JUDGMENT Niamatullah, J. - This is an application for revision against an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate, First Class, District Muzaffarnagar. The applicant Kishore Lal was the complainant in a case of cheating brought by him against Atma Ram and Krishna Lal. The complainant is a partner in the firm known as Uggar Sen Parshotam Das, carrying on business of commission agents at Muzaffarnagar. His story was that, on the 14th September, 1933, the accused met him at Dehra Dun and desired to purchase through his firm 10 bijkas'. The complainant insisted on payment of 50 per cent, of the price, but the accused assured him that payment would be made as soon as the 'bijaks' were purchased. The transaction was to be completed at Muzaffarnagar. The complainant phoned to his firm informing them of the bargain and assuring them that payment would be made by the accused as soon as the 'bijaks' were purchased. The accused made payment by a cheque on the Allahabad Bank, Dehra Dun Branch. The 'bijaks' were purchased by the complainant's firm at Muzaffarnagar; but the cheque was dishonored on presentation on the ground that the accused had no account with the Dehra Dun Branch of the Allahabad Bank. The defence was that it was the complainant who approached the accu- sed with an offer of purchasing, on their behalf, certain 'bijaks', which were likely to prove, profitable. The accused agreed, but stated that they had no money. The accused, however, told him that payment would be made after a certain time. It is also alleged by the accused that they distinctly told the complainant that they had no money in the Bank but that they would deposit it in the Allahabad Bank, Dehra Dun, for the purpose of paying for the 'bijaks'. On that understanding they gave the cheque to the complainant with instructions not to present it for payment till a time named, by which the accused would open an account with the Allahabad Bank, Dehra Dun, for payment to the complainant's firm. 2. Both parties produced witnesses in support of their allegations. The Magistrate, who examined the witnesses, disbelieved the complainant's story and his witnesses, and believed those produced on behalf of the accused. On that finding the accused were acquitted. 3. In revision before me two questions have been argued by the learned Advocate for the applicant. 2. Both parties produced witnesses in support of their allegations. The Magistrate, who examined the witnesses, disbelieved the complainant's story and his witnesses, and believed those produced on behalf of the accused. On that finding the accused were acquitted. 3. In revision before me two questions have been argued by the learned Advocate for the applicant. First, it is contended that the Muzaffarnagar Court had no jurisdiction to try the accused. This comes with a bad grace from the complainant, who himself filed a complaint at Muzaffarnagar. This, however, is not a fatal objection to the argument, if it is otherwise well-founded. The learned Advocate for the applicant has referred me to a case recently decided by a full Bench of this Court, in which it was held that Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies where the act done and the consequence following that act must enter into the definition of the offence the commission of which is complained against. But where the offence is complete in itself by reason of the act having been done and the consequence is a mere result of it, which was not essential for the completion of the offence, then Section 179 would not be applicable-Kashi Ram Mehta v. Emperor (1934) 3 A.W.R. 506 (F.B.). Section 179 which was the subject of consideration in the ruling cited above, provides that When a person is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of anything which has been done, and of any consequence which has ensued, such offence may be enquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such thing has been done, or any such consequence has ensued. 4. It is argued that the offence of cheating was committed at Dehra Dun in its entirety. It is said that the accused made a misrepresentation to the complainant at Dehra Dun that payment would be made immediately on purchase of 'bulks' and that they handed over a cheque at Dehra Dun in payment of the price, which also implied a representation that they had money in the Allahabad Bank, Dehra Dun, from which it could be drawn by the complainants firm. Acting on these representations, the complainant instructed his firm at Muzaffarnagar to make the purchase. 5. Acting on these representations, the complainant instructed his firm at Muzaffarnagar to make the purchase. 5. It is contended that the complaint would not have phoned to his partner to make the purchases, if the accused had not made misrepresentations already referred to. In this view, it is said, the offence of cheating, as defined in Section 415, was competed at Dehra Dun, and no part of that offence was committed at Muzaffarnagar. This argument ignores one aspect of the case, which makes Section 179 of the Code of CPC clearly applicable. It was not the complainant who was cheated. It was the complainant's firm at Muzaffarnagar, who were deceived into purchasing the 'bijaks' in consequence of misrepresentations made by the accused through the complainant. But for his misrepresentation, purchase would not have been made at Muzaffarnagar. In this view, the cansequences resulting from the deceit on practiced by the accused at Dehra Dun ensued at Muzaffarnagar. in my opinion, Section 179 is clearly applicable to the case, and the ruling, to which reference has been made, does not help the applicant's contention, 6. The learned Advocate for the applicant also contended that the Magistrate disbelieved the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution and believed those produced in defence in disregard of the contents of a written agreement between the parties. I have examined the written contract, and do not find anything which militates against the statements of witnesses examined on behalf of the accused or corroborates the evidence given by the prosecution witnesses. It is a well-established rule of law that this Court will not interfere with an order of acquittal, except in very special circumstances. The learned Advocate for the applicant offered to take me through the evidence to show that the weight of evidence is against the finding of the Magistrate. I do not think that this course is permissible in a revision from acquittal. Accordingly I dismiss this application for revision.