JUDGMENT Lort-Williams, J. - This is an appeal against an order of Mr. Justice Roy in a suit which was instituted in April, 1933. The writ of summons was issued and lodged with the Sheriff at the beginning of May. Then the Petitioners, when trying to effect service, found that the partners had closed their business in Calcutta and had gone to their native village Kalakopa in the District of Dacca. Thereupon they made enquiries and found that the firm was a joint family firm, and that some of the members of the firm were minors. 2. That being the position, the attorney for the Petitioners came to the conclusion that to avoid any trouble that might arise owing to the rules about service of summons on the partners of a firm which has been dissolved, a much simpler and surer plan was to get an amendment of the plaint by adding all the members of the firm as individual Defendants in the suit and serving each of them. 3. This was done and the amendment was obtained on the 4th August, 1983. This accounts for the somewhat long period which elapsed between the two steps of the lodging of the writ of summons on the 3rd May and the amendment of the cause title on the 4th August. Except for that delay, so far as I can see from the dates which are set out at page 5 of the Paper-Book, the Petitioners had proceeded properly and diligently with the prosecution of the suit. But considerable time elapsed before the writ could be served upon all the parties, and eventually on the 16th February an order for extension of the returnable date of the writ had to be obtained, and on the 5th March the Petitioners attempted to serve the writ of summons by registered post upon a number of Defendants at their residence at Kalakopa in the District of Dacca. 4. The result of that delay was that on the 19th March notice was given, under Chap. X, r. 36 of the Original Side Rules, to the Petitioners that their suit would be placed on what is known as the 'Special List.' They got notice of this on the 20th March. 4. The result of that delay was that on the 19th March notice was given, under Chap. X, r. 36 of the Original Side Rules, to the Petitioners that their suit would be placed on what is known as the 'Special List.' They got notice of this on the 20th March. Their partner Balkissen, who knew all about the matter, was absent from Calcutta, with the result that they were not ready with an affidavit on the 22nd March, 1934 when the suit came before the learned Judge in the 'Special List' and was dismissed by him. After that and before the order of dismissal had been drawn up, the Petitioners gave notice that they would ask the Judge to set aside the order. 5. It has been argued that this was an application for review, and as the learned Judge refused that application for review, the Petitioners have no further remedy, because there is no appeal against such an order. In my opinion, this was not an application for review, which must be upon new facts discovered since the last hearing. 6. This was the sort of application which was referred to by Mr. Justice Buck-land in the case of Sarupchand Hukumchand v. Madhoram Raghumull 28 C. W. N. 755 (1924), a part of the head-note of which is as follows :-- The principle that where an order has not been perfected, the Judge has power to reconsider the matter, applies equally well to an order of dismissal for default under Chapter X, Rule 36 of the Rules of the High Court in its Original Jurisdiction. But the jurisdiction comes to an end once the order is completed. 7. In my opinion, the order made on the should be 3rd May, 1934.--Reporter 16th of April was the final order dismissing the suit and the Petitioner is entitled to appeal against that order. Further, I am of opinion that the learned Judge's order of dismissal, must be set aside. 8. It must be remembered that Rule 36 of Chapter X is a very drastic rule indeed. Further, I am of opinion that the learned Judge's order of dismissal, must be set aside. 8. It must be remembered that Rule 36 of Chapter X is a very drastic rule indeed. The Effect of it is, in certain circumstances, to deprive the Plaintiff of his right to sue in these Courts, and such deprivation can only be justified in a case in which it can be shown that serious and unjustified delays have been made on the part of the Plaintiff, and that what has happened comes strictly within the purview of Rule 36. 9. In circumstances such as are set out in the present case, I do not think it can be said that there has been such inordinate delay by the Plaintiff that he must be deprived of his right of suit. Further, in my opinion, on the 22nd March, 1934, when the suit was dismissed, he had not had time to produce an affidavit, and there ought to have been an adjournment of the matter until the next Special List in order to give him an opportunity of meeting the allegations made against him by the Defendant. 10. In these circumstances, this appeal must be allowed and the order of dismissal set aside. Costs both here and in the Court below will abide the event of the trial. Jack, J. I agree.