence can be admitted. It was emphasised that whether it be a case where the evidence is required to enable the Court to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause, it must in either case be the Court that requires it and that this is the plain grammatical reading of the sub-clause. Their Lordships further remarked that in Inderjit Sahai's case (Supra), the question really was as to the power of the Board to admit additional documents which the High Court had rejected and such power was in no way restricted or governed by the provisions of the Code. Their Lordships further remarked that in Inderjit Sahai's case (Supra), the question really was as to the power of the Board to admit additional documents which the High Court had rejected and such power was in no way restricted or governed by the provisions of the Code. It was then laid down that If any incidental remarks appearing in this judgment (Indrajit's case) have occasioned any doubt as to the meaning of the Rules above referred to or the condicions under which the discretion of the Appellate Court is to be exercised, their Lordships desire to emphasise their view that the correct practice in the matter, as they have now defined it, is in accordance with the plain words of the Code. 7. The same strict view was adopted by their Lordships in AIR 1931 175 (Privy Council) where their Lordships considered the introduction of fresh evidence in appeal as highly irregular and discarded such incomplete testimony in considering the rest of the evidence. I must accordingly hold that the Appellate Court had no power to admit this fresh evidence. Indeed, the language of Order XLVII, Rule 1 indicates that the Court which can review its judgment is the Court which has pronounced it and not the Appellate Court before which the appeal is pending. The only remedy open to a party which has discovered new and important matter, which could not with due diligence have been found before, appears to be to move the Court for a review of judgment. 8. The last point is that the custom of pre-emption has been established in this case. The Plaintiff relied on entries in two wajib-ul-arzes of 1833 and 1860. There were no entries in the subsequent wajib-ul-arzes. The history of the village was disclosed by the kafiat mahtavi and kafiat sherista nizamat and it appeared that there were several sale deeds in favour of StrangerS. Two judgments, one a compromise decree for pre-emption of the year 1923, and the other, a copy of the High Court's judgment of 1914, were produced. The High Court had, on practically the same materials, come to the conclusion that no custom had been established. Two judgments, one a compromise decree for pre-emption of the year 1923, and the other, a copy of the High Court's judgment of 1914, were produced. The High Court had, on practically the same materials, come to the conclusion that no custom had been established. In the present case, therefore, the Plaintiff had against him not only the materials which existed in the previous suit which came up to the High Court, but also the High Court's judgment, whereas the only additional evidence in favour of the Plaintiff was a compromise decree of 1923. No doubt the presumption was in favour of the Plaintiff but there was sufficient evidence for the Court below to hold that that presumption had been rebutted. The view expressed by a Division Bench of this Court on practically the same materials is a strong piece of evidence in favour of the Defendant. I accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.