JUDGMENT Sulaiman, C.J. - This revision has been referred to a Division Bench by a learned Judge of this Court because of an apparent conflict between a ruling of this Court and that of the Calcutta High Court. 2. It appears that a money decree was obtained on 30th April, 1020, by Raghubir Prasad against Bachman Tewari, which was being executed for some years without complete satisfaction. On 13th November, 1928, Bachman Tewari died but apparently this fact was not then brought to the notice of the decree-holier who filed an application on 15th December, 1928. The Court below has treated this application as an application for execution, but in reality it was an application praying for the transfer for execution of the decree from the Court of the Judge, Small Causes, Gorakhpur, to the Deoria Munsafi on the ground that the judgment-debtor and his property were within the jurisdiction of that Munsfi. On 19th February, 1929, the Court transferred the execution of the decree to the Deoria Court. On 27th February, 1929, the deree-holder applied there for execution and notice was issued to the judgment-debtor which was returned unserved with the report that the judgment-debtor was dead. This report was put up before the Court on 19th April, 1929, and the Court ordered that the decree-holder should take necessary steps by the 29th. He failed to take any steps and the application for execution was dismissed on 29th April, 1929, and a certificate was sent to the Gorakhpur Court. Subsequently the decree-holder died and his widow did not file any application for execution till 11th March, 1932. This was against Bir Bhad araman and Chilanman, the sons of the deceased judgment-debtor. 3. The Court below has held that the application was barred by time because it was not made within three years of any application made in accordance with law or any proper step taken in aid of execution. 4. In the first place, we must point out that there has been a misapprehension in treating the application of 15th December, 1928, as an application for execution. As already noted it was an application praying that the execution of the decree be transferred to the Deoria Court. It was accordingly an application for taking a step in aid of execution and not an application for execution itself. 5. As already noted it was an application praying that the execution of the decree be transferred to the Deoria Court. It was accordingly an application for taking a step in aid of execution and not an application for execution itself. 5. Sir John Edge C.J., and Blair, J, in Madho Prasad v. Kesho Prasad (1897) 19 All. 337, held that applications for the execution of a deeree made after the death of the judgment-debtor and without either any representative of the judgment-debtor being brought upon the record or there being any subsisting attachment of the property against which execution is sought are not good applications for the purpose of saving limitation. The Calcutta High Court appears to have dissented from this ruling in Bipin Behari Mitter v. Bibi Zohra (1908) 35 Cal. 1047, following some earlier cases including a case of the Madras High Court. With great respect, we are unable to agree to the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court and we think that the ruling in Madho Prasad's case laid down the correct law. It is impossible to hold that if an application for execution is not an application in accordance with law, having been made against a person who is dead, it is nevertheless a good application to take some step in aid of execution against the deceased. There would be no object in drawing a distinction in Article 182 between an application made in accordance with law and taking steps in aid of execution, if the same application for execution while not fulfilling the first requirement were to be a good application for the second purpose. When a person is dead, proceedings for execution taken against him cannot be regarded as any valid proceedings at all. The taking of some step-in-aid of execution is obviously something different from the mere filing of an application for execution which in itself is not in accordance with law. 6. But in the present case we have already pointed out that the application of 15th December, 1928, was really not one for execution of the decree, but one for taking a step in aid of execution. Under Sections 38 and 39 of the Code of CPC Courts are empowered to send decrees for execution to other Courts. They may either proceed suo motu or proceed on the application made by the decree-holder. Under Sections 38 and 39 of the Code of CPC Courts are empowered to send decrees for execution to other Courts. They may either proceed suo motu or proceed on the application made by the decree-holder. These sections do not provide that notice must be given to the judgment. debtor before the order is made. Similarly there appears to be a clear distinction drawn in Order 21, between applications for transfer of execution of a decree dealt with in Rules 3 to 9 and applications for execution of decrees dealt with in Rule 10 and the following Rules. The first set of rules do not even lay down that the name of the judgment-debtor should be specified nor is it necessary that the mode of the execution should be specified. On the other hand, Rule 11 requires particulars to be supplied when an application for execution is made and they include the mode in which the assistance of the Court is required as well as the name of the person against whom execution of the decree is sought. The decree-holder in applying for the transfer of the decree to another Court was merely asking the Court to transfer the execution of the decree as it stood and which decree was not dead, simply because the judgment-debtor was dead. We are therefore of opinion that an application for the transfer of the execution of a decree made at a time when the judgment-debtor is dead is a valid application to take steps in aid of execution. It cannot be said that no proceeding taken when the judgment-debtor is dead can be such a valid step. We may give the instance of an application for substitution of names or heirs which is to be made after the death of the deceased judgment-debtor. 7. But even this aspect of the matter does not help the decree-holder. Time began to run from the date of the order made by the Court on 19th February, 1929, on the application for taking steps in aid of execution which had been hied on 15th December, 1928. More than three years expired before the present application was made, so this is of no avail to the decree-holder. 8. Time began to run from the date of the order made by the Court on 19th February, 1929, on the application for taking steps in aid of execution which had been hied on 15th December, 1928. More than three years expired before the present application was made, so this is of no avail to the decree-holder. 8. The application for execution made on 27th February, 1929, in the Deoria Court was undoubtedly an application for execution mace against a dead person, and was an our opinion not in accordance with law. Differing from the view taken in Calcutta and Madras and following the ruling of our own Court, we must hold that this application for execution which was not in accordance with law did not amount to an application for taking steps in aid of execution. Accordingly the decree-holder did not get a fresh start from 29th April, (929, when this application for execution was ultimately dismissed. The present application not being within three years of any order on any application in accordance with law for execution or on any valid application for taking step in aid of execution, is barred by time. 9. The application is accordingly dismissed with costs.