Judgement Appeal (No. 84 of 1932) from a decree of the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction (March 8, 1932) reversing an order of the Court in its original jurisdiction (December 14, 1931). The respondent, as receiver appointed in an insolvency under the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1909, applied to the High Court to set aside under s. 55 of the Act a transfer of property made by the insolvent to the appellant within two years of the insolvency. The question for determination was whether it was established that the appellant was not a purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration within the meaning of the above section. The facts and the terms of the section appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The application was heard by Sen J. and was dismissed. The learned judge found on the evidence that the transaction was not brought within the terms of the section. 60 Law Rep. 60 Ind. App. 362 ( 1932- 1933) Pope V. Official Assignee, Rangoon 161 An appeal to the High Court was allowed by a judgment delivered by Page C.J. and concurred in by Mya Bu J., and the transfer declared to be void. The learned Chief Justice said that the case was concluded against the present appellant by the judgment of Lord Blackburn in Tomkins v. Saffery (( 1881) 3 App. Cas. 213, 237.) and by that of Cotton L.J. in Ex parte Chaplin. (( 1884) 26 Ch. D. 319, 331, 332.) The only reasonable inference from the evidence was that when the transfer was made to the present appellant he knew that Mrs. Young had no available assets except those transferred and was in insolvent circumstances, and that nothing would be left out of which any other creditors could receive a rateable distribution. The appeal is reported at 1. L. R. 10 Ran. 219. 1933. July 25, 27. T. F. R. McDonnell and Hubert Hull for the appellant. The onus admittedly was upon the Official Assignee to prove that the purchase, which was for valuable consideration, was not made bona fide. The evidence did not justify the inference that the appellant knew that the transferor was insolvent ; there was no affirmative evidence that he knew. The learned Chief Justice based his conclusion that the purchase was not bona fide upon Tomkins v. Saffery (( 1881) 3 App. Cas. The evidence did not justify the inference that the appellant knew that the transferor was insolvent ; there was no affirmative evidence that he knew. The learned Chief Justice based his conclusion that the purchase was not bona fide upon Tomkins v. Saffery (( 1881) 3 App. Cas. 213, 237.) and Ex parte Chaplin (( 1884) 26 Ch. D. 319, 331, 332.), but the question in those cases was whether there had been a fraudulent preference and an act of bankruptcy, and both proceeded upon the basis that the transferee knew that the transferor was insolvent. The words " in good faith " in s. 55 merely exclude a transaction which is not real but colourable. That appears to have been the view of the Board in Official Receiver v. P. L. K. M. R. M. Chettyar Firm (( 1930) L. R. 58 I. A. 115, 121.) ; and has been held to be the effect of the same words in s. 47 of the (English) Bankruptcy Act, 1883 In re Pope. Ex parte Dicksee. ([ 1908] 2 K. B. 169, 174.) The respondent did not appear. Oct. 16. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD THANKERTON. This is an appeal from a judgment and decree of the High Court of Judicature at Rangoon dated March 8, 1932, whereby the Court, in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, set aside an order dated December 14, 1931, made in exercise of its original jurisdiction, and declared that the deed of sale hereinafter referred to was void as against the respondent. The respondent did not appear in the appeal. The deed of sale in question was dated February 27, 1931, and was made between Mrs. Edith Young, who carried on business as a milliner and dressmaker at 15 Phayre Street, Rangoon, and the appellant; Mrs. Young thereby assigned to the appellant the stock in trade then lying in her shop and all her book debts then due and owing, in consideration of the payment by the appellant to her bank of the sum of Rs. 20,229, being the amount of her overdraft with the bank. The appellant had guaranteed Mrs. Youngs overdraft with her bank up to the sum of Rs. 25,000, and the bank was pressing the appellant for payment. On June 16, 1931, Mrs. Young was adjudicated an insolvent. 20,229, being the amount of her overdraft with the bank. The appellant had guaranteed Mrs. Youngs overdraft with her bank up to the sum of Rs. 25,000, and the bank was pressing the appellant for payment. On June 16, 1931, Mrs. Young was adjudicated an insolvent. On July 7, 1931, the respondent, as the assignee in insolvency of Mrs. Youngs estate, made the application out of which the present appeal arises, to have the deed of sale declared void as against the respondent, in respect of the provisions of ss. 55 and 56 of the Presidency-towns Insolvency Act, 1909. The respondents contentions, however, have been confined to s. 55, and it is unnecessary to refer to s. 56. Sect. 55 provides as follows " 55. Any transfer of property, not being a transfer made before and in consideration of marriage, or made in favour of a purchaser or incumbrancer in good faith and for valuable consideration shall, if the transferor is adjudged insolvent within two years after the date of the transfer, be void against the official assignee." 60 Law Rep. 60 Ind. App. 362 ( 1932- 1933) Pope V. Official Assignee, Rangoon 162 The sole question in the case is whether the deed of sale was a transfer " in good faith and for valuable consideration " within the meaning of s. 55, and it is clearly for the respondent to establish the contrary in order to succeed in his application Official Receiver v. P. L. K. M. R. M. Chettyar Firm. (L. R. 58 I. A. 115.) There is little dispute about the facts, and the evidence is referred to in detail by Sen J., who decided the case on the original side of the High Court. In carrying on her business, which was started in 1929, Mrs. Young financed it by means of the overdraft of Rs. 25,000 permitted by her bank on the guarantee of the appellant, who deposited the title deeds of his house with the bank and a promissory note for l Rs. 25,000 signed by himself and Mrs. Young. The appellant also guaranteed Mrs. Youngs rent for the shop for three years from 1929. On February 4, 1931, the bank called on the appellant as guarantor to liquidate the overdraft and, after obtaining the deed of sale from Mrs. 25,000 signed by himself and Mrs. Young. The appellant also guaranteed Mrs. Youngs rent for the shop for three years from 1929. On February 4, 1931, the bank called on the appellant as guarantor to liquidate the overdraft and, after obtaining the deed of sale from Mrs. Young, the appellant liquidated the overdraft by two payments on March 26 and 27 amounting to Rs. 20,521-2-9, which was considerably less than the guaranteed amount. Four days after signing the deed of sale Mrs. Young left for England, where she told the appellant she hoped to realize Rs. 35,000 from her fathers estate, and the appellant thereafter carried on the business in order to realize the stock, and made no new purchases except little articles like ribbons used for making up dresses. Their Lordships are unable to find any evidence that the appellant knew, when he took the deed of sale, that Mrs. Young was insolvent. The overdraft was not exhausted, and there is no evidence that the appellant knew of other creditors at that date. Their Lordships agree with the opinion of Sen J. The transaction admittedly was a real one, which takes it out of the class of case found in Ex parte Chaplin. (26 Ch. D. 319.) In that case and in Tomkins v. Saffery (3 App. Cas. 213.) there was knowledge of insolvency. Their Lordships are therefore of opinion that the respondent has failed to prove that the transfer was not made in good faith, and they will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be allowed, that the decree of the High Court dated March 8, 1932, should be set aside and the order dated December 14, 1931, should be restored, the appellant to have the costs of this appeal and of the proceedings before the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.