Judgement Consolidated Appeals (Nos. 101 to 106 of 1932) from six decrees of the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction (April 1, 1931) reversing and varying six decrees of the High Court in its original jurisdiction bearing different dates. The consolidated appeals, in each of which Babu alias Govindoss Krishnadoss was the appellant, raised two main questions—namely, (1.) whether a firm, which traded in Madras from 1890 to 1924 under the name Mulidoss Ramdoss & Co., and at the date of the litigation was in liquidation, was a joint Hindu family trading business or a partnership firm ; and if the latter, (2.) whether the appellant, as representative of his father Krishnadoss, who was a member of the firm until his death in 1908, was entitled to his fathers share in the assets of the partnership free from debts, secured and unsecured, contracted by the firm long after 1908. The facts are stated in the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The six suits to which the present consolidated appeal related were tried together by Venkatasubba Rao J. The learned judge held that the partition award of 1890 effected a complete partition between all five brothers, and that subsequent conduct was not admissible to show the contrary; a reunion between the two elder brothers was legally possible, as each had a minor son, but on the evidence no reunion was established. In his view, therefore, the business was a partnership business, and as the debts in question, whether secured or unsecured, had not been incurred for the purpose of winding up the partnership, they were not chargeable against the share of the appellants father. Appeals were heard by Ramesam and Stone JJ., and were allowed. Ramesam J. said that the document of 1890, which was not a deed of partition but an award, was peculiar in that it allotted the business without a division between the brothers. In determining the effect upon the rights of persons not parties to it he thought that the subsequent conduct of the parties could be considered. Ramesam J. said that the document of 1890, which was not a deed of partition but an award, was peculiar in that it allotted the business without a division between the brothers. In determining the effect upon the rights of persons not parties to it he thought that the subsequent conduct of the parties could be considered. After examining the evidence the learned judge said that, in his opinion, by November, 1907, or probably earlier, " the branches of Muralidoss and Govardandoss made up their minds to be a joint family and declared themselves to be so, their conduct being consistent with either that they reunited in 1906 or continued in union from 1890." Even apart from reunion or continuance of union, but upon the basis of partnership, the present appellant was not entitled to relief. Having referred to ss. 240, 241, 262 and 263 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and to certain English decisions, the learned judge said that the creditors were entitled to assume that the debts incurred to them were for the purpose of carrying on the business, and that the present appellant was not entitled to priority over charges given for such debts. He was further of opinion that in the absence of the evidence of the appellants mother, the appellant was to be deemed to have been admitted to the benefits of the partnership within s. 247 of the Act, and that he was therefore liable in respect of the debts incurred in carrying it on. Stone J. delivered a separate but concurring judgment. 1934. Feb. 26, 27; Mar. 1, 2, 5, 6. De Gruyther K.C. and Hyam for the appellant. The award of 1890 effected a complete partition between the five brothers, and its effect cannot be altered by the subsequent conduct of the parties Balkishen Das v. Ram Narain Sahu. (( 1903) L. R. 30 I, A. 139.) The burden of proving a reunion was upon those who asserted it Balabux Ladhuram v. Rukhmabai. (( 1903) L. R. 30 I. A. 130.) That burden was not discharged. After the award the two brothers referred to themselves as partners in several documents; the accounts were regarded by both Courts below as inconclusive. (( 1903) L. R. 30 I. A. 130.) That burden was not discharged. After the award the two brothers referred to themselves as partners in several documents; the accounts were regarded by both Courts below as inconclusive. On the basis that the business was a partnership business, the appellant was entitled under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, s. 253, sub-s. 10, and s. 263 to his fathers share in the assets at the date of his fathers death, subject only to debts incurred for the purpose of winding up the business. The question depends upon the terms of the Act not upon the English authorities. As the debts in question were all incurred at least eleven years after the dissolution, and to creditors who believed that they were dealing with a joint Hindu family, they cannot be regarded as having been incurred for the above purpose, nor can the creditors have believed that they were so incurred. There was no evidence upon which it could be inferred that the appellant had been admitted to the benefit of the partnership under s. 247. Dunne K.C, Sir Thomas Strangman and Mockett for the respondents in the first appeal ; Narasimham and J. Chinna Durai for other respondents. The business was the joint family business of the Muralidoss and Govardandoss branches, and consequently the appellants share was subject to the debts incurred, and charges created, in carrying it on. The suit was originally instituted on the basis that the family was joint and partition was claimed. Laldoss, who instituted the suit, on behalf of the appellant, must have known the true position. The allegation that it was a partnership business was first made by the amended plaint filed a year later. The award of 1890, on its true construction, effected a partition of the three younger brothers only; the business was dealt with by the award only for the purpose of finding their proper shares. At any rate the award was ambiguous on the point, and the subsequent conduct of the two brothers was relevant as to its true effect. The terms of documents executed by the two brothers, and the accounts of the business, established that they took jointly ; alternatively, that there was a reunion. The fact that some of the documents used the word " partnership " does not necessarily show that the business was not a joint family business. The terms of documents executed by the two brothers, and the accounts of the business, established that they took jointly ; alternatively, that there was a reunion. The fact that some of the documents used the word " partnership " does not necessarily show that the business was not a joint family business. But even if the business was a partnership business the share of the appellants father was subject under s. 266 to the debts incurred in carrying on the business. The appellant, as representative of his father, had no right in any specific item of the assets. As the creditors bona fide believed that the debts were incurred and the securities given for the purpose of carrying on the business the appellants rights are subject to those of the creditors. The material provisions of the Contract Act are based upon the English law of partnership and the English decisions apply. [Reference was made o Knox v. Gye (( 1877) L. R. 5 H. L. 656.), In re Langmeads Trusts (( 1855) 20 Beav. 20.), In re Bourne ([ 1906] 1 Ch. 113; [ 1900] 2 Ch. 427.), Rodriguez v. Speyer Brothers ([ 1919] A. C. 59.) ; Lindley on Partnership, 9th ed., p. 440.] De Gruyther K.C. replied. May 8. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD THANKERTON. These are six consolidated appeals from six decrees all dated April 1, 1931, made by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in its civil appellate jurisdiction, which reversed six decrees of different dates made by the same Court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. As will be seen later, a decision in the leading appeal (No. 101 of 1932) will, in effect, apply equally in the remaining appeals. Babu alias Govindoss Krishnadoss, who is appellant in all the appeals, was plaintiff in the principal suit (C.S. No. 622 of 1923), which was filed through his next friend Laldoss, his uncle, on account of his then minority, on August 30, 1923, and is the subject of the leading appeal. The appellants father, Krishnadoss, died on August 13, 1908, and the main question is whether his fathers interest in the business carried on under the name of Muralidoss Ramdoss & Co. was that of a partner or of a member of an undivided Hindu family. The appellants father, Krishnadoss, died on August 13, 1908, and the main question is whether his fathers interest in the business carried on under the name of Muralidoss Ramdoss & Co. was that of a partner or of a member of an undivided Hindu family. If the latter be the correct view, the appeals admittedly fail; if the business was a partnership, a question arises whether the interest of the appellants father is affected by debts, secured and unsecured, contracted by the firm some years after the date of his fathers death, and, if so, to what extent ? The trial Court held that the firm at the time of the death of the appellants father was an ordinary partnership and that the debts subsequently contracted by the firm did not affect his interest in the firm. On appeal the High Court held that the firm was a joint Hindu family firm; they further held that, even if it was a partnership firm, the interest of the appellants father in the firm was liable for the debts subsequently contracted. The following pedigree shows the relationship of the appellant in the family in question and the parties to the principal suit, so far as they are members of the family— Ramdoss Ghanshamdoss (d. Oct. 17. 1879) m. Kamalabai or Akka | | | | | | Muralidoss (d. April 24. Govardandoss Balamukundoss Baghavandos Subbarayadoss 1907) m. Yasodabai or (d.Sept. 26. (b. 1866) (d. s (b. 1869) (d. (b. 1878) Jossubai. 1969) m. 1896). 1911). (alive). | Kammubai | (d. Jan. 1926 | | | 5th deft.) | | | (1) |(2) |(1) |(2) Putlibai Krishnadoss Gokuldoss 1st Dwarkadoss, alias Nani, m. Laldoss. (b. May 16, 1884) (d. Aug. 13, 1908) m. Radhabai, 4th deft. (b. April 6, 1885) m. Gangabai. 2nd deft. (b. Nov. 12, 1891) (d. Jan. 14, 1925) m. deft. Jamma Bai || Babu alias Ramdoss, 3rd Govindoss (b. deft. (b. Aug. Nov. 18, 9, 1914). 1907), plf. The following facts may be taken as beyond controversy in the appeal. The appellants ancestor, Ramdoss Ghanshamdoss, came to Madras and carried on a business in cloth, money-lending and yarn, and acquired landed properties, houses and gold and silver. He died in 1879, leaving five sons, of whom two—Murali and Govardan—were then major. Nov. 18, 9, 1914). 1907), plf. The following facts may be taken as beyond controversy in the appeal. The appellants ancestor, Ramdoss Ghanshamdoss, came to Madras and carried on a business in cloth, money-lending and yarn, and acquired landed properties, houses and gold and silver. He died in 1879, leaving five sons, of whom two—Murali and Govardan—were then major. These two sons carried on the business as the managers of a joint Hindu family business until 1890, by which time their younger brothers Balamukun and Bhagwan had become major, while Subbaraya was still minor. In 1890, as the result of a demand by Balamukun and Bhagwan and their mother, Kamalabai Amma, as guardian of Subbaraya, and submissions by the parties, a panchayat award, dated September 27, 1890, was made, under which admittedly a partition was effected of the shares of the three younger brothers, and the family business was allotted to the shares of the two elder brothers, Murali and Govardan, the younger brothers ceasing to have any interest therein. The principal matter of controversy is whether this award left Murali and Govardan as undivided coparceners or as partners in the business, and, if they were partners, whether there was a subsequent reunion between them. But, without prejudice to these questions, it is the fact that they carried on the business until 1906 when their respective sons, Krishna and Gokul, were assumed into active management, and thereafter it was carried on by them and the survivors until about 1919, or later when the business began to get into difficulties and, ultimately, on November 28, 1924, Gokul and his younger brother, Dwarka, were adjudicated insolvents. Throughout the whole period from 1879 to this date the business was carried on under the style of Muralidoss Ramdoss &Co. In the opinion of their Lordships, the first question to be determined is whether the award of 1890 effected a partition between the shares of Murali and Govardan, and that depends on the construction of the award, in regard to which the subsequent actings of the parties is not relevant. Their Lordships agree with the view of this matter taken by the trial judge and they are unable to agree with the view expressed by Ramesam J., in which Stone J. concurred. Their Lordships agree with the view of this matter taken by the trial judge and they are unable to agree with the view expressed by Ramesam J., in which Stone J. concurred. The award itself appears to contain a narrative of every material surrounding circumstance, and it divides the properties into five shares, equal in value but varying in character, and has appended to it receipts for the shares. Their Lordships are clearly of opinion that the award effected a complete partition between each of the five brothers, and they agree with the reasons given by the learned trial judge. It follows that Murali and Govardan were left by the award as partners in the business, the interest of each partner being one-half, and the burden of proving that there was a subsequent reunion rests upon the respondents. It may be observed that there is nothing unusual in this particular burden of proof ; it means that the evidence of the change from partnership to co-parcenary must be sufficient to satisfy the Court that in fact it took place. It may further be observed that the circumstances of the partition may themselves ease the burden of proof in the sense that they provide a setting not unfavourable to reunion between certain of the parties to the partition. The present case appears to provide an illustration of this, for the narrative in the award makes clear that the demand for separation came from the three younger brothers, who stated that they would have no concern at all with the profit and loss of the business thereafter, and, while in law the award effected a separation of the interests of Murali and Govardan in the business, it would be natural enough for them to carry it on in fact as a co-parcenary business. If, on the other hand, it had appeared that the partition had originated, at least partly, in the desire of these two brothers to separate, the burden of proof of the change would have been a heavier one. Bearing in mind that the respondents require to establish by the evidence that a reunion had taken place prior to the death of Krishna on August 13, 1908, the documentary evidence between the date of the award of 1890 and the death of Krishna may be first considered. Bearing in mind that the respondents require to establish by the evidence that a reunion had taken place prior to the death of Krishna on August 13, 1908, the documentary evidence between the date of the award of 1890 and the death of Krishna may be first considered. In the first place, there is a series of formal documents, such as plaints, sale-deeds and mortgages, beginning in 1893 and ending with a mortgage deed of December 20, 1907, which, with the exception of a mortgage deed of November 4, 1907, do not afford any positive evidence in favour of the respondents, but, on the contrary, most of these documents afford positive evidence of co-partnership. But there are two outstanding documents in this period, the first of which consists of public notices by handbills and by advertisement in the " Madras Mail " and the ; “Fort St. George Gazette," on October 20 and 23, 1906, which informed the public that Krishna and Gokul had been admitted by Murali and Govardan as " partners in our company " from October 19, 1906, and that the name of the firm would still be Muralidoss Ramdoss and Company. The other document is a letter addressed by Murali to Krishna and Gokul on February 13, 1907, in the following terms —" My brother Govardandoss is very ill and unable to attend to business ; I am now in a poor state of health and I am advised to take rest. 1 am desirous of handing over the management of our business to you. You will therefore hereafter conduct the business of the firm of Muralidoss Ramdoss and Co. and under the same name. I will if necessary give you any advice you may want till our partnership is dissolved by a proper deed. I will not object to buying and selling goods." The letter is stamped with an eight annas stamp. The reference to the dissolution of their partnership by a prope deed, in their Lordships opinion, is inconsistent with anything but partnership. The writer of the letter died less than ten weeks later. The subsequent mortgage deed of November 4, 1907, will be referred to later. The remaining documentary evidence consists of a series of account books beginning in 1893, and, with intervals, coming down to about 1909. The writer of the letter died less than ten weeks later. The subsequent mortgage deed of November 4, 1907, will be referred to later. The remaining documentary evidence consists of a series of account books beginning in 1893, and, with intervals, coming down to about 1909. The various accounts and the entries have been fully reviewed in the judgments of both the Courts below, and counsel for the respondents submitted an elaborate and able argument on them, but their Lordships are unable to draw any conclusive inferences from them, as they are not kept on any distinct system clearly based on either co-parcenary or partnership. On the death of Krishna, he was survived by the appellant, then less than a year old, and by Govardan and his sons Gokul and Dwarka, the latter being still minor. These four would then have constituted the joint family alleged by the respondents. There seems to be little doubt that Govardan, , who died in September, 1909, was not in a condition fit for active business, and that Gokul really controlled the business from this time onwards, though Dwarka may have been associated with him in it after he became major in the end of 1909. After the death of Govardan the business appears to have been consistently described in formal deeds and plaints as a co-parcenary business, which is in striking contrast to the description in similar documents prior to the death of Krishna, with the exception of the one mortgage deed of November 4, 1907, which describes the business as that of a joint Hindu trading family. It appears clearly that the learned judges of the Appellate Court mainly based their finding of a previous reunion on this particular deed, but, in their Lordships opinion, such an isolated instance is quite an insufficient support for such a conclusion, unless it were made clear that Krishna was an active party to it. It appears clearly that the learned judges of the Appellate Court mainly based their finding of a previous reunion on this particular deed, but, in their Lordships opinion, such an isolated instance is quite an insufficient support for such a conclusion, unless it were made clear that Krishna was an active party to it. The deed itself refers to a previous mortgage deed of January 5, 1907, and wrongly narrates that the parties had been described in the earlier deed as " members of a joint Hindu trading family merchants carrying on business in co-partnership," whereas the actual description was only " merchants carrying on business in co-partnership." It is proved that by November 4, 1907, Krishna was already afflicted by the wasting disease from which lie died nine months later, and, though he may have been mentally unaffected, it is quite probable that he was not involved in the revisal of this particular deed. It may be further noticed that there is a subsequent mortgage deed of December 20, 1907, in which Govardan, Krishna and Gokul are described as the only surviving partners of the firm, and that, after Krishnas death, there is a series of plaints, in which the business was described as a partnership, and which were all amended a month after Govardans death so as to assert that it was a co-parcenary. If suspicion were a legitimate source of evidence, there is as much room for its consideration in these contemporaneous circumstances, as in the other circumstances to which the learned judges in the Courts below appear to have attached some importance. Their Lordships desire to observe that, in their opinion, such circumstances as the basis on which the appellants plaint was originally framed, or the absence of Gokul and Laldoss from the witness box, or the absence of the accounts from 1890 to 1893, there being no evidence of their being wilfully withheld, are insufficient to overcome the positive evidence afforded by the documents or to prove sufficiently any re-union prior to the death of Krishna. Their Lordships are of opinion that the respondents have failed to prove any such reunion, and that accordingly, at the time of Krishnas death, the business was a co-partnery, in which Krishna, Govardan and Gokul were partners. The appellant claims that Krishna then held a half share, Govardan and Gokul being each entitled to a one-fourth share. Their Lordships are of opinion that the respondents have failed to prove any such reunion, and that accordingly, at the time of Krishnas death, the business was a co-partnery, in which Krishna, Govardan and Gokul were partners. The appellant claims that Krishna then held a half share, Govardan and Gokul being each entitled to a one-fourth share. The respondents contended that, the presumption being for equality, Krishna was only entitled to a one-third share. Their Lordships are of opinion that the appellants view is the correct one. At the death of Murali in the previous year, Krishna became entitled to his share, and, in their Lordships opinion, the proper inference is that the surviving partners agreed that this share should be left in the business, thus giving Krishna a one-half interest in it. It follows that the appellant is entitled to call the surviving partner, Gokul, who also represents Govardan, the other partner who survived Krishna, to account for Krishnas one-half share as it stood at the latters death. In the present suit the appellant seeks to recover a one-half share of (inter alia) certain immovable properties which were owned by the partnership prior to Krishnas death. Certain of the respondents are secured creditors of Gokul, who hold one or more of these properties as part of their security. The other respondents are the official assignee of Gokuls estate and certain unsecured creditors of Gokul. The main question is whether the appellant is entitled to have his claim satisfied out of the assets of the dissolved partnership, including the immovable properties in suit in preference to the claims of any creditors, secured or unsecured, in respect of debts incurred by the firm long subsequent to the dissolution of the partnership by the death of his father Krishna, or whether his claim is merely that of a creditor on the insolvent estate of the firm. If the latter be held to be the correct view, the respondents further contended that the appellants claim fell to be postponed to the claims of the other creditors by virtue of s. 262 of the Indian Contract Act. There being no contract of partnership, the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, apply to this case without qualification, and the partnership was therefore dissolved by the death of Krishna (s. 253, sub-s. 10). There being no contract of partnership, the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, apply to this case without qualification, and the partnership was therefore dissolved by the death of Krishna (s. 253, sub-s. 10). Provision is made for the winding up of the business so dissolved by s. 263, which provides as follows —" After a dissolution of partnership, the rights and obligations of the partners continue in all things necessary for winding up the business of the partnership." In substance this is identical with s. 38 of the (English) Partnership Act of 1890. As regards the partnership property and its application, the following provisions of the Indian Act are material— " 253. (1.) All partners are joint owners of all property originally brought into the partnership stock, or bought with the money belonging to the partnership, or acquired for purposes of the partnership business. All such property is called partnership property. The share of each partner in the partnership property is the value of his original contribution, increased or diminished by his share of profit or loss. (2.) All partners are entitled to share equally in the profits of the partnership business, and must contribute equally towards the losses sustained by the partnership. 262. Where there are joint debts due from the partnership, and also separate debts due from any partner, the partnership property must be applied in the first instance in payment of the debts of the firm, and, if there is any surplus, then the share of each partner must be applied in payment of his separate debts, or paid to him. The separate property of any partner must be applied first in the payment of his separate debts, and the surplus (if any) in the payment of the debts of the firm." These provisions are among the rights and obligations which are continued after dissolution for the purposes of winding up by s. 263, and, in their Lordships opinion, there is no material difference between them and the provisions of ss. 24 and 39 of the English Act, except that s. 262 of the Indian Act is in more absolute terms than s. 39 of the English Act. The English authorities are fully and carefully reviewed by the learned trial judge, and, in their Lordships opinion, the principle laid down in them is equally applicable to the present case. 24 and 39 of the English Act, except that s. 262 of the Indian Act is in more absolute terms than s. 39 of the English Act. The English authorities are fully and carefully reviewed by the learned trial judge, and, in their Lordships opinion, the principle laid down in them is equally applicable to the present case. It is clear on these authorities that the right of the representatives of the deceased partner is one of property and does not rest merely on contract, and that the surviving partners, who have the right and duty to realize the partnership property, hold a fiduciary relationship towards the deceased partners representatives as regards his interest in the partnership property, though the latter have no such right in any individual asset of the partnership property as will entitle them to interfere with the surviving partners right to deal with and dispose of any such asset, for the purpose of realization. But it must be particularly noted that the surviving partners right of dealing with and disposing of such asset is limited to the purposes of realization. The most recent case on the nature of the relationship is Hugh Stevenson & Sons, Ld. v. Aktiengesellschaft fur Cartonnagen-Industrie. ([ 1918] A. C. 239.) It follows that the appellant is entitled to an accounting for the assets of the partnership property free from debts, secured or unsecured, incurred by the surviving partners or partner, except in so far as these were incurred for the purpose of winding up, or so far as the creditors bona fide and reasonably believed that they were so incurred. The case of In re Langmeads Trusts (20 Boav. 20.) is not inconsistent with this principle, for in that case the retiring partner had already received an amount representing his share of the partnership assets, and the only right left to him was a contractual right to have the debts of the dissolved firm paid out of the assets of the firm by his late partner, to whom he had assigned his interest in them. Though the creditor had notice of this arrangement it was held, in view of the lapse of six years, that he was entitled to assume that the firms debts had been already discharged. That case does not bear on the right of a deceased partners representative to have an account for such partners share. Though the creditor had notice of this arrangement it was held, in view of the lapse of six years, that he was entitled to assume that the firms debts had been already discharged. That case does not bear on the right of a deceased partners representative to have an account for such partners share. Both the Courts below have rightly regarded the case of In re Bourne ([ 1906] 2 Ch. 427.) as illustrating the application of the principle in circumstances most analogous to those affecting the secured creditors in the present case, and their Lordships agree with the view of that decision taken by the trial judge, but they are unable to accept the view expressed by the High Court. The principle is thus expressed in Bournes case by Romer L.J. ([ 1906] 2 Ch. 431, 432.) When a partner dies and the partnership comes to an end, it is not only the right, but the duty, of the surviving partner to realize the assets for the purpose of winding up the partnership affairs, including the payment of the partnership debts. It is true that in a general sense the executors or administrators of the deceased partner may be said to have a lien upon the partnership assets in respect of his interest in the partnership on taking the partnership account, but that lien is not one which affects each particular piece of property belonging to the partnership so as to affect that property in the hands of any person dealing with the surviving partner in good faith. It is really what one may call a general lien upon the surplus assets, and does not affect each particular property so as to interfere with the right of the surviving partner to deal with the separate properties belonging to the partnership for the purpose of realization and to give a good title to persons dealing in good faith with him in respect of those properties. The power of the surviving partner of course extends to a sale, and it also extends to giving a mortgage on any particular part of the property belonging to the partnership to secure in good faith one of the partnership debts. The power of the surviving partner of course extends to a sale, and it also extends to giving a mortgage on any particular part of the property belonging to the partnership to secure in good faith one of the partnership debts. That statement, in their Lordships opinion, rightly makes clear that the good faith must be good faith that the transaction is incident to, and for the purpose of, the winding up of the partnership business, and their Lordships are unable to agree with the wider meaning attributed to it by the High Court. In that case the bank was held entitled to retain the security for their account, which had been given to them by the surviving partner, on the ground that they were entitled to] consider the debt as a partnership debt. It was the continuation of a partnership account still under the partnership name. Romer L.J. says in Bournes case ([ 1906] 2 Ch. 427,433.) "When you find an account of that kind continued—and here it is only continued for something like nine months before the charge is given—the bankers, it appears to me, are entitled, in the absence of evidence showing the contrary, to assume and to be credited with the belief that the surviving partner is continuing it for the purpose of realization, and that sums paid into that account and sums drawn out of that account in the name of the partnership are paid in and drawn out for the purpose of the partnership." In the present case, as pointed out by the trial judge, the earliest debt, in respect of which any of the respondents hold the properties in security, was not incurred before 1919—eleven years after the dissolution of the firm—and the earliest of these securities was given in November, 1921. Further, these respondents admittedly dealt with Golkul as the manager of a joint Hindu family trading business. It is not possible for any of them, in that view, to suggest that they thought, and had reason to think, that Golkul was incurring the debt and giving the security as the surviving partner of a co-partnery engaged in winding up the business of a firm which had been dissolved in 1908. It is not possible for any of them, in that view, to suggest that they thought, and had reason to think, that Golkul was incurring the debt and giving the security as the surviving partner of a co-partnery engaged in winding up the business of a firm which had been dissolved in 1908. It followers that the appellant is entitled to have the properties in suit brought into account, free of incumbrances created subsequent to the dissolution of the partnership, along with the other assets of the firm. In this view, the respondents contention under s. 262 of the Contract Act does not arise. Reference should be made to an alternative ground on which the High Court were prepared to base their decision against the appellant—namely, that the Court was entitled, in the state of the evidence, to infer that, after the death of Krishna, the appellant, though a minor, was admitted to the benefits of the partnership in terms of s. 247 of the Indian Contract Act. Ramesam J. states " We must therefore infer in the absence of any member of the family giving us information on the point that the mother agreed and therefore the other partners admitted him to the benefits of the partnership at any rate." The respondents counsel was not prepared to support this ground. In their Lordships opinion, no such inference could legitimately be made from the absence of the appellants mother from the witness box. Such an act of admission to partnership must be proved, but, in the present case, the possibility of such an act of admission appears to be completely negatived by the evidence as to the joint family basis on which the business was carried on subsequent to the death of Krishna. On the whole matter their Lordships agree with the conclusions of Venkatasubba Rao J. the trial judge, and they will humbly advise His Majesty that the six decrees of the High Court, dated April 1, 1931, should be set aside, and that the six decrees of the High Court in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction which were thereby set aside should be restored. The appellant is entitled to his costs in these appeals, and also his costs of the appeals before the High Court in its civil appellate jurisdiction. Note—See now s. 47 of the Indian Partnership Act (IX. The appellant is entitled to his costs in these appeals, and also his costs of the appeals before the High Court in its civil appellate jurisdiction. Note—See now s. 47 of the Indian Partnership Act (IX. of 1932), closely following s. 38 of the English Partnership Act and not altering the substance of the law.—F. P.