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1935 DIGILAW 108 (ALL)

Amba Datt Satti v. Secy. of State

1935-02-21

body1935
JUDGMENT 1. This is a defendants' appeal arising out of a suit brought by the Secretary of State through the Notified Area Committee, Ramnagar, against the defendants for ordering the latter to execute a lease for a period of 30 years, and in default to be ordered to be ejected. The plaintiff's case was that the land belonged to the Government as proprietor and that the defendants were tenants-at-will liable to be ejected at any time; that they were paying Rs. 124-5-8 per annum to the plaintiff as rent, and that they promised to execute the lease, but failed to carry out their promise which gave rise to the present action. 2. The defendants denied that they were tenants-at-will and pleaded that the land had been given to their ancestors permanently on 7th November 1862, and that acting upon the grant they have spent about Rs. 30,000 in improving the land, constructing boundary walls and building houses and planting groves, etc., and that the plaintiffs were estopped from maintaining the claim. They further pleaded that the defendants were not tenants-at-will, but were at least occupancy tenants of the land in question and were not liable to execute a lease for 30 years. The first Court dismissed the suit on certain other grounds, but on appeal issues were remitted for determination. Ultimately the lower appellate Court decided the claim holding that although the defendants held what was called a deed of tasallinama, dated 7th November 1862, apparently executed either by the Deputy Commissioner or some other person who was managing the Government estate at the time. Under that document the defendants' ancestors acquired only a monopoly of cultivation in the village provided that they cultivated the whole land available, and that the grant of rights of pukka asami under the document did not amount to anything more than that the grantee was to he a direct tenant of the Government, and that his rights were merely those of a tenant-at-will liable to ejectment at any time, and therefore bound to execute a lease if called upon. The learned Judge further found that the defendants and their predecessors had been in possession of this village for over 70 years and had colonised it and constructed houses of considerable value on the lands. The exact value of the constructions was in dispute and has not been found. 3. The learned Judge further found that the defendants and their predecessors had been in possession of this village for over 70 years and had colonised it and constructed houses of considerable value on the lands. The exact value of the constructions was in dispute and has not been found. 3. In appeal it is urged before us that the defendants have acquired rights of occupancy which are at least heritable. In the Courts below it does not appear to have been disputed that the officer who signed the tasallinama had authority on behalf of Government to make the grant. It is also clear that no question arose as to whether the Government had not the right to get the rent enhanced. The only question was whether under the terms of this deed the defendants were merely tenants-at-will or whether they had rights of occupancy in the lands. 4. We are of the opinion that on a proper construction of this document, the defendants cannot be treated merely as tenants-at-will liable to ejectment at any time. The document authorised the grantee to settle or "abad karo" all the lands that fell within certain specified boundaries and provided that the settling cultivator who brought the entire land under cultivation would be considered a full or permanent tenant, and that if he failed to settle all lands and it remained uncultivated or waste, the Government would have power to make over the village to somebody else for purposes of settlement; but that if he settled the whole, he would be entitled to it. The power to revoke the grant was reserved in case the grantee failed to bring the entire village under cultivation. There was no mention of a right of ejectment in any other contingency. Obviously the land was barred and uncultivated at the time and the idea was that it should be reclaimed and brought under cultivation by the grantee who would have to spend money on it and if he was successful in that way, he would be entitled to retain the land as pukka asami. The original grantee is dead and his successors have remained in possession without any objection and have been paying rent continuously. No rent was mentioned in the document itself, but the rent was assessed under some separate proceeding. The original grantee is dead and his successors have remained in possession without any objection and have been paying rent continuously. No rent was mentioned in the document itself, but the rent was assessed under some separate proceeding. As pointed out above, the defendants' liability to pay an enhanced rent has not been considered by the Court below and does not arise in this suit. The only question is whether the defendants are liable to ejectment. On a proper construction of the document which has been translated and placed before us, we are of the opinion that the defendants have heritable rights as tenants liable to pay rent, but not liable to ejectment at will. As the grant was given in 1862 long before the Tenancy Acts, came into existence, the defendants do not come under any of the categories of tenants mentioned there, and furthermore, the case would be governed by the Crown Grants Act (Act 15 of 1895), which is retrospective. We accordingly leave the question open whether the rent payable by the defendants can or cannot be enhanced, but we allow the appeal and setting aside the decree of the lower appellate Court restore the decree of the Court of first instance with costs in all Courts.